Evening Republican, Volume 21, Number 239, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 11 October 1918 — Zeebrugge Raid Told By Commanding Officer [ARTICLE]

Zeebrugge Raid Told By Commanding Officer

Superhuman Work in Face of Whirlwind of Fire and Heroic Attack of Storming Party Graphically Described—Block Ships Still in Position Sealing the Navigable Channel Into.Canals—Keyes in Charge.

London—An official interview with one of the commanding officers of the Zeebrugge raid gives for the first lime some Idea of the tremendous, intricate schemes that must be devised for modern naval operations, such as bottling up the Zeebrugge submarine While the name of the officer who gave the Interview may not be used, lor obvious reasons, the study was arranged with the permission of the first sea lord, Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, and through the courtesy of Sir Douglas Brownrigg, chief naval censor. The. spectacular story of the raid; the almost superhuman work done in the face of a whirlwind of fire, and the heroic attack of the storming party scrambling over the Mole were all placed by the British officer as mere incidentals In the tremendous assault that was determined upon. „ “The problem that lay before us,” be said, “was far bigger and greater than'the landing on the Mole, or any mere spectacular features. It was vastly different from merely sending one or more ships into a' harbor protected by shore batteries, because the channel to be blocked was natrow, and a ship or ships must be placed carefully to make the effort successful. Moreover, the waters through which the vessels must dash were under the protection of heavy guns ■which commanded the sea practically for 15 miles out from the coast. Dash Under Cover.

the attention of the Mole batteries before the block ships arrived in the vicinity, and In the latter case to keep them diverted until after the blocking ships had arrived at their destination. Use Special Storm Parties. “The German garrison In the Mole was believed to consist of about one thousand men. It was decided to storm the Mole with special storm parties immediately prior to the arrival of the blocking ships. The necessity of holding trfe Mole for a certain length of time would also provide opportunity to- carry out a certain amount of destructive work on the Mole. The possibility of re-enforcements coming from the shore end and preventing the storming party from attaining their object was to be countered by cutting the Mole off from shore by blowing up the railway viaduct. “The Mole is a mile and a half long and 80 yards wide. On the outer side It is flanked by a wall 30 feet high. Five feet below the top of this wall is a narrow gangway or parapet running the whole length Of the Mole, with an iron handrail on its inner side. From the parapet there IB a 16-foot drop to the Mole proper. The inner side of the Mole is fitted to allow ships berthing alongside; whereas it probably was never considered that any. ships would wish to berth along the other side. The ships carrying the storming party could not go along the inner side of the Mole without passing close to the Mole batteries, and thereby risking the.certainty of being sunk. “Therefore it was necessary for these vessels to be secured alongside the parapet of the Mole, and for the storm parties to climb over the 30-foot wall down to the parapet, and thence over the handrail and drop 16 feet to the Mole before they could attack the Mole batteries or carry out their destructive work. Went Like . Clock Work. “The operation went like clock work. The Vindictive, Iris and Daffodil proceeded alongside the Mole in spite of a heavy fire from the Mole batteries. The arrival was at one minute past midnight, April 22-23, and the storm party disembarked on the Mole immediately. The Daffodil, pushing the Vindictive alongside the Mole, enabled this to be done. Because of the roughness of the sea the Iris had difficulty in securing to the wall, and finally went alongside the Vindictive with the intention of disembarking her men over that ship. “The Germans appear to have been taken completely by surprise. Immediately that they had heard the approach of the vessels they fired many hundreds of star shells. But the smoke screens prevented the enemy from discerning the nature of the attack until it was too late. An old submarine, fitted with explosives, had run into and secured herself under the viaduct, and had been blown up after the crew had escaped in a small dinghy. This terrific explosion in their rear, the attack of the storm party in their midst, and the general confusion which must have reigned amongst, them, were probably the cause of the Germans not noticing the approach of the block ships. These latter passed close around the end of the Mole and made direct for the canal entrance. The leading ship, H. M. S. Thetis, was heavily engaged by the shore batteries, but although in a sinking condition managed to direct the other two vessels toward their destination. The Thetis herself struggled on, and finally sank very close off the canal entrance and right across the fairway. The Intrepid and the Iphegenla proceeded into the canal entrance and sank in the positions ordered by blowing out their bottoms by mines especially placed for the purpose. Motor launches had followed in after the.three blocking ships and under terrific fire from almost point blank range they went around the Sunken vessels and took off the crews. This rescue work was so magnificently car-, ried out that practically none of the

“This meant that the vessels, with the block ships, must arrange their <tash under cover for 15 miles. And then, having run the coast batteries, they must run close to a heavy battery on the Mole, located practically a mile out In the harbor, and which could fire practically point blank at the vessels. And then, of course, also under cover of the near shore batteries of the Mole and the heavier coast batteries, making another run of 15 miles. The German mine fields also had to be encountered. “Various elepaents had to be taken into consideration. Naturally the cash must be made at high tide. There was only one way in whlch.we could hope to protect the vessels If the raid were made by daylight, and that was a smoke screen. But airplanes, scouting above, would lay a lleet open to observation and to practically- the same attack by indirect fire as on land. So the dash had to be made at night, and on such a night ws the tide would be high at about inldnight, for the ships must go in, do their destruction, and then come cut again before the shore batteries would have the daylight to help them. “There were something like 150 jruns on the shore commanding the 15mlle radius. If these discovered the vessels none of the ships could have lived through the falling shells. As the batteries all had the use of searchlights and star shells it became necessary to take measures to prevent the ships being seen by any •method of illumination until the last moment. That necessitated the use cf smoke screens. A smoke screen is very little use unless It approaches with you; thus you must always have the wind blowing In your direction of advance. In our case It was from the north. The use of any craft to make smoke would not be of much avail unless they could approach the coast making smoke to the last mlfiute. This necessitated light draft vessels, and they In turn required calm weather. Details to Be Worked Out. “So the conditions necessary demanded high water occurring at a particular period of the night, wind blowing directly Into the harbor, calm weather and, of course, no fog, for the latter would prevent the blocking ships from finding the coast. “Having attained these, there still were other matters to be worked out. For the blocking ships to find their destination It was quite obvious that they must be able to see for a certain distance, say for a. mile or two at least. And this means that the moment the entrance to the canal was In the same area of clear atmosphere with the blocking ships, namely, during the final run In, the shore batteries on the coast line also would be i!n the clear weather and able to concentrate on the blocking ships, much lc their detriment. ‘•This applied both to Zeebrugge and Ostend, where the German batteries are on the actual coast line. Hut at z Zeebrugge there was the additional obstruction which Is absent at Ostend—the Mole. “The Mole at Zeebrugge extends rather more than three-quarters of a mile from the entrance of the canal, • and the outer end of the Mole had been turned into a veritable fortress. The position of the navigable channel leading to the canal entrance was such that the ships were forced to pass dose to the batteries on the Mole, and it was too much to hope that they would be able to do this and pass Inside these batteries and then meet the fun blast of the shore batteries without being teunk before reaching the canal. It therefore became clear that it would be necessary either to destroy or to divert

crews of the three block ships were lost. Still in Position. “All three block ships are still in position, after three and a half months, and the navigable channel into the canals remains sealed. The difficulty of placing a ship across the channel in broad daylight and without opposition is considerable, so how the commanding officers of these ships managed to sink them so successfully almost passes comprehension. “The escape of the officers and men from the wrecks was well carried out. The Intrepid alone carried nearly 90 men and not a single man fell into German hands, although, as has been said before, this blocking operation took place very nearly one mile inside the batteries of the Mole, and two of the block ships were actually inside the shore line. 1 “When it was considered that sufficient time had elapsed for the blocking ships to do their work and for the crews to be rescued the order was given to the storming parties to retire from the Mole. Whilst the Vindictive and her consorts were actually alongside they were comparatively safe from fire except in the case of the upper works which rose above the Mole. The big funnels and mast of the Vindictive had been riddled through and through, and many casualties were caused by flying splinters. As soon as the order to retire was given the storm parties re-embarked. Some had been killed, several severely wounded, an<j yet out of about four hundred men who had stormed the Mole less - than a’ score were left behind, in spite of the 16foot climb up the ladder onto the parapet.

“There must have been many acts of great gallantry to enable men who could not walk to be carried back on board amidst heavy fire of the light guns on the Mole and shell fire from the shore batteries, which had commenced to shell their own Mole as Boon as they discovered it was in our possession. Small Craft Take Part “It was fully realized that immediately the ships shoved off the Mole they would come under the concentrated fire of every battery that could bear. H. M. S. Iris, on leaving the Vindictive, was severely hit and suffered many casualties, but- the Vindictive herself and the Daffodil bore charmed lives. All three ships retired to the northward whilst emitting smoke cloudis to cover their retreat. “In addition to the vessels already mentioned, a large number of small craft took part in the operation, and it can safely be said that any failure on the part of a single unit might have prevented the success of the whole expedition. Small motor boats steamed up and down close off the shore batteries, as it were, treating the latter with utter contempt. Destroyers supported the Small craft, bombarded the enemy batteries and assisted in rescue work with equal contempt of danger. “Vice Admiral Keyes directed the whole operation, which had been prepared under his own supervision, from H. M. S. Warwick, and did not leave the scene of operations until the last of the blocking ships’ crews had been recovered. The spirit and determination with which he had imbued all his officers and men and his great quality of leadership made success as near a certainty as possibly could be done. “Every officer and man who took part in this operation consequently had put to sea with absolute confidence that success would be attained. A complete success was attained, and more complete was it than could ever have been hoped when the undertaking first came up for consideration.”