Evening Republican, Volume 21, Number 211, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 14 September 1918 — Great Merchant Marine in the Making [ARTICLE+ILLUSTRATION]

Great Merchant Marine in the Making

S Naval Overseas Service Will Provide Crews For Hundreds of American Ships After the War 12 oil tankers in the autumn rof 1917 to a fleet of more than 150 cargo ships of all kinds in July, 1918, This emphasizes the marvelous growth of the naval overseas _ ■ transportation service In less than TSSSST one year. gsgggas From a fleet of more than 100 cargo ships of all kinds in July, 1918, to a vast armada of 1,500 in July, 1919- 'This epitomizes the predicted growth ’in the service in coming year. From a vast armada of 1,500 ships of all kinds in July, 1919, to the world’s greatest merchant marine for aU time to come. This epitomizes the •devout hope of'every man in the transportation service. . The naval overseas transportation service is an outgrowth of the recruiting for class No. 3j>f the naval reserve. It developed early in the autumn Of last year when the urgent need for military supplies Impressed the navy department with the necessity of giving separate entity -to the operation of cargo ships. There now are 1,700 officers and 11,000 men in this branch of the navy’s service. A commander of the navy is supervisor of the entire naval overseas transportation service, with headquarters at Washington. The New York division is under the supervision of a naval lieutenant. . ■ The great conflict raging In Europe has been described as a war of transportation. It is-gen-erally conceded that the war cannot be won without the American army. But the American at home is more than 3,000 miles from the front, The problem of winning the war resolves itself, therefore, into one of transportation, To remedy the weak points in this means of communication the navy overseas transportation service was established. Thus far from a small beginning it has overcome what for awhile appeared to be insurmountable obstacles, and it is doing a work that for importance and efficiency is second to none in the army or navy. For every man that the United .States sends, to the front about four deadweight tons of shipping must be set aside lo maintain him. To send him across without thus providing for his existence would be nothing short of a crime. It is the duty of the navy overseas transportation service to see that there is an incessant flow of supplies to that man. Any Interruption through lack of shipping or men to man ships would be disastrous. Besides supplying the troops at the front, It is the duty of the transportation service to fetch necessities to the United States from other countries. < Navy vessels are used to bring hemp, nitrates, manganese and chrome. Coal is transported to Important manufacturing points in New England to relieve railroad congestion. American destroyers running about at high speed in European waters are in constant need of fuel oil, which must be supplied by the transportation service from the oil fields of the United States or Mexico. All other sources of supply are controlled by Germany. . Already the United States has in Europe more than 1,000,000 mep. By the end of next year there probably will be 3,000,000 men on the other aide. Tills, reckoning four deadweight tons for each man, will mean that America will have to provide 12,000,000 tons of shipping to supply these men. Charles M. Schwab, director of the shipping board, has said that he is golng to build 10,000,000 deadweight tons of ships in the coming year. The aim of the transportation service is to be ready to man and operate all or any of the new whips. If the service can have the necessary advance notice as to personnel requirements there need be no hitch from this standpoint In the number of troops sent over. They will be amply provided for after they arrive and they wIU be brought back home at the close of the war. ' The question of manning this enormous array of ships seems to be about solved by Edward H. ’Hurley, Chairman of the shipping board, who is reported to have requested the secretary of the navy to begin at once the training of 22,000 officers and 200,000 men to man the merchant marine. ' It thus appears as if the navy may be asked to man not only the war-zbne ships, but those plying among American seaports and to North and South American ports. Naval officers would not be surprised If it should mean eventually the manning by the navy of coal barges and towboats. : About 100 companies owned the American merchant marine at the time the United States en- ■ tered the war. Enormous profits were made In v the transportation of essentials by water. Any old tub that would float was worth almost her weight In gold. Many abandoned ships were repaired and put into service. Some were raised from the ocean, where they had lain for years, and were rebuilt Coastwise steamships were put Into ocean Service. Schooners and off-shore barges took the place of the coastwise vessels. America had at the beginning of the war about ’ 3,000,000 deadweight tons of shipping. Only 70 per cent 'of this was available for ocean travel. In addition to any submarine losses America may suffer she will have to provide perhaps 12,000,000 tons to supply the troops.<overseas and

about 3,000,000 tops fol -coastwise, West Indian and South American trade. The navy overseas transportation service started operations last autumn. Its first act was to take over 12 oil tankers to supply ships with fuel oil. In the emergency it was necessary hurriedly to commission the skippers who had been running ships under civilian auspices, put them into lieutenant commanders’ uniforms and send them on their way with a book of navy regular tlons. It is not strange that in the circumstances the average new reserve officer was more or less “in the air.” The service, starting in New York and Norfolk, was extended to Philadelphia, It now Is expected that 80 additional offices will soon be opened, Including those on the other side of the Atlantic. The navy overseas transportation service must not only operate its ships, but it must see that they are operated at their maximum efficiency. They must be loaded in record time. They 'must carry record cargoes. They must go across in record time. They must arrive on the other side in safety. The sinking of one ship would mean not only the loss of the cargo she was carrying at the time, but of all other cargoes that she might have been called upon to carry on other trips. Officers of the service figure that if by improved efficiency in the engine room they can run ten ships across the ocean at one knot better speed than that at which Inferior engine-room crews would put them over, one ship has been created. In like manner, if they can put an additional 10 per cent of cargo on each of the ten ships an additional ship has been created. The transportation officers figure also that night and day a ship costs about SIOO an hour. In other words, every hour saved to a ship is SIOO gained.-A battle may be lost to the allies through the sinking of a cargo ship. In the matter of defense of cargo ships at sea the service places particular stress upon these four elements: A sharp lookout, ability to maneuver, speed and guns. “Expectation of life” is increased 300 per cent by guns on merchantmen. They force the submarine to operate under the surface of the water, where its speed Is slower and Its deck guns are useless. The situation today in New York and the other ports of embarkation in regard to the operation of ships is more or less complicated. Not the navy alone is operating ships, but the shipping board, the quartermaster’s department ’ and the navy supply department. Besides this, the shipping bokrd assigns' ships to private owners to operate, and certain ships manned by the navy are assigned to private owners. The general opinion with regard to these ship's seems to be that, under current labor conditions, navy recruiting offers the best means and the only real guarantee for manning most of the great new fleet of cargo ships under construction. There has been a disposition in- certain quarters to belittle the cargo-ship service. The notion prevails that there is no romance in some of the old tramp ships being used in this service. In answer it is shown by the men in the service that it is not only the most useful but the most interesting service in the war. Outside of the destroyers, the men-o’-war carrying freight probably will be the only warships that will see active service in this combat. -As a clinching argument, this service is about the only one that is constructive and not destructive. It is laying the foundation for a great American merchant marine after the war. That America did not have an immense merchant marine at the outbreak of the war was due to several causes. Confederate raiders dealt it a severe blow. Metal ships and the development of railroads followed. Then came the blocking i> congress of all legislation for -such a merchant marine. The La Follette act was the blow that killed the project The transportation pressure due to America’s entry into the war brought the realization of the inadequacy of the number of American officers in the merchant marine. As the first step toward supplying the deficiency, a great school was established at Pelham Bay for the training of deck officers. In addition to the valuable nucleus of young officers already given to the* naval reserve from this school, accommodations have been provided on a greatly enlarged-scale for thousands more. Here the men take two months' intensive practical and theoretical training, followed by two months of real experience at sea. The cadets

get a taste of the real sea aboard more than 100 coastwise steamships. Engineer officers are trained at the Stevebs Institute of Technology in Hoboken, where men with M. E. degree or its equivalent receive Intensive training in marine engineering. Thousands of men are being trained for the naval auxiliary reserve at the Great Lakes (III.) station. . . / All 'men turned out by these schools are as much a part of the navy as if they had been graduated from Annapolis. All of these future officers are American citizens and will form the natural nucleus of a great merchant marine. All navy crews on merchant ships for the duration of the war were advocated by the navy early in the conflict. It was the belief that all such ships should be placed under the strictest discipline; that with permanent crews, efficiency aboard ship would be increased; that the ships . would be self-sustaining, in that the crew would be able to make all repairs; that the loading and unloading could be more efficiently done, and that several hundred thousand Americans would join the service, where it was believed they would remain after the war. It was the idea of the service that by tills means the love of the sea would be planted again in the American heart. Men who once, had a sniff of the salt air would probably nevqr be satisfied to go back to the cities or farms. They would Xorrn the nucleus of a 100 per cent merchant marine. In the beginning nobody wanted a governmentcontrolled cargo service. Steamship owners feared it meant federal control. The navy, had only about 2,600 officers and most of these were needed to aid the 20,000 reserve force to break in the 200,000 new enlisted men. Gradually, as has been stated, the manning and operation of the merchant ships devolved upon the navy and the overseas transportation service was organized to handle it. In some quarters it is believed that the entire work of manning and operating cargo ships should be turned over to the navy. Danger of strikes among civilian crews Is feared. Ships carrying cargo in time of Should not, it is thought, be- rated as private property of any -Individual or company. They must not be in the hands of men who are working for money only. Illiterate men, anarchists, socialists and the dlsloyal may become members of mercantile crews, whereas only men who are intelligent and physic--ally fit may become soldiers or seamen of the nation. Soldiers work for S3O a month and the sense of duty alone. Merchant seamen receive today S9O a month or more and extra pay for overtime and Sundays, and they are not under any obligation to remain at sea." At the outbreak of the war there were 5,000 Germans in the American merchant marine. Sixty per cent of the members of the Seamen’s union are said to be foreigners. As the service was run under antewar conditions it was impossible to hire Americans and the class of foreigners who would work on these ships was largely undesirable. Strikes are said to be likely at any time aboard ships manned by foreign laborers. An Incident is cited in which the crew of a freighter, bound to Europe with a cargo of essentials for our soldiers, refused to obey the commander’s order to assist in getting up ammunition when submarines were reported ahead, on the ground that it was Sunday, and the La Follette law provided only for watch duty on Sunday. On another occasion a civilian -crew demanded overtime for performing on Sunday a certain duty provided by law. Civilian sailors of cargo ships have been caught "in the act of signaling to enemy submarines, and fireroom forces have bolted for the deck upon the sounding of an alarm of Ships manned with naval officers and crews are safe from strikes and mutiny. Efficiency and competent operation are certain. On two or three occasions civilian crews that have struck'have been Instantly supplanted by navy men and the ship carried through with its precious cargo for the American men at the front. . Some students of naval strategy are of the opinion that a great part of the United States navy might be sunk without to any great- extent affecting the result of the war, but if the cargo ships do not get across the war is lost to the allies. . v