Evening Republican, Volume 21, Number 159, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 16 July 1918 — CAN WIN THE WAN ONLY BY FIGHTING [ARTICLE]

CAN WIN THE WAN ONLY BY FIGHTING

Germany’s Nor Allies’ Food Shortage Is Considered. ZONES OF WAR PREPARATION First Step Is Actual Military Mobilization; Second, Establishing War Industries; Third, increase In Human Energy. By JAMES H. COLLINS. (From the Committee on Public Information, Washington, D. C.) A traveler recently out of Germany told of an experience in a German city of 17,000 population. This city had left, for treatment of civilians, one physician and one surgeon, all other medical men having been drawn into the army. “How do you manage to attend all the sick?” asked the traveler of the physician. "I simplify by paying no attention to people over fifty-five years of age,” was the doctor’s answer. Which is to say, that Germans past this age, being of ho military use to the state, and of probably the least economic use, are automatically set aside, and in sickness, take their own chances of recovery or death. This story was told to Dr. Alonzo Taylor of the United States food administration and department of agriculture. Doctor Taylor was attached to the United States embassy at Berlin during most of 1916, and under Ambassador Gerard had neutral inspections of German prison camps in charge. Herbert Hoover has said that Doctor Taylor’s scientific knowledge of dietetics, and his practical grasp of war food problems, is wider than that of any other person he knows, and behind this technical knowledge is a thorough acquaintance with the German state and the German people, as well as the food problem of the central powers and the allied nations. Last autumn Doctor Taylor was a member of the American commission sent abroad to further our co-operation in the war, and deal particularly with the problem of food. The point of the story above Is the different interpretations that may be put upon it. Regarded simply as another Interesting insight into the deprivation which is now believed to prevail in Germany, it would be taken by the average American newspaper reader as one more indication that Germany is desperately pressed for every necessity of life and that this internal SltUatlcm must soon cause her to “crack.”

But Doctor Taylor looks at it in an entirely different way. Fifty-Five the Dead Line. “That story simply Indicates how far the Germans are willing to go to win,” he says. “If It is necessary to abandon all that part of the German population above fifty-five years of age, they Intend to do it. They are willing to take other measures as coldly practical as that to pull through. So far as hunger, suffering, death, and toll are concerned, these cannot safely be regarded as factors In Germany’s defeat. She has pulled through before, and will pull through again. The only way to defeat Germany, In my opinion, is by a straight military decision on the western front" . / Since the second year of the war, accounts of German food shortage have been staple reading in the American and English newspapers. These have been based upon German rationing regulations, articles in the German press dealing with food shortage, information brought out of Germany by travelers, and other data. The subject is one that has been carefully studied by trustworthy Investigators in great detail. Much of the information obtained has undoubtedly been sound, yet Doctor Taylor regards most published accounts of German hunger as mischievous, if not as deliberate enemy propaganda. Largely through his Investigations the United States food administration has adopted the policy of discountenancing reports of German hunger. “The Germans are unquestionably on very short rations,” he adds, “but I know the German mind, the German state, the German press. The obedience of the German mind to the German state and the latter’s control of the German press are so complete that even admitting German food shortage to be as grave as reports indicate, all published information on this subject coming out of Germany is still artfully colored for military ends. That must never be lost sight of. Germany will unquestionably have a hard pinch in food this summer, but, she is going to pull through again so far as food is concerned, and all plans based upon that as a factor in the military situation rest on an unsound basis. The Germans are suffering. No matter —in the winning of this war we cannot afford to give any tin ught whatever to their suffering from hunger—their submarines give none to the sufferings of our allies. —— Must Win by Fighting. When we ourselves entered the war a year ago, German food shortage was accepted as one of the apparent factors which would help us win. Twelve months' experience has brought an awakening to the American people. We now know that allied countries are hard pressed for food. We have In our own country the reflex of the

allies’ food zaeds. Bve*ks last fall la Italy, and the past winter In Russia, make it clearer than ever that this war is to be won by fighting alone' (military, economic and. Industrial), and that consideration of the German food situation and other factors than the military one is short-sighted, dangerous, and may lay the basis .for prolongation of the war. One nation from the first has given no consideration whatever to German hunger as a war factor. That nation is France. The clear, scientific French mind has studied and accurately tabulated real military factors of Germany’s strength, such as man power; but German-made propaganda based on food shortage .has gained no circulation or credence in the French press or among the French people. France has lived side by side with the Boche, fought him In the past, and borne the brunt of his invasion in this war. He has been able at times to overcome her by military strength, but he has never overcome her by propaganda. "In another way France stands alone as a warring nation,” says Doctor Taylor—«the immediateness and completeness of her mobilization for war from the first days of August, 1914.” To make this clear, he divides war preparations into three zones. The first zone is that of actual military mobilization, and operations involving the raising of armies, the dispatch of fleets, and the making of war paraphernalia. The second zone Is one entered by a nation when it begins to divert its civilian industries to war industries, a transformation that is absolutely necessary in modern war, and which can only end when every Industry has been reshaped to military purposes. The third zone is entered when a nation, having seen the necessity for militarization of industries, and met it, recognizes that even this is not sufficient, but that every man, woman and child outside the fightiqg force muse put forth from 25 to 50 per cent more effort and energy than in peace times. The mechanic must produce that much more work, either by intelligent speeding up or longer hours; the farmer must plant that much more, th? merchant must eliminate luxury articles in his stock and serve his customers with fewer clerks, and all classes of the population must save for war purposes, not merely money but materials, food, effort, recreation. France Knew What to Do. It took England over a year to enter the second zone and a year more to enter the third. Italy required as long to enter the second zone. Russia only succeeded In partially entering the second zone —and that shortcoming, together with neglect of food management, probably did as much as German propaganda to undermine her military establishment. But France, who knew the Boche and had lived for more than a generation never losing sight for a day of the fact that ultimately- she would have to resist him again, entered all three zones of war preparation on the day that Germany invaded. Her armies marched to the front. Her factories, railroads, and farms were instantly turned over to war purposes. Her women took their men’s places to carry on the work of producing military supplies, food, and other war necessities. Luxury and pleasure disappeared, to be replaced by industry, and industry itself was Increased by concentrated effort. The United States has occupied efficiently the first zone of war preparation, and competent observers from abroad, who have seen other nations like our own mobilize, say that we are ’’making satisfactory progress in entering the second zone, where industries must be diverted from peace to war needs. We have not yet entered the third zone, and from the viewpoint of a long war, to be won by straight military decision, involving the orderly carrying out of a program of vast magnitude, it is perhaps well that we have not yet pressed on into this third zone of increased industry. For obviously, until the second zone has been entered and put in order to some extent, the increased activity required by a nation that has entered the final zone of war preparation might cause confusion and wasted effort.

Speed Up to Win. Wars are fought, won, and paid for out of increased production, coupled with savings. During the past year the American people have set a new record in their subscription to government loans. As a nation, however, we are still more or less under the impression that money saving alone suffices. That is not enough. A mail who in normal times would be justified in buying three hats each year will in wartimes probably have to get along with two. The hat maker will manufacture the three hats just the same, but one of them will be sent to South America In exchange for rubber with which to make army truck tires, or nitrate to make high explosives. The whole basis of foreign trade Is rearranged to give other countries things which we can make that are unobtainable from the countries with which they formerly traded, so that we may import in return raw materials vitally necessary for war. The demands of the army and navy for weapons, clothing, food, and every sort of supplies, coupled with destruction and shortage of wool, cotton, metals, chemicals, and other raw materials, necessitate a careful rearrangement of personal and individual consumption and a speeding up of production. England has been most efficient in working these transformations. And today all her production, < 'strlbutlon, and consumption are absolutely on tha war basis. \ x ;