Evening Republican, Volume 21, Number 252, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 8 November 1917 — WAY JAPAN DIRELY SEEDS AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP [ARTICLE+ILLUSTRATION]

WAY JAPAN DIRELY SEEDS AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP

The Oriental Empire has incurred the enmity of Germany, is not in harmony with aims of revolutionary Russia, is• under suspicion of England and France for unfair activities in China::Mikado's people now turn to Uncle Sam for comfort and influence at IF\mid Court

By WILMOT LEWIS, in New York World.

Mr. Lewis, editor and wnr correspondent, has spent twenty years of his life in the service of Far Kastern journalism. He reported the Boxer uprising and the HussoJapanese War. He has written for or helped edit most of the important publications of v the treaty ports, including the North Chinn Daily Sews. For six years past he has been editor of the Manila Times, the leading daily of the Philippines. Mr. Lewis speaks both Chinese and Japanese, and.-through his long experience has mastered the intricacies of Oriental politics.

HERE may be five or there may be ■I twenty good reasons for the disPa ' Patch of Japanese missions to the Sg United States at this time. Each I and °f ie ® ve or the twenty 1 have I gmssed. and_.have, in tact, been publicly discussed. But ) behind the five—or the twenty— JuTjcAj there Is one reason big enough to swallow all the rest, and it has not been mentioned at all.

Japan comes seeking the friendship of the United States because she has not another friend in all the world, because she occupies a position of cruel and dangerous isolation. Her statesmen, when they look forward to that day of the congress of nations which shall remake a tortured world, know that as things stand now they will find at the council board suspicion where they desire sympathy. They know that there is none to whom they can turn with any comfortable certainty of support —unless it be America- Gan they win the friendship of America, a friendship based on mutual trust and liking? Only such a friendship will avail them. Official Records Ignore Isolation. The story of the isolation of Japan, of the paradox of the member of the great alliance against the central powers who is without a friend, is not to be found in official documents, but its truth is nevertheless indisputable. When war came, three years ago, the statesmen of Japan believed that Germany would be defeated in six months. In other words, they “played” the allies to win, and win quickly, and they acted accordingly. They demanded the evacuation of Shantung by Germany, they invested and took Kiaochau, and they made naval dispositions in the waters of the far East which were of undoubted assistance to the British admiralty. The aggregate effort involved was relatively small, but it ranged Japan, as her statesmen thought, on the winning side, and they felt they could afford indifference to the bitterness and the hostility thus caused in Germany.

Japan’s Early Part in the War. Then, as the months went by, with their everrecurring stories of German success on land, the statesmen of Japan were haunted by the fear that they had hacked the wrong horse. Little by little, therefore, they allowed the ardor of their championship of the allied cause to weaken. The government of Japan did not move as much as its little finger when a powerful section of the press over which it exercises complete control became openly contemptuous of the chances of Entente victory, when the attacks upon Great Britain grew daily in volume and bitterness, when the AngloJapanese was flouted and a strong pro-German tone became everywhere apparent. Nor did the government of Japan associate itself —save in a tardy and lukewarm way—with the commercial measures against Germany which the allies concerted and carried out. Japan in those days offered the extraordinary spectacle of a country at -war with Germany, but notably pro-German in feeling. Small wonder that, as this condition of affairs and its inner meaning came home to Great Britain and France, they grew suspicious and resentful. Developments outside Japan were not of a sort to allay this suspicion and resentment. In Kiadchau and throughout Shantung it soon became clear that Japan intended a long stay, and proposed also-that much more than the lion’s share of the benefit of that stay should accrue to her. The British and the French found a hundred little hindrances there—nothing large enough in any single instance to make dignified complaint possible, but enough aIL told to exert a verypowerful effect. In China generally, the allies of Japan had to realize that their preoccupation with the conduct of the war furnished a.n opportunity which Japan promptly and very cynically took. Japanese aggression became more marked than ever. denfands upon poor, disrupted China were unending. The nations of Europe, and with them the United States, could see nothing in this but a desire on the part of Japan to make profit out of the embarrassments of others—a selfish and unjust said the embittered critics. The statesmen of Japan were indifferent to this., criticism. They saw German victory approaching, and they were strengthening themselves against that day. For they had another card un their sleeve. They had before them the possibility-—indeed, it was at one time a prdbability—that a separate peace would be concluded between Germany and Russia, and that immediately thereafter a Ger-man-Russian-Japanese alliance would be concluded, a pact between countries contiguous in territory, a plunderbund to be conducted on the. autocratic principle to which all were loyal. Machiavellianism Astray. ’ And the months wore on, however, and 1916 drew to a dose; this faith in full German victory weak-, ened. The strategy of the allies was increasingly coherent and effective, the Britain they had condemned was making a gigantic effort and was achieving an unexpected and admirable national efficiency, and there was anxiety in the councils of They had antagonized Germany, they had

—fallen deep into- t he- bad graces -of England andFrance.’ Remained only the possibility of that alliance with Germany and Russia which was splendidly to rehabilitate their international position. And then two events of extraordinary import played havoc with their plans, knocked out the supports of the structure they had been building. Russia flamed up into revolution, and the world heard of the sequestration of the czar and the downfall of his vicious and reactionary grand ducal circle. Where now was the plunderbund? A liberalized Russia, it was true, might make a separate peace with Germany, but it would never lend itself to the aggressive schemes so dear to the hearts, and so profitable to the pockets, of autocracies. Looking Toward Peace. Second, the United States severed relations with Germany, and then, in quick succession, declared war, passed a conscription law, made huge appropriations and set seriously about the business of building up an army and a navy commensurate with its size and importance. If any hope of German victory, and of a final rapproachrnent between Germany and Jhpan had been left to the calculating statesmen of the mikado, it went glimmering when the United States ranged itself on the side of Germany’s enemies. They looked forward to the day of peace, but now they know it could never be a day of Teuton triumph. They asked themselves what position Japan would find at the council board of the nations. She had-profited from the war, she is not so poor as she has been, and yet she is still a poor nation. The swift growth of her teeming population means a cry for room, more room. Where? In China, of course. Yet experience has shown that the Individual Japanese laborer cannot compete on equal terms with the Chinese. If the government of Japan is allowed its way in China this condition can be remedied —and it must be, say the Japanese, for the alternative is revolution at home at some time j.n the future. In this perplexity, where was Japan to turn? She has turned to the United States. Can her mission persuade America that Japanese, intentions in China are not selfish or imperialistic? Can the Washington government be brought to see the dire need for a certain freedom of Japanese action in China? Finally, can Japan look forward, on that day of the great peace conference, to finding at least one powerful and sympathetic friend? If not, the outlook is dark indeed. First and foremost, then, above and beyond all, the mission from Japan to America comes in quest of friendship. Japan needs the sympathy and the support of the United States more today than she needs anything in the world. And she should have friendship—if she shows by acts which support her words that she realizes and will live up to the obligations of that friendship. These obligations are incompatible with the carrying out of purely imperialistic designs in China, with deliberate and selfish aggressiveness, with the patent illiberality of her designs in the far East. In short, Japan must mend her ways if she is to hope for American sympathy and support. Her Interest in China. There is no reason why the peculiar situation of Japan in relation to China should not be admitted by Washington.. There is no reason why Japan should not find the outlet she so sbrely needs to effect her economic salvation, and at the same time bring immense benefit to China. All this can be done honestly, frankly, in fair and open competition with the other nations of the world, for Japan has tremendous advantages in her geographical position, to say nothing of a common script and of a hundred minor matters. But she cannot expect the United States to help her if she seeks salvation by means, of aggression and intimidation, and she cannot expect the United States to stand tamely by and see these methods used. K For sixteen years Atnerlca has been the champion of the policy of the open door, which seeks to secure equality of opportunity in China’s markets to all nations. Yet it is curious that, in what-

ever part of-China the Japanese exert political control or influence, there does American and European trade diminish and disappear, while that of Japan swells amazingly. May not those be. pardoned who assert that Japan’s oft-declared loyalty to the policy of the open door is mere lipservice? For sixteen years the United States has stood behind the pledge that China’s integrity should be maintained, and Japan has fervently protested her agreement. Yet he would be blind or a fool who should deny that for a quarter of a century past Japan has in effect aimed at nothing less than complete military, police and political control over China. Much to Correct In Policy. These principles of the open door and the integrity of China were propounded by John Hay in 1899 and 1900, respectively, and they are still the leading motives of American policy in the Far East. Their maintenance has been more seriously jeopardized by Japan than by any other nation, and at no time so seriously as since the outbreak of the great war. America has nothing to be ashamed of, and Japan has (to put it mildly) much to correct'in matters of Far Eastern policy. If today Japan finds herself alone she has none to blame but herself, and the opportunity is the more favorable for seeing to it that she correct her faults. Not until she has done so can there be any settlement of such questions as the acquirement of citizenship by Japanese and the modification of the land laws of California and other Western states. These questions can only be settled, and the obstacles to full and hearty friendship between America and Japan can only be removed, when the American people have confidence in the good faith of the Japanese government in the larger problems of Far Eastern policy.

VISCOUNT ISHII, OF JAPANESE MISSION TO UNITED STATES, WITH WIFE AND DAUGHTER