Evening Republican, Volume 21, Number 226, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 9 October 1917 — SELF HELPS for the NEW SOLDIER [ARTICLE]

SELF HELPS for the NEW SOLDIER

By a United Stain Army Officer

THE PATROL LEADER. The leader of a patrol, usually a corporal If it consists of a squad or less, ■aestbespeeially chosen. And the more important the work, the more careful the selection. The leader must be skilled in the methods of covering targe areas with a few men; he must be able to report the strength and ’Character of hostile forces, deduce ‘ their probable intentions, and report Intelligently to his commanding officer. Endurance, courage and good judgment are requisites of the patrol leader. His judgment will be called constantly into play, in order to read indications and pass upon the significance of the information at hand. He should be rapable of seeing a connection between apparently irrelevant facts and formulating his reports accordingly. Before setting out, however, the patrol leader should be given such information of the enemy and country as stay be of value to him —the general location of his own forces, and particularly those with whom he may come In contact From this it will be seen that the patrol leader already has a basis upon which to Interpret the information he gains. When possible, the patrol leader should have a map of the country he is to traverse-—in many cases the route specified—and he should have a compass, a watch, a pencil and a notebook. When practicable, he should take with him field message flanks. He carries, •f course, his arms and ammunition. When the patrol leader assembles the men detailed for the patrol, he makes sure of several things: their arms and ammunition are in a suitable condition for duty; that none has any papers or maps which would be of value to the enemy if captured; that their accoutrements do not glisten ®r rattle as they move. He then repeats his instructions and explains them until he is satisfied that every man understands them; he also rehearses with the men the signals which are to be used; and designates a man to take his place if he should be disabled. The formation of the patrol will depend upon the nature of the country ajpd the character of the coverr-the formation best suited to the needs of the case will be determined by the leader. But at all events, the formation must be so regulated as to insure, so nearly as possible, the escape of one man if the patrol is “Jumped” by a superior force. Generally speaking, it will consist ®f a main body with advance, rear and flank guards, though each of the guards be represented only by a single man. It can be' seen, however, that this would be an easy formation for a patrol as small as a squad to assume, since, beside the guards, it would allow for a main body of the corporal and three men. With a small patrol—as small, indeed, as four or five men —the distance between the men may not be more than from 25 to 50 yards. With a larger patrol, they may be as great as 100 yards. The reason for this variation Is both that a smaller force must, tn the nature of things, remain closer together, and that the guards at 100 yards would have far mote difficulty in keeping in aright two or three men than a larger force.

SENDING BACK INFORMATION FROM PATROLS. Patrol work calls for the exercise of more faculties perhaps than any other >form of duty. Not only the young soldier’s muscles, but his head also must ibe exceedingly active. He has many things to remember, much to watch out Ifor, and must be able to transmit such pieces of information as he gains. The country must be carefully observed. When a hill is to be passed over, the region beyond should first be observed by one man; in the same way, houses or Inclosures should be approached by a single man or avoided entirely. This |for the reason that * one man is distinctly less likely to be seen than the patrol as a whole, but what is more to 'the point the guard, encountering danger, would be able to warn the main body before It fell Into a trap. Woods tshould generally be reconnoitered in a •thin skirmish line. This serves as a big rake, of which each man Is a tooth, for combing the thicket. Patrol leaders, and the men as well, should know the uniforms, guidons and other insignia of the enemy. This will help ih determining the class of troops sighted when no other means are available. Patrol leaders should send back important Information as soon as it is gained unless the patroi itself is to return at once. In any case, it is the duty of the leader to send reports to his commander with sufficient frequency to keep the commander informed as to his whereabouts and what he is accomplishing. The information, if written, should be signed by the leader, and should state the place, date, hour and minute of its dispatch. If this does not seem requisite to the young soldier, it must at all times be borne in mind that the commander is continually receiving information from other sources—other patrols, probably, and that'he assembles and pieces together all that he obtains. The hour and minute when the information was gained may furnish th< commander with a clue to a whole series of other facts which have been reported before, but which he was unable to interpret As a simple Illustration of the neces-

slty of the time element, it will be seen that If a troop of cavalry is reported at a certain spot at a certain hour by one patrol and a troop three miles up the road is reported by another patrol moving in the same direction, the only way in whleh the Commander might know whether or not it was the same troop is by the time. If the reports of the two troops are timed, say, half an hour apart, the commander concludes tlpit it is the same troop; if they are timed within ten minutes of each other, he naturally concludes th at two distinct troops are approaching.

THE OUTPOST. Patrols are by no means sufficient to guarantee the setjuflfy of a force In hostile territory, or tn the proximity of an enemy In friendly territory. Every.camp dr bivouac should be protected by covering detachments known ns otitposts, although it is true that, an outpost may also exercise the functions of a patrol and become an outpost patrol. 7 The size and disposition of an outpost will depend upon a number off actors, Including the size of the whole command, the proximity of the enemy, the particular situation with respect to the enemy, and the nature of the terrain. Outposts may vary in strength from a very small fraction to one-third of the entire force. The principle /o be kept in mind is that outposts, like patrols, should be no stronger than is essential to the work in hand; but they should at least always be sufficiently large to insure reasonable security. A few sentinels and patrols will usually answer for a single company, but for a large command, a more elaborate system of outposts must be established. The supreme duty of an outpost is to prevent surprise and prevent an Attack upon the camp before the troops are prepared to resist. For a camp to be “jumped," In the colloquial language of the army, is an offensq-on the part of the commander which Is neither to be explained nor extenuated. This does not mean that a camp or bivouac may not be overwhelmed with a sudden attack by an enemy force, but at least the command should have sufficient warning from its outposts to make an organized show of resistance. The outpost patrol is used to keep in close contact with the enemy, and this has been found to be the most economical form of protection, since, if the commander is kept constantly advlsed of the whereabouts of the enqmy, it will be unnecessary for him to make use of as elaborate a system of outposts to guard against surprise. Nevertheless, he should always err on the side of caution In the matter of the protection of his camp. Outposts should be composed of complete organizations. Discipline and morale can be better maintained In a full squad, for example, and one which is accustomed to drilling together, than with a detachment, say, of six or ten men. If more than one squad Is required at any point, two squads are preferable to one squad and a half. Troops on outposts keep themselves concealed as much as Is consistent with the performance of their duties. Especially, they avoid appearing on the skyline, for this would render to the. enemy a clear silhouette of their movements. The skyline, indeed, is a background which brings out a figure more than any other—even the olive drab uniform does not escape the eye, since it is the outline and not the color which is distinguishable. Troops on outposts do not render honors. It is assumed that their attention is completely occupied in keeping upon the lookout.