Evening Republican, Volume 21, Number 215, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 26 September 1917 — SELF HELPS for the NEW SOLDIER [ARTICLE]

SELF HELPS for the NEW SOLDIER

By a United States Army Officer

(Oo*j right, 1817, by the Wheeler Syndicate, Inc.) *» THE CHARGE. If a company is advancing to the -~4trtag 4ine by rushes, the captain may Increase or decrease the size of the fractions he sends forward, as lie secs fit, in order to complete or retard the movement. When the company forms but -one unit of the firing line, it may be sent forward by a rusu of the whole " -.just as the plntoon may be similarly advanced. The captain leads the rush of the company, and platoon leaders ran at full speed at the head of their respective platoons. Platoon guides follow the line to Insure a prompt and orderly execution of the advance, that fs, to prevent straggling or a sagging of the front. The advance is not limited, however, to the methods described, as has already been explained. Any method may be employed which successfully brings the attack closer to the enemy. Crawling, especially in surprise attacks, may be the most practicable and effective method to be pursued. It should be repeated here, as in the first lesson in extended order drill, that the use of the rifle is here assumed. At all events, the framework of extended order movements could be learned with broomsticks, while there Is no method of learning the rifle itself, even to the fixing of the bayonet, without a rifle in hand. But no consideration of extended order, combat exercise or skirmishing, would be complete without the charge. Sven on an armory floor, extended order drill is usually finished off with a charge, In order to inject something of ♦he supremely exciting element of battle into what might otherwise become mechanical plodding. The charge is a rush —an eruption— Into which all the pent-up mental and emotional intensity of a battle may have an outlet That to be sure, Is not the purpose of the charge, which is to expel an enemy from a given position, but it does become a vent for the otherwise suppressed excitement of battle, and to that extent gathers in violence. Beeause fhis outburst contributes to the force of the charge a general shout Is important. The signal for the charge, sounded from the post of the commanding officer, is repeated by the musicians of all parts of the line. The company officers, both the captains and lieutenants, lead the charge—the time has now passed for direction and control and the necessities call for sheer leadership. Therefore the officers precede ♦Jieir men, encountering the danger first.'The skirmishers, with fixed bayonets, spring forward together—shouting—and close with the enemy.

THE PATROL. The patrol is perhaps the most responsible and important work upon whieh an enlisted man may be engaged. The patrol represents the eyes of the unit —eyes like those of crabs, thrust out on long feelers, so to speak, but vKich are still in contact with the main force and can be withdrawn to it. The use of a patrol is threefold: It Is a detachment sent out from a command to gain information of the country or of the enemy; to prevent 'the enemy from gaining information; «r to provide the necessary security against surprise. An erroneous impression prevails in miloformed quarters that the use of the airplane on the great scale now witnessed in Europe has dispensed wiQi old methods of foot patrol. This Is not the case. To be sure, there is no petroling in trench warfare, in the former sense, except, perhaps, in night raids; but in all mobile operations, to which the warfare on the western front fs now reverting, the principle of the patrol is indispensable. The reason that the airplane cannot substituteJor the foot patrol is that the airplane is seldom able to distinguish a command behind cover or in the shelter of a forest. This fact is so well established that artillery positions hgve been covered with bushes and trees and the guns themselves are painted a mottled green which deceives the birdmen. There is an infinite amount of careful groping out and derailed observation left over for foot patrols, after the airplane has passed over. It is not necessary, in these articles, to consider cavalry patrol. As for the matter of surprise, even units as small as a company, when on the firing line, must be well protected t>y patrols on each flank. lsach leader of a flank platoon details a man to watch for the signals of the patrol or patrols on his flank. Patrols or parties posted to prevent hostile reconnaissance should relieve the main body of the necessity of betraying its position by firing on small bodies of the enemy. “To be surprised by an enemy at short range,” says the drill regulations, “Is an unpardonable offense." Therefore, reconnaissance is kept up throughout an action and It is the Important duty of combat patrols to give security to exposed flanks. Whether or not the patrol is able to stop a hostile reconnaissance or even an attack, It must at all hazards convey warning of the enemy’s approach to the main If caught by a fire on the flank, body. This Is the more essential because, while the firing line is obligated to take care of Its own front. Its flanks are particularly vulnerable to modern a machine gun, raking a company or battalion from the flank, might exterminate the entire command. qwn »h«n the casualties are not lm-

medtately high, the moral effect of flunking fire is known to be as great as the physical effect. In fact, a unit which is giving the enemy a hot fire on the front may quickly go to pieces

STRENGTH AND PURPOSE OF A PATROL.

In general, it Is understood that a patrol—not a combat patrol—should be sent out for one purpose only, arid this purpose must be clearly fixed in the may determine its proper strength, select Its leader and Issue the proper instructions. The strength of a patrol may vary from two or three men to a company—if the company is a unit in a larger command. Inasmuch as patrol work is at all times a matter ,of discretion and secrecy. It should be just strong enough to accomplish the stipulated purpose and no stronger. Not a superfluous man Is desired. Neither should, a patrol start forth a man short of the requisite number to make the necessary reconnaissance and insure that all important information will reach the commander. It may be necessary for patrols to fight their way to the designated point by driving off enemy patrols. If there is a prospect of such clashes, the patrol must be stronger than otherwise, and invariably provision must be .made, for the escape of one man to return with essential information. While it is In general the business of a patrol to execute its purpose and, if possible, avoid fighting, the purpose may be of such a nature that it must be executed whether this requires fighting or not. If such be the case, as has just been said, the strength of the patrol when sent out must be fixed proportionately. - On the other hand, If the purpose is to gain information only, and of a general nature, a small patrol is better than a large one. For it moves less conspicuously and conceals itself more readily than a larger detachment. Two men are often sufficient for such work «s observing from a point in plain view of the command or reconnoitering between outguards. Whether messages are to be sent back, and how frequently, also determines the strength of the patrol, and it must be large enough to furnish the probable number of messengers without reducing the patrol to less than two men. Two men are the minimum, since provision must be made against the chance that the patrol leader might be disabled. In sending back messages, If the information Is of exceptional importance, the patrol leader will commit the same message to two men who will return to the main body by different routes. The character of the information desired when the patrol is dispatched in this connection also will determine the strength of the detachment and double messengers, or a series of double messengers, will be provided. In friendly territory, a weaker patrol may be used than lor the corresponding purpose in hostile territory, since the patrol would have the assistance of friendly civilians, and would be obliged to keep a lookout for the enemy only. In a Jiostile territory, on the other hand, a patrol must be wary of hostile civilians as well as hostile forces, for hostile civilians will be quick to apprise the enemy of the presence of the patrol.