Evening Republican, Volume 59, Number 112, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 1 June 1917 — HOW BIG ARMIES WERE CREATED BY GREAT BRITAIN [ARTICLE]

HOW BIG ARMIES WERE CREATED BY GREAT BRITAIN

Least Difficulty Found Was Obtaining Men in Early Days ’ _ of the War. PROBLEMS QUICKLY SOLVED -System la Finally Established After Early Blundering and the PresentDay Efficiency of the Troops, in France Is Testimony to the Thoroughness of Their Training. New York. —We received from the office of the general staff an interesting article on the “Organization and Training of the-New Armies of Great Britain” which tells us that the British army that went, opt to Mons in the early days of August, 1914, was probably the best trained army that has ever left England, the Army and Navy Journal states. Nearly all the officers were men who toofc a keen Interest in their profession and who availed themselves of every opportunity to increase their military knowledge and experience. The training of part of the expeditionary force at Aldershot, under the commanders who themselves led it into action, was training such as never had been seen in England. Owing to the stress of circumstances the training of the new armies during the first period was less- complete than that of the armies organized later in the second period, but both armies were characterized by the spirit which puts life Into the instruction in military duties. The practical training in small wars had taught the British soldier the inestimable value of never knowing when he is beaten, the Russians saying that the English never win more than one victory in a war—but that is the last. This and a strong regimental feeling which has always been characteristic of the British army have been preserved in the armies now in the field. Men at First Responded Quickly. This regimental feeling tends to make officers and men one happy family, proud of themselves, jointly anx-

ious to make their regiment a glory to the British army. It cultivates a spirit -of self-reliance, loyalty and kindness, all based upon the strong sense of discipline and community of interest. It is a broadminded and tolerant method which insists on smartness and on duty .... and discipline ana high courage and courtesy, but not on hate. The men who came into the army as recruits were the kind who were ready to respond to the British methods of “* training a volunteer army. The least ■ difficulty found was in obtaining the men in the early days of the war. Recruits, came faster than they could be taken care of and supplied with proper equipment. Some 800,000 troops were housed in hired buildings and other temporary quarters, but within a year huts to hold three-quarters of a million men, with water and light laid on, had been built, besides various enormous depots for stores, remounts, etc. JTJiese huts seemed to spring up in every part of the country; one great bare moorland in the midlands, uninhabited since the dawn of history, had been covered with new roads, railways, pumping establishments, power stations and huts for some 40,000 individuals. Soldiers' Quarters and Food. Within a year the problem of quartering the troops in the chief training centers had been solved. The previous uncomfortable accommodatlPHS Were the cause of bad discipline anti slovenly training. Fortunately a satisfactory system for feeding the troops on a war basis had been elaborated two years before the war. A description of this method is given. At the beginning certain articles of food, especially meat, were so excessive that great waste resulted, also owing much to the ignorance of the soldiers detailed for cooking duties, who served the excellent food provided in a slovenly unappetizing way, and improvement followed the establishment of schools in instruction in cookery and the admonition to commanding officers to lay stress on the variety in the cooking of the food, on cleanliness and on economy. Clothing the recruits was another difficulty experienced at the beginning. Important parts of the equipment such as army boots were for a long time sadly deficient. The enlargement of old plants, the erection of new plants and instruction in the methods of manufac- __ ture was a slow and laborious process. When the war started, England seemed to have been as badly off in matters of supplies as we. They had igss than 800,000 rifles, only half of them tly> latest pattern. The weekly output of rifles in the United Kingdom was under 2,000, which could be Increased somewhat by night shifts, but which at the best was infinitesimal compared with - the needs of the new army. Unfortunately the rifle, though needed in larger - quantities than any other weapon for an army, requires longer time than any other beroTeTts mnnufadtnfP with new plants can be started, owing largely to the number of gauges,of extreme accuracy required in the process; con—sequently the recruits had to _ wait long. t By January, 1915, the flrtft new army had about 400 service rifles per battalion, and the second aboyt 100, and -it was not u n 11! Search, 1915, that these armies were beginning to be fully armed. To provide even a limited amount of drill and musketry practice It was necessary to hand around the service rlfleqin each battalion as

the three Fates handed around their solitary eye in the story of Perseus. Many rifles were too worn to shoot with sufficient accuracy for musketry practice and there was no opportunity to cultivate in the soldier a personal pride in his own rifle and the knowledge of its idiosyncrasies. This scarcity of rifles in the early days prolonged the training. In October, 1914, the artillery of one division of the first new army had only, six 18-pounders' altogether Instead of its full complement of 54; another had only a few of the obsolete 15-pounders; in March, 1915, some divisions had only two guns per battery; even in Mayr when the full complerhent of guns had arrived for the first new army dlvisionSj the equipment of dial sights, etc., for indirect laying was still deficient. The second new army was at that date in very much the same state, except that in their case the howitzer brigade had not been delivered. The third end fourth new armies were still worse off. For months the gunners in some divisions had to learn what they could of the mechanism of a rifle without even seeing one. Some enthusiastic officers provided dummy wooden guns at their own expense and obsolete guns were utilized for the same purpose. When some such guns as these’ were available there were no artillery instruments such as dial sights, range finders, directors and so on, without which a modern battery is almost help-less,-except those that could be ImproVRea .tflMua ingenious" Umber gunner. Similarly horses, harness and the proper wagons were hardly ever complete for any battery of the first three armies till on the very eve of their departure over sea. Noncommissioned officers fit to train recruits were sadly lacking. Those having experience could not be spared from their regiments at the front. The most that could be done was to have one experienced man in each unit and this only by employing 200 officers of the Indian army home on leave and retired officers (“dug out” as they were popularly called). Some of these did important service and others were of little value, not being up-to-date and lacking the capacity of making themselves so. The, infantry drill had been altered and the double company substituted for the old single company.; in artillery the changes had been more notable by the introduction and almost exclusive use of indirect laying, which required in artillery officers and noncommissioned officers facilities of rapid observation and calculation; again the cooperation of artillery and airplanes was a closed book to all the old school gunners; the use of telephones and signals had been developed in a manner unknown to quite recent generations of officers. To secure officers required the courses at Woolwich and Sandhurst were reduced and the age limit lowered. A certain number of commissions graduates and ex-warrant and noncommissioned officers were given commissions. There were at the beginning of the war— 22- -senior- officers’ training corps. Some of the best trained men from the senior corps were given regular commissions at once and large numbers received “temporary commissions” for service with the new battalions. A great many senior boys from the cadet corps of the schools were also given temporary commissions. It is an indication of the value of. these O. T. C.’s at a critical junction ;,of the war, that

within the first year of the war the Oxford university O. T. C. provided over 2,300, three of the smaller northern universities’ O. T. C.’s over 1,000 and the Inns of Court O. T. C.’s over 2,500. It was found necessary to give temporary commissions even to university graduates and the senior boys in public schools. Practically all pupils of the public schools applied for commissions as soon as they reached the age limit. Excellent material for junior officers was found among the young men who had gone to the colonies or foreign countries to take up a life of adventure. No young men made better officers than these, for all had taken some risks; they had been on their own responsibility, and generally had men under them and experienced dangers by flood and field. The supply of officers for a technical corps proved surprisingly adequate, the war office selecting according to the recommendations of the heads of the corresponding civil professions. In addition to these the war office has obtained a large staff of specialists for work with the troops, e. g.', bacteriologists, ophthalmologists, aurists, radiologists, dermatologists, experts in tropical diseases, etc. For all practical purposes, most of the infantry subalterns of the new armies had to train themselves during the first five months of the war as best they could in the intervals of training their men. If the officers were untrained, the noncommissioned officers of the new armies were in the main even less trained. This presented a marked contrast to the really good sergeant of the old school with his mingled humor and severity, putting a squad of recruits through their paces, the type of Kipling’s Private Mulvaney. There was some compensation for this, however; the fact that the necessity of doing the noncommissioned officers’ job as well as their own gave the officers greater proficiency and better understanding of their men. An experienced British general writing on the training of some of these new divisions, said that a mass of civilians had been-transformed in less than eight months into an army which had more practical training for war than it had ever been possible to give to troops in England before. There was, he added, a feeling of confidence fn all ranks, due partly to the organizing power of a short-handed staff, but chiefly to the keenness of all ranks to make themselves fit for the front. The experience? here recorded are highly suggestive of bur own experiences and they jndiefite the methods we shall have to follow in creating armies to meet our regular requirements.