Evening Republican, Volume 21, Number 10, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 13 January 1917 — NEW LIGHT ON NEUVE WELLE [ARTICLE]

NEW LIGHT ON NEUVE WELLE

Fredrick Coleman Tells Wh~t Wrong in That ■^ r ' Battle. FAIL TO FOLLOW SUCCESS . - ' * y ; " 7* J Writer Discourses in an Interesting Manner Concerning a Famous Battle and Its OutcomeStaff la at Fault. London.—ln “With Cavalry in 1915” Mr. Frederick Coleman new light on a famous fight. Over and over again has been the question, “What -went wrong at Neuve Ch»-~ pelle?” Some explanation of the difficulties encountered on that early effort at a “push” is given by Mr. Coleman, though he is careful to say “Let the writer of the future dig the story out. of the tfingled orders of the day.” Nevertheless, he was on the spot; he served Gen. de Lisle as voluuteer chauffeur, and was in close touch with the principal actors in the drama, and to some extent he raises the veil behind which—quite properly many will agree—the details of that engagement are at present hidden. “General Haig had been quite reasonably correct in his estimate of the enemy’s strength,” Mr. Coleman says. “OUr chance to break through the German line was the finest opportunity of the whole war. That with such odds in our favor, with a preponderance of guns, and shells as well, we would have so signally failed and lest 18,000 men into the bargain required some explanation. “Tbe tragedy of Neuve Chapelle was a failure to. take advantage-of an Initial success.” He outlines the dispositions of the brigades engaged and. then continues: “The initial guccess won, the whole line waited, eyes on the right, for the signal to go on. Before nine o’clock in the morning all was ready; and the road cleared. - “All day the watchers waited in ;/ vain. “It was after four o’clock in the afternoon before the word came. It was then too late. The great opportunity had been lost, and lost forever. Tracing the Fault. “The Germans bad rallied, filled farms with machine guns, and mowed down the gallant Twenty-third and Twenty-fifth brigades, who had so dearly won such splendidly advanced positions.

“The Twenty-fourth brigade had come on part way, then concentrated and was sadly cut up. That the line on the right had ‘dug In’ Instead of moving forward had resulted In a de-, feat when a great victory was within grasp. And who was to blame? “A brigade commander and the general in command of the artillery on a certain division were promptly ‘stellenbosched.’ A divisional commander was reported and sent home, and his case reopened when he declared the fault was. not his, as could be proved by certain hitherto unproduced papers from corps headquarters. A further inquiry resulted In his being reinstated. His corps commander went to England—•sent home,’ said many. Shortly afterward back he came, to the discomfiture of the* prophets, and took up his old command." r Mr. Coleman’s tidal comment is: “No battle of such magnitude could be won without fine staff work, and the work of more than one staff on that March 10, left much to be desired.” There are other disclosures of failure on the part of the British In the early days of the campaign—failures, due far more to Inexperience than to Incompetence and failures which are not likely to be repeated. Through Mr. Coleman one is able to appreciate all the myriad difficulties with which brigade, divisional and corps commanders had to contend throughout the campaign of 1915.

Transportation at Fault. There is, for example, the tragedy behind the scenes of the great Canadian fight before Tpres and the struggle for Hill 00 In April, 1915: “A run to Cassel at daybreak was a maddening experience, the road from Steenvqprde to Poperinghe being packed' and jammed with all manna’ five-ton lorry belonging to the Canadians had broken down as It was being turned In the narrow roadway. Besult, an Immovable barrier across the pave. - f "Truly an ounce of prevention In the way of road organization and route selection by some competent authority would have been worth many pounds Of condemnation poured forth with volubility by all road users in those days of tiresome traffic tangles." There were other little things that wanted organization—and have since been seen to. In the Hooge battle an* officer’s diary records a message sent to brigade. headquarters asking for “two dozen extra detonators per regiment, as the bombs here are without detonators." But Mr. Coleman’s boojjc is not atl tragedy. There is much of the light side of war In it also, and It gives a wonderfully graphic picture of some of the hardest times that ever a British army has gone through.