Evening Republican, Volume 19, Number 95, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 22 April 1915 — DESERT WARFARE [ARTICLE+ILLUSTRATION]

DESERT WARFARE

T is a recognized maxim in J strategical problems that a I desert frontier is the one most easy to defend and most formidable to assault. ‘WaSBr Mountains, rivers and seas have their difficulties, and are serious obstacles for an invader to tackle, but for Impracticability they do not compare with even a narrow zone of barren land, where food and water are nonexistent and where bad ground makes transport either laborious or altogether impossible. Battlefields, like the sites of capitals, are not made by man, but are the outcome of geographical position. The chief lines of communication of the world, and consequently the warpaths of nations, are, in like manner, determined by the He of the; land and its physical features. So long, for instance, as Egypt and Palestine are not under one rule, and so long as there is a likelihood of a recurrence of hostility between the powers that control these two coun-, tries, the desert barrier that separates them will be the scene of conflict. Being a narrow neck of land joining two continents, and being the only land link between two of the most fertile regions of the earth, it has always been, and will always be, an important line of communication. For the same reason it must retain its significance from a military standpoint. It chances that the link between Egypt and Asia is cursed by the blight of aridity. But the same providence that caused this area to be useless to man provided the more favored region of the Nile valley with an inimitable protection from envious foes. A hundred miles of waste is a better guard against invasion than any other natural feature; it is far less costly than modern fortifications and probably more effective. Yet, in spite of nature’s bulwarks, this area has probably been the scene of more hostility than any other desert in the world. Inexorably, as it were, the silent wilderness has been disturbed by successive waves of migratory hordes and by the continual passing of military expeditions. There Is no rest for this land; it seems to attract tragedy. The desert, Egypt’s ancient barrier against intruding foes, has proved to* be a formidable breakwater on to which many an enemy has hurled himself. Their efforts have been met with varying success. Although it has proved of no avail against determined and systematic attacks, it has caused a hostile advance on Egypt to be looked upon as a big undertaking. It would be foolish to treat such an obstacle lightly, but with sufficient initiative Its difficulties can be successjtully surmounted. It Is noteworthy ’that desert frontiers to fertile lands also probably entail the responsibility of wild tribes to be kept at bay. The wilderness that fringed ancient China was a barrier against distant foes, but the nomads actually inhabiting that desert were the source of so much danger that they might be considered the direct cause for the building of the Great Wall. In the same way the early inhabitants of the Nile valley did not consider nature’s battlements sufficient to repel the wild nomadic tribes that constantly swept in from arid Arabia to raid them. So they supplemented this barrier by lines of fortifications, which ran from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Suez. Nowadays a still more effective barrier has supplanted the crude, though colossal

labors of the ancients, the hostile desert being backed by the canal, which has rightly been described as "the most formidable military obstacle ever constructed by man.’-’ Invading foes must accomplish the toil of the desert march, they must arrive in some sort of “fitness,” attack carefully prepared positions, succeed in breaking the defensive and cross the canal before they can rely bn getting food and water. There is probably no newer method -of dealing with the problems of supply bn such a campaign than those employed by Alexander, Napoleon or Ibrahim Pasha. The more adaptable and the better acclimatized to the per culiar conditions are the forces in use the more simple does the problem become. To move bands of Bedouin to and fro across such country would be only asking them to live their everyday lives. No doubt many of the troops being employed by the Turks on the present venture are quite at home in such surroundings, can' live hard and travel hard, but there cannot be a very great number of them. Numbers, it should be noted, have an abnormal Influence in the East, where bluff plays such a large part in life. The Arab, in his own Intertribal wars, depends largely upon giving an exaggerated idea of his numbers and strength. The issue of a desert engagement is often decided without a blow being struck, those in the minority giving in without resistance to those in the majority. It seems doubtful that the true desert warriors—-the Bedouin —are being employed in any large extent. Had the big tribes of Arabia been in perfect sympathy with the Turks they might have constituted a formidable array. But the children of Ishmael have not changed; they are still as "unstable as water.” Even of those who have been commandeered, with their camels, large numbers have deserted and disappeared into the hteart of the wilderness. So the great reserve of desert soldiery remains disused. The successful issue of a desert campaign depends upon a phenomenal ability to tackle the problems of supply and of transport. The organization of these must be perfect in detail and absolutely reliable in action. In the old days, although military operations took much longer to come to a head than they do now, when the antagonists actually joined battle, the result was quickly decided. The decisive battles of the world have generally been decided between dawn and dusk. This is especially the case in Arab tactics. Sudden attack and swift retreat is the secret of desert warfare, for there is no time to waste. It may be recalled that in all former conflicts on the Egypto-Turklsh frontier the issue has not long hung in the balance. Alexander entered Egypt a week after he left Gaza, a distance of 120 miles. Napoleon only spent six and a half days on the road between his base at Katleh and his arrival before Gaza. The advance guard of the Turks, in 1800, under Taher Pasha, left El Arish on April 2 and actually took Salahleh, on the farther side of the present canal, before the 12th of the month. But in that case, it is true, there was no serious opposition to their advance. Swift and decisive action is evidently the maxim of that particular military undertaking; by the mercy of Allah the prevalent creed of the present-day invaders is that "haste is of the devil.” It is certain

that the retreat which followed on the recent attack on the canal is without precedent in the history of all former wars for the mastery pf the eastern’ gates of Egypt. As regards the problem of transport, we have an object lesson in Napoleon’s Syrian expedition of 1799. He concentrated, about 14,000 picked men—l3,ooo infantry and 1,000 cavalry—he inured his troops to the hardships they were about to undergo, and he formed a special camel corps for scouting. He did not even attempt to move his artillery by land, but essayed to send it by sea. His plan for the transport of this comparatively small force entailed the services of 2,000 camels to carry water for the three days’ journey between Katieh and El Arish, where the supply was to be replenished. Another 1,000 camels borq provisions for the 14,000 men and 3,000 horses for 15 days. Besides this, 3,000 mules were set apart solely for the conveyance of baggage. This was no light undertaking, even for such a genius as Napoleon, and, as we know, it ended in a retreat which may be considered the turning point of his career. Consider for a moment what an army of animals must be necessary for the transport of the 65,000 or more men who are said to be concentrated on the confines of Palestine. Camels will doubtless be employed in enormous numbers, both on account of their adaptability to foodless and waterless countries, and also because there is an unlimited supply on the eastern borderlands of Syria and Palestine. They are invaluable for patrol work, and unequaled as beasts of burden. But they need careful attention and are by no means as hardy as one might suppose. So long as they are in condition, well watered and sufficiently fed, they will undergo considerable strain, but if asked to do too much they literally go to pieces. The great herds of camels that have, no doubt, been driven in from the Arabian borderlands will never have been ridden or even saddled. Thirteen thousand camel saddles cannot be produced in a hurry, and this is about the number that will be required, estimated by Napoleon’s allowance per man. Camels will carry heavy loads on even ground t they are easy to feed compared with horses, or even mules, and they do not need water every day. But it must be mentioned that when they do’ drink they are in the habit of putting away a phenomenal amount of water. It is the maximum amount of water required that is the point in this case, and is likely to prove unprocurable. The bountiful wells of El Arish, for instance, have been estimated to be capable of supplying the needs of 15,000 to 20,000 men. I do not know the comparative drinking capacity of man and camel, but out of 18,000 camels, not to mention horses, mules and men, there would be many to go thirsty. A still more significant point in the commissariat arrangements is the fact that the desert will very soon be bereft of even its poor camel scrub. For a region which will easily support passing caravans fails under the tax of continuous grazing by innumerable herds. 1 Looking at the problem of campaigning in the wilderness, it seems that the peculiar physical features of the theater of action —the poverty of the land —are playing an even bigger part in this venture of the' ( twentieth century than ever they did in days gone by. DOUGLAS CARRUTHERS.