Evening Republican, Volume 17, Number 116, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 15 May 1913 — STORIES of CAMP and WAR [ARTICLE+ILLUSTRATION]

STORIES of CAMP and WAR

GENERAL MEADE AT MINE RUN Highly Promising Plan Ruined by Blunders Of Subordinates Thereby Preventing Concentration. In response to a query asking for an account of the Mine Run campaign the National Tribune makes the following reply: The Mine Run campaign was one of the best-conceived movements of the war, but utterly failed on account of the mismanagement of the corps commanders. November, 1863, saw what was virtually the end of the Gettysburg campaign, with its sequelae of manuvers back and forth from Alexandria to Orange Court House. Gen. Meade saw that he had Lee at % great disadvantage. Lee had sent Longstreet’s Corps to East Tennessee, and had left only Ewell’s and Hill’s Corps. Ewell’s Corps was watching the Rapidan in the neighborhood of Culpeper Court House, while Hill’s Corps was a day’s march away up the river. Gen. Meade had the Army of the Potomac well in hand, only 20 miles away around Culpeper and Stevensburg. He conceived that „he could throw his army across the river and overwhelm Ewell’s Corps before Hill could go to his assistance. It was only a short day’s march to reach Ewell, and he could have been thrashed in a few hours. Meade carefully worked out his plans, and if his orders had been carried out a great victory would have resulted. The movement was to begin at dawn of Nov. 26, by the Fifth Corps, followed by the First Corps crossing the Rappahannock at Culpeper Mine Ford and marching to Parker’s Store on the Plank Road. The Second Corps was to cross at Germanna Ford and march to Robertson’s Tavern, where it was to be joined by the Third and Sixth Corps crossing at Jacob’s Mill Ford. Meade expected his whole army to be united across the Rapidan and cut the flank of Lee’s intrenchments on Mina Run, by noon of Nov. 27, and the plan had every prospect of success. The first blunder was in the movement of the Third Corps, which, having a greater distance to march, should have started earliest, but as a matter of fact was much behind its time and delayed the whole army. The next was that the engineers had not correctly measured the width of the Rapidan, and the pontoon bridges were too short. The, banks of the Rapidan were so high and precipitous that they delayed the march of the artillery and cavalry so that the whole of Nov. 27 passed with less than half of the distance having been traversed. In the meanwhile Lee’s signal officers, looking down from Clark’s Mountain, had detected the movement, and. Hill’s Corps was summoned back in haste to meet it. In the meantime the corps officers were mistaking the roads and making other blunders which prevented the concentrftion, and when the army was at last gotten together, Nov. 28, it was found that the whole rebel army was in front and fortified along the crest of a range of hills, which made a natural fortification in themselves for six or eight miles. The Confederates had their artillery so placed as to enfilade every line bf approach. The corps commanders' each examined their fronts for possible points of attack, and made strong reconnoissances, which cost a great many men’s lives. As all the trains had been left on the north side of the Rapidan in anticipation of a quick, sharp movement, the army was now out of rations, and Meade saw frustrated bls hopes of ending the Gettysburg campaign by a decisive victory. He therefore ordered the army to return ,to its camps around Culpeper. He wanted to move his army to Fredericksburg, which would havebeen an excellent manuyer, and placed Lee at a disadvantage, but he was prevented by Halleck’s orders not to make any change of base without authority from Washington.