Evening Republican, Volume 14, Number 106, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 4 May 1910 — LEGAL INFORMATION [ARTICLE]

LEGAL INFORMATION

In State v. Finch}. 103 Pacific Reporter, 505, a prosecution for murder. It was assigned as error that the trial court allowed a photograph of deceased to be shown to the physician who performed the autopsy, for the purpose of proving by him the Identity of the body op which the autopsy was performed; he not being acquainted with deceased. The photograph was proven to be a correct likeness of deceased In health and strength, and apparently not of a character to excite or inflame the Jury. The Oregon Supreme *Court ruled that there was no errbr in thus using it. How is the receiver of an Insolvent corporation to learn the names of the owners of stock .upon which assessments have been made when the stock has been transferred by Insolvent holders to other persons who have failed to have the transactions accorded on the corporate beoks? A situation of this character Is shown Ih Huey v. Brown, 171 Federal Reporter, 641, where the receiver applied for an order of discovery against stock brokers through whom" the transfer was accomplished. Respondents demurred to the bill, their demurcer was overruled, and they appealed to the Circuit Court or Appeals. Tfiat tribunal upheld the decision of the lower court, following the similar case of Kurtz v. Brown, 152 Fed. 372, 81 C. C. A. 498, thus deciding, In effect, that respondents might be compelled to give the names and addresses of their customers in Instances of this kind. A very important decision on the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission was handed down recently by the United States Circuit court for the Northern District of Illinois in the case of Chicago, R. I. & p. Ry Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission and Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. vs. Same, 171 Federal Reporter, 680. The bill In one case was to restrain the enforcement ot certain rates prescribed by the commerce commission on freight from tne 'Atlantic seaboard to Missouri river points, and the other involved rates from Chicago jnd St. Louis to Denver. At the time of the orders complained of the through rate from the Atlantic coast to Missouri river points was $1.47 per hundred pounds; the rate from the seaboard to the Mississippi river being 87 cents per hundred pounds, and from the Missippi river to the Missouri river 60 cents per hundred pounds, thus making an aggregate equal to the through rate from the seaboard. The rate prescribed by the order of the commerce commission was $1.38 per hundred pounds frqm the seaboard to Missouri river points, while the intermediate rates from the seaboard to the Mississippi river points, and frflm there on to the Missouri river, were left the same as before existing. The tendency of this , readjustment would be, of course, to benefit manufacturers along the Atlantic coast and those at the Missouri river points at the expense of others, established at intermediate places, who, If compelled to transport their raw material from the sea coast and then ship their finished products on west, would be compelled to pay the sum of the two rates, or $1.47, per hundredweight, as against the $1.33 exacted of their competitors having their establishments at the termini to which the through rate of $1.38 per hundred would apply. The court says, In substance, that the exercise of such a power by the commerce commission would place it In a position where It could thus establish zones of trade tributary to others, and holds that no tributary to others, and holds that nosuch pGwer exists, and that the order complained of is invalid. The legal questions involved In regard to the rates from Chicago and St. Louis to Denver were identical wtih those in the other case.