Democratic Sentinel, Volume 16, Number 3, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 5 February 1892 — FAMINES IN RUSSIA. [ARTICLE+ILLUSTRATION]

FAMINES IN RUSSIA.

CALAMITIES THAT SEEM TO BE PERIODICAL. The Awful Desolation Attending tho French Invasion or 1818 —Cities and Towns Burned by the Cossacks The Famine and Prestige Which Followed the War. •‘The Great Hunger.” Russian famines are periodical like the snows, or rather perennial like the Siberian plague. To be scientifically accurate, one should distinguish the two different varieties of it, the provincial and the national, the former termed golodovka, or the little hunger, and tho latter golod, or the great hunger. Not a year has elapsed during this century in which extreme distress in

some province or provinces of the empire has not assumed the dimensions of a famine, while scarcely a decade has passed away in which the local misfortune has not ripened into the national calamity. The present century, which has yet eight years to run, has already had its full share of visitations which some optimists regard as automatic checks on over-population; in 1801,1608, 1811, 1812, 1833, 1840, 1860, and 1831. These are the national golods. The provincial famines frequently equal

them in severity if not in extent, says a writer in the Fortnightly Itoview, and so complete and child-like is the peo- I pie’s trust in Providence and the Czar, who, it is hoped, will utilize in good time the abundance of the harvest In the neighboring provinces to relieve their needs, that the crops are allowed to lie rotting in some places until tho peasants in others are beyond the reach of hunger and of human help, and many of them lie down by the roadside, in ditches, in the yards of deserted houses and give up the ghost without a murmur against their Little Father, the Czar. In 1887-1888, when the abundance of the harvest in Russia seemed to partake of the nature of the miraculous, the distress in certain districts was to the full as intense and disastrous as at present. In the government of Smolensk the peasants lived during the year on bread mado partly of rye and partly of the husks Of rye, often eaten with the wormeaten bark of the oak or the pine, which

etllls without satisfying the cravings of hunger. The evil is undeniably chronic; the symptoms are always the same, and the descriptions of them published ten or fifty years ago might be served up afresh to-day or n&st year as faithful photographs of the life in death of millions of Russian Christians. The Czars have been aware of it for centuries, and have ■done all that they could be expected to it. The district now from Odessa on the sk Sea through Little the rich black loam sd for its marvellous through the country olga, across the Urals, d wider till it reaches *r words, it covers a ) miles long and from broad, which supports

fortunate inhabitants of that stricken country the-historic days in the early part of this century, when a famine, the worst of all, prevailed for three years. Then, as now, according to the GlobeDemocrat, the central districts of the empire were devastated, and to the terrors of famine and pestilence were added the horrors of war in its most savage form. The occasion of this former visitation was the invasion of Russia by Napoleon and the French, an invasion which, in destructiveness of human life, has few parallels in ancient or modern times. Ab to the justice of the war waged by Napoleon against the mighty power of the North there always has been and always will be a difference of opinion, for certainly there was provocation enough on both sides. Napoleon thought that the power of Russia should be curbed; ho preferred to wage the war in person, so between tho years 1810 and 1812 he made preparations for the most stupendous military operation he had ever undertaken. The first fright over, b.usy preparations -were made throughout the giant empire to meet the coming French. Serfs by thousands were drafted, handcuffed, sent to points of instruction to be trained and drilled, and as rapidly as possible were hurried to the front. Along the western frontier, then described by the River Niemen, an army of 300,000 was gathered. Every effort was made to inspire,the Russian troops with confidence, but when the massive columns of Napoleon began to move from Kocnigsberg the hearts of the Russian generals failed; Kotusoff had been beaten by Napoleon at Austerlitz, and

remembered the lesson. The French were allowed to cross the Niemen without a blow, and June 24, at Kovno, less than 100 miles from the Baltic, the grand army passed into Russian territory. Napoleon soon perceived what kind of warfare would be waged against him. The Russian armies of the frontier, altogether numbering nearly 400,000 men were in full retreat, leaving desolation behind them. As they retired, in addition to burning the bridges and destroying the roads, they drove before them the peasants and their cattle; they burned the houses, they leveled the fences, they destroyed the inclosures, they set on fire the growing crops. Carrying provisions was a novel experience for the French. In all their expeditions up to this time they had lived j on the country, making requisitions for what they-aeeded, and paying for it or ; not as circumstances dictated. Aware I of the thinly settled districts through which- they must travel during the in- . vasion of Russia, immense stores had | betii collected nt Koenigsberg, but bad management was conspicuous in forwarding them for the use of the troops. When the army crossed the Niemen not

a fourth of the baggage wagons had ar- j rived, and before the middle of July, or i in less than two weeks, though not a i battle, not even a skirmish, had been 1 fought, hundreds of men and over 10,- ! 000 horses had perished from starvation and exposure, and 25,000 patientswere in the field hospitals. This was but tho beginning. The Russians were afraid to meet Napoleon in the field. Kotusoff’s experience at Austerlitz had made him careful; so on the principle that no army could exist in tho midst of ruins, they destroyed right and loft everything that could sustain life. The whole of Lithuania was depopulated and its people driven into exile. A tract of country 200 miles wide and 350 miles in extent from east to west was bared of inhabitants and of means of supporting life. The Cossacks, swarming everywhere, depopulated and ruined the provinces of Wilna, Vitebsk, Mensk, Smolensk, and Moscow. Nor did the savage system cease with driving off the population of the country districts and destroying houses, barns, and crops. The towns were no more spared than the rural- districts. Between the Niemen and Moscow the flourishing towns of Wilna, Sventziani, Utchatch, Rumen, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Valentina, Jarkovo, Jemlevo, Tertaki, Besovka, with over a hundred villages,were ruthlessly depopulated and set on fire.

Only twice did the Russians venture to oppose Napoleon between the Niemen and the capital. Urged by the remonstrances of the inhabitants of Smolensk, a city deemed by the Russians almost as holy as Moscow, the Russian commander made a stand almost before its gates, and was defeated with terrible slaughter. Then again, at the command of his imperial master, who forbade him to give up Moscow without striking a blow in its defense, Kotusoff made a stand on the Moskwa at the little village of Borodino, where was fought one of the greatest battles of history. Terrible was the loss on both sides. The French admitted a loss of 40,000 in killed and wounded, the latter dying, almost to a man, from neglect, while the most authentic accounts make the Russian loss nearly 60,000,amdin addition to this terrible slaughter they were driven in headlong rout from the field. Kotusoff intended to fight another battle, but the French coming upon him before he could rally, drove him back, and with furled colors and silent drums he marched through the capital, the rear-guard following, and driving out the population of over 300,000. This evacuation of the capital has been represented as spontaneous, but in view of the wellknown methods pursued by the Russians at other points during the campaign, it seems altogether improbable that a great city would be abandoned by its entire population with such precipitation that large quantities of the most valuable property were left without thp slightest apparent effort at preservation. As the commander of the rear guard prepared to evacuate the city, he released all the prisoners in the various jails and houses of detention, and, bringing them before him, promised them freedoms. And large rewards If they would set the city on fire during the French occupation. The day after the Russian evacuation the French moved in; Napoleon passed through the Holy Gate into the Kremlin, took up Us quartan in Alexander's

palace, looking out across the square upon the curious Oriental Cathedral of St. Basil, and offered to his great enemy conditions of peace. 'To his letter no reply was deigned, and tho next day the work of destruction planned by Alexander and Kotusoff was begun by the depraved wretches who were left for that

purpose. The best quarters of the city were destroyed, and, as the- fall was rapidly approaching, the question as to the disposal of the French army during the winter season at onco became prominent. Several plans were proposed; one, to fortify Moscow, gather all the

provisions possible, and remain there during the winter. The second was to retreat direct to Germany as quickly as possible; the third, to go south to the fertile province of Kalouga, and there winter in the midst of plenty. The third was adopted. The army set forth with a strength of less than onehalf of that with which it had entered Russia, and starting to the south, found the Russians had anticipated the movement, and that Kotusoff was there with all his forces. At Malo Jaroslavitz a terrible battle was fought; the Russians were defeated, but as they still showed a formidable front, Napoleon determined to retreat along the line of his advance and make the best of his way back to the Niemen. Then begun the most disastrous movement of'a body of troops ever seen in modem times, and yet distinguished at almost every turn by a brilliancy of generalship that has few equals. After leaving Smolensk, Ney was cut off from the main body, and his division was supposed to be lost, but by incredible offorts and a superhuman display of bravery he rescued his co mmand and rejoined Napoleon on the Beresina. A winter of unusual severity had set in, and in a few days the grand army became a mass of starving humanity. Horses died by thousands of starvation and cold; men perished like flies. Most were from the south of Europe; all were in their summer uniforms, and were utterly unprepared for the cold of an arctic winter. There were no overcoats; the baggage wagons were all left behind; no stores could be saved; there were no provisions, no medicines; the well could not help the sick; the wounded were left to die. As the cold grew more severe deaths by wholesale occurred; as the famine grew worse bits of horseflesh became luxuries; handfuls of burned corn snatched from the ruined stores were dainties. On the arrival of the army on the Beresina, about half way back on the road to Germany, all hope seemed to be taken away. Napoleon had less than 26,000 effective troops and over 70,000 stragglers, sutlers, camp followers, foreigners in Russia who preferred to follow the French army, runaway serfs, soldiers who had lost their arms, women, children, wounded and crippled. He had no artillery, no cavalry. The opposite side of the river was held by the Russians, numbering.over 140,000 men, with an abundance of artillery and many thousands of Cossack cavalry. At his rear hovered a cloud of savage horsemen, while a division of the Russian army was in close pursuit. Never did the genius of Napoleon appear to better advantage. He made preparations for tho worst. Ail the useless baggage wagons were destroyed; the eagles of all the regiments were collected and burned; he cast into the flames all his own private papers and memoranda. The officers who had been able to save their horses ho organized into a band called the "Sacred Squadron.” Colonels, majors and generals acted as private captains, and marshals of France acted as non-commissioned officers and cap- ! tains. Napoleon took every means to | deceive the enemy; bodies of troops { were dispatched down the river as | though he Intended to force a passage at a ford some distance lower down. While Kotusoff was thus deceived, the engineers were set to work at night to build a bridge. Incredible wore the dis-

flcutles under which they labored. There were no proper tools, there was no lumber, even nails were lacking; the river was full of floating ice, which impeded the efforts of the workers. Of the 107 engineers who, through that long, and terrible night, labored from waist deep to neck deep in water, only five survived; but by daylight the bridgo was done. The effective troops passed over, took possession of tha heightson the opposite side., and the host of stragglers began to follow. But the deceived Russians now returned, and established their artillery where it was beyond the reach of the French, and began firing on the bridge. The most awful destruction ensued. • The advancing Cossacks, crowding on the swarms of unarmed fugitives, out them down without mercy; the artillery played upon them as they crossed the bridge, and, as the regular forces of Russians advanced, orders were given to act the bridge on fire. It was done while some thousands of the French fugitives were still on the further side

of the river. In wild despair, some attempted to escape by swimming, others by rushing through the flames. In the spring 36,000 dead bodies were drawn from the Beresina and burned on Its banks. The Russians never ventured another attack, but hovered round the shattered remnants of the Grand Army, cutting oft stragglers, and from a safe distance playing on the retreating columns with their artillery, to which no reply could be made. The cold became extreme. The winter was one of the severest known in Russia. The thermometer sunk to 27 degrees below zero. The retreat became a rout. All organization was lost. Hunger made all equal, and all perished alike. In the morning a ring of corpses round the embers of an extinguished fire indicated the bivouac of the preceding evening. Packs of wolves, flocks of crows, vultures and other birds of prey followed the line of march to feed on the bodies of the dead. Numerous instances of cannibalism occurred, the miserable survivors eating the flesh of their departed comrades. Exclusive of those left at various points to maintain a Hue of communication, the number of men in the French army which actually marched into tho heart of Russia was estimated at 500,000. Of these, 100,000 were killed' in battle

or wounded and perished in the field or in hospital, 100,000 were taken prisoners and died in the Siberian mines, while nearly 150,000 more died of famine or of exposure and cold during the terrible retreat. Never was ruin more complete. Immense as were the losses of the French, those of the Russians were far greater. The mortality in battle vastly exceeded that of the French, and the deaths from hunger weie innumerable. During the advance of the French, the Cossacks, as already stated, burned the cities and towns, and devastated the country, in order that the invaders might tell the story. During the retreat the French burned everything behind them to prevent pursuit. Over 300 cities and villages were thus totally destroyed in the late summer, fall and early winter, and it was computed that 2,000,000 peo-

pie, inhabitants of Russia, were rendored homeless and destitute. Half a dozen of the finest provinces in the empire were ruined, and their inhabitants driven out to starve. Of the 300,000 population of Moscow, over one-third died of privation, and the same proportion was true of other places. It was computed that from battle, famine, cold and exposure during that awful winter no less than 1,000,000 perished. But the winter of 1812-13 did not close the terrible scene. The resources of Napoleon were not exhausted. He hurried home to raise another army and renew the war. To oppose him a merciless conscription was ordered in Russia to obtain troops. The heads of families were taken away, only sons did not escape, and during the following season no crops were sown in the devastated country. The famine continued. There were no relief committees in those days; there were no railroads, no contributions from the benevolent of Europe, for Europe was still busy with the war. Masses of dead bodies on the Beresina, before Smolensk, on the Moskwa near Borodino, and along the line of retreat,

brought pestilence in its worst form. Thousands of Russian peasantry died; just how many there are no means of knowing, but it is computed that in the years 1812, 1813 and 1814, in consequence of the French invasion and its resulting woes, over 1,500,000 Russians perished. Such a calamity has ho parallel In Europe or Western Asia since the days of Tamerlane and Genghis Khan, and the fact that the Russians look from their present misfortune back to the “starving years” of the French invasion sufficiently indicates the nature and extent.of the present terrible misfortune. * S*

A COMMON SIGHT.

NAPOLEON'S HEADQUARTERS AT BORODINO.

A WATER CARRIER IN SMOLENSK.

PEASANT SHELTERS IN LITHUANIA.

A VICTIM OF THE FAMINE.

THE HOLY GATE OF THE KREMLIN.

ON THE BANKS OF THE BERESINA.