Democratic Sentinel, Volume 15, Number 20, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 5 June 1891 — ITS A “DRY” DECISION". [ARTICLE]

ITS A “DRY” DECISION".

' 1 ORIGIN A L-PACK AGE LAW MUST STAND. I'Hlcf Jiislici Fuller Interprets the Act of (iu Favor o>" tho Froh bitory States— Interesting Discussion of the n -latlve Powers of the State and Federal 1 awmaklug I exile*. The United States Supremo Court has lecidod that the original-package law passed by tho last 1 Congress was valid and constitutional, and that it wont into affect in all States where prohibitory laws prevailed without re-enactment by tho States of tho laws by which they forbade tho sa'o of Intoxicating liquors within thoir boundaries, whether imported from other States or not. Chief Justice Fuller lendored tho opinion of the court, and tho bench was united in support of the conclusions at which ho arrived, though Justlco Gray announced that Justices Harlan, Brewer and hinv self did not concur in all tho reasoning of tho opinion of the court. The case upon which tho decision was rendored was that of John M. Wilkerson, Sheriff of Shawnee County. Kansas, vs. Charles A. Rahrer, brought here on appeal from tho decision of tho Circuit Court of the United Statos for tho district of Kansas, against tho Stato. llnhror was tho original-packago agent at Topeka, Kan., of the firm of Maynard, Hopkins & Co. of Kansas City, Mo., and was arrested tho day after tho original-package law went into effect, lie claimod that tho law was unconstitutional and also that It could not go into operation until the Stale had ro-enactocl its prohibitory laws. The court says tho power of the Stato to impose restraints and burdens upon persons and property in the promotbn of tho publ'c health, good order and prosperity is a power always belonging to the States, not surrendered to them by the General Government, nor directly restrained by tho Constitution of tho United States, and essentially exclusive. The power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several States when the subjects are national in their naturo, the court says, Is also exclusive. The Constitution does not provido that interstalo comtnerco shall bo free, but by tho grant of this exclusive powor to regulate It It was left free except as Congress might undertake 1o regulate It. Therefore, it has been determined In Robbins vs. Shelby Taxing District that tho failure of Congress to exercise this exclusive powor in any case Is an expression of its will Unit the subject shall be tree from restrictions or Impositions upon it by tho several Stitos, and if a Stato law comes In conflict with tho will of Congress tho Stato and Congress cannot occupy the position of equal opposing sovereignties because the Constltut on doclurcs its supremacy and that of laws passed In pursuance thereof. The court says that Intoxicating liquors are undoubtedly subjects of commerce, liko any other commodity, and aro so recognized, but nevertheless It has boon often held that laws prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor within Stato limits do not necessarily infringe any constitutional privilege or immunity, this right being vested, as iu the Mugior caso, upon tho acknowledged r ght of the Slates to control thoir puro y internal aflairs, If in sodolng they protect tho health, morals, and safety of thoir people by regulations that do not Interfere with tho powors of tho General Government.

Tho present case arises upon tho theory of ropugnanco between the Stato law and interstate commerce clause of tho Con dilution, and Involves a distinction between tho cerumeiclal power and tho police power which, though quite distinguishable when thoy do not approach each other, are sometimes, like the colors, so nearly allied as to perplex the understanding as tho colors do tho vision. , The court says the lowa laws hold to he unconstitutional in the Loisy originalpaekago case were enacted in the exorcise of the State’S police power and not ut all as regulations of interstate commerce, but as It amounted In effect to a regulation of such commerce, it was hold that so long as Congr. ss did not pass any law to regulate specifically the traffic between the States in Intoxicating liquors, or act in such a way as to allow State laws to operate upon it, Congress thereby indicated its w.ll that such common e should bo free and untiammoled, and therefore that tho laws of lowa wero inoperative so far a- they amounted to regulations of foreign or Interstate commerce In inhibiting tho reception of such articles within the State, or their sale upon arrival In tho form In which Imported. It followed as a corollary that, when Congress acted at all, the result of Its action must be to oporato as a restraint upon that perfect freedom which its silence insured. ( ongress has now spoken, and declared that Imported liquon sha 1 upon arrival In a State fall within the category of domestic articles of a similar nature. Continuing, tho Court says: The laws of Congress did not use term* of permission to the Stato to act, but simply removed an Impediment to the enforcement of the Htata laws In respect to Imported packages in their original condition, created by the absence of a specific utterance on Its part. It Imparted no power to the State not then possessed, but allowed Imported property to fall at once, upon the local jurisdiction. ' The liquor arrived In Kansas prior to the passage of the act of Congress, but thero Is no question presented of the right of the Importer to withdraw the property from the Btate, nor is It perceived that the Congressional enactment Is given a retrospective operation by holding It applicable to a transaction occurring after it took effect. It Is not tho case of a law enacted in the unauthorized exerclso of a power exclusively confided to Congress, but of a law which It was competent for the State to pass but which could not operate upon articles occupying a certain situation until the passage of the act of Congress. That act removes tho obstacle, and no adequate ground Is perceived for holding that a .re-enactment of the State law was required before it could have the effect upon imported which it had always had upon domestic property. Jurisdiction attached, not In virtue of the law of Congress, but because that law placed the property where jurisdiction could attach.