Democratic Sentinel, Volume 9, Number 17, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 22 May 1885 — THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. [ARTICLE]

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

The Story of How McClellan? Was Prevented from Capturing Riefainond and Ending the WarThe Machinations of the: Washington Directory—Stanton's Infamous Treachery. [From the Chicago Times.] It is nearly a quarter of a century since the period when General George B. McClellan was in command of the Army ot the Potomac; and when he was the target ot the missiles hurled by "loya lets” of every grade, from btanton down to the cheapest ot politicians who edited newspapers at some cross-roads or peddled whisky in some backwoods shanty. Hu original er.me was ti.e heinous one of being a Democrat, and although he entertained his political opinions without ostentation, without ever thrusting them forth tor inspection, it made him the object of suspicion on the part of some, and of envy ami hatred on the part of others. He was of the same class as Generals McDowell, Porter, Thomas, Sturgis, and Steele; and the result was that, no matter what these men did, however well and gallantly they fought, they were incessantly the objects of detraction, suspicion, and denunciation. For the urst time, Gen. McClellan has broken silence, and has given to the public some of the facts connected with his famous campaign between Washington and Richmond. It is one of the most humiliating and infamous phases of the civil war, and snould doubly damn in the estimate of decent posterity the men who at Washington used their places to maneuver in the interests ot party, and who, to gain mean partisan advantages, did not hesitate to sacrince the blood and treasure of the country, and to blast the reputation of competent, patriotic men, whose only offense was that they, differed from the capital directory in their party affiliations. Having obtained some brilliant successes in Western Virginia, the very first of the war, McClellan was, the next day after the defeat of Bull Run, appointed to take charge of Washington and the troops of the vicinity. It was a period of terror; the victorious Confederates were expected to appear momentarily, and take a city filled with demoralize ! fugitives from the battlefield ot Manassas. McClellan took command; he brought order out of chaos;, reduced a drunken inob to a disciplined army: erected ample fortifications for the defense of the capital; and when this had been accomplished, and the shivering officials had been, assured of safety, he began the work of organizing an army ot offensive operations against the enemy. Uhls work had to be done from the very, bottom. Gen. McClellan says: “Everything had tq be created from the very beginning. Raw men and officers were to be disciplined and instructed. Artillery, small-arms, and ammunition were to bo fabricated or purchased from abroad; wagons, ambulances, bridge trains, camp equipages, hospital stores, and all the vast impedimenta and material indispensable for an army were to be manufactured.” It was not till the spring of the next year, 1862, that sufficient small-arms were secured and enough field batteries accumulated. When Scott retired McClellan was made com-mander-in-chief of all the armies. He had charge of Washington, the organization of the Army of the Botomac, and the direction of the movements ot the armies of the West Stanton at this time was appointed Secretary of War, and prior to this he had always expressed the most ardent regard for McClellan, "the expression of which,” says Gen. McClellan, “was exceeded only by the bitterness of his denunciation of the Government.” The moment Stanton was in office "it became very difficult to approach him, even for the transaction of ordinary bus ness, and our personal relations at once ceased. The impatience of the Executive immediately became extreme, and I can only attribute it to the influence of the new Secretary, who did many things to break up the free and confidential intercourse that had heretofore existed between the President and myself.” McClellan devised the plan of a campaign against Richmond in which Urbanna, on the Rappahannock River, was to be the base of operations. This was interfered with by a positive order from the President to open the Baltimore and Ohio Railway and relieve the Upper Potomac of Confederate batteries. The leader was positive that the Urbanna movement would ac complied this by forcing all the Confederates at Manassas to fall back to protect Richmond; but the order was positive. He went to Harper’s Ferry and commenced operations, and soon after learned that the President was dissatisfied, whereupon he went to Washington, explained what he had done to Stanton, who said it was perfectly satisfactory, and who also said it was in accord with the views of the 1 resident, and that it was unnecessary for McClellan to communicate with Mr. Lincoln. A little later the President sent for him, and then McClellan learned that no explanation had been made, as Stanton had asserted, and that the President knew nothing ot the Harper s Ferry matter. Here is direct evidence of a most contemptible piece of treachery on the part of the Secretary ot \\ ar, who is spoken of by his admirers as a Carnot, but who, in this light, seems to have been simply an envious Judas. It was at this interview that President Lincoln gave a singular exhibition of timidity. In discussing the Urbanna campaign, he said to McClellan that it had been suggested to him that McClell n had decided on this movement for the "traitorous” purpose of leaving Washington uncovered and exposed to attack. This was at a time when the capital was fortified and defended beyond all possibility of capture. On the sqme day, without any consultation with McClellan, orders were issued forming army corps of the Army of the Potomac, and assigning the corps and division commanders. The Urbanna plan was agreed to by the President, who, soon after, without any consultation with McClellan, issued his famous order directing the Army of the l otomac to advance to the attack ot Manassas. McClellan succeeded in getting this order revoked, but its issuance had interfered with his Urbanna movement. He had intended to get to Urbanna, leaving the Confederate army at Manassas, by which he would be able to place hims If between it and Richmond. The order ot Lincoln sent the Confederates to Richmond, and tne Urbanna plan was ruined. The movements of McClellan from the time he adopted the York River as the base of operations till the transfer of his army to the James River, and the victory at Malvern Hills, were impeded willfully at every step by the Washington authorities. Before starting, it was agreed by the President that he should have 155,000 men tor the campaign. Before he left Washington, Blenker’s division of 10,000 was taken from him; the day he reached Fortress Monroe another 10,000 were withdrawn; at Yorktown, just as he was about to move up the peninsula to seize a critical position, a telegram came from Washington withdrawing the First Corps from his command. This reduced his force 43,000 more, and left him with 92.0G0 men, instead of the 155,0v0 which had been agreed on. Deducting train-guards, the sick, non-combatants, and the like, he was left with an actual effective force ot 6 1,000 men. It is needless to rehearse the events of the Chickahominy campaign. McDowell’s corps was to advance from Fredericksburg and join the Federal right. It never came; the march was begun, and was stopped by orders from, Washington. McClellan, by one ot the most! brilliant movements in the history of war, extricated himself from the Chickahominy swamps, and, in face of a superior force moving on interior lines, transferred his entire army to the James, where he occupied a commanding position against Richmond, and where, at Malvern Hills, he inflicted a crushing defeat on the Confederate forces. From this position the fall of Richm nd and the close of the war were assured within a short time; it was the position that was obtained two years later by Grant at an expense of life toe horrible to contemplat ■. But the administration then was not so much warring aizainst the Con.ederates as against McClellan; he was removed, and the Army of the Potomac was taken from the James River. These facts and many others of importance are presented in McClellan’s paper in the Century, "The Peninsular Campaign." They prove, in the light of subsequent events, that the campaign was one ot the best-conceived during the war, but was defeated solely by the machinations of th# Washington directory. After a perusal ot the article, no fair man can doubt for an instant that if McClellan had been supported to one-twentieth the extent Grant was, two years later, Richmond would have been captured in July, 1862, and the war would i have ended. His entire army was onlv about I equal to the number lost by Grant in the four | battles from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor.