Democratic Sentinel, Volume 7, Number 40, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 2 November 1883 — THE CIVIL RIGHT'S DECISION. [ARTICLE]

THE CIVIL RIGHT'S DECISION.

The Opinion of Justice Bradley Voiolng the Eindings of the Supreme Court. So Authority for the Law in the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments. Negroes Must Seek Bedress in State Courts as Citizens Without Special Legal Guardianship. The following are the main points la the deeision of the Supreme Court In the civilrights oases. After quoting the first two sections of the act, Justice Bradley, who delivered the opinion, says; Has Congress constitutional power to make such a law? Of course, no one will contend that the power to pass it was contained in toe constitution before the adoption of the last three amendments. Power is sought first In the Fourteenth amendment. The first section (which is the one relied on), alter declaring who shall be citizens of the United States and the several- States, is prohibitory In its character (and prohibitory upon the State*.) It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual.invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes v<sid all State legislation and State action of every kind which impairs the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or,which injures them in life, liberty or prosperity without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws. It not only does this, but,in order that the national will thus declared may not be mere brutum fulmen , the last section of the amendment invests Congress with the power to enforce it with appropriate legislation. To enforce what? To eniorce prohibition. To auopt appropriate legislation tor correcting the eftects of such prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus to render them effectually null, void and innocuous. This Is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and this is the whole of it. It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State legislation, but to provide modes of relief against State legislation or State action of the kind referred to. Until some State law has been passed or some State action through its officers or agents been taken adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment nor any proceeding under such legislation can be called into activity, for the prohibitions of the amen i-ment-s are against State laws and acts done under State authority. An inspection of the law here in question shows that it applies equally to cases arising in the States which have ihe justest laws respecting the personal rights of citizens, and whose authorities are ever ready to enforce such laws, as to those which arise in States that may have violated the prohibitive amendment. In other words, it ste.-s into the domain of local jurisprudence and lays down rules for the conduct of individuals lit society toward each other, and Imposes sanct.ons for the enforcement of those rules without referring in any manner, to any sujiposed action of the State or iflß authorities. If this legislation is appropriate for Enforcing the prohibition amendment it is difficult to see where'it is to stop. Why may not Congress, with cn equal show of authority, enact a oode of laws for the enforcement and vindication of all rights of life, liberty and property? If it is not supposable that States may deprive persons of life, liberty, and property without due process of law (and the amendment itself does not suppose this), why should not Congress prooeed at once to prescribe a due process of law for the protection of every one of these fundamental rights in every possible case, as well as to prescribe equal privileges in inns, public conveyances and theaters? Judge Bradley refers to the Civil Rights bill of. April 4, 1866, and shows it “ is clearly corrective in its character, intended to counteract and furnish redress against State laws and proceedings and customs having the force of law which sanction the wrongful acts specified.”

In this connection it is proper to state that civil rights such as are guaranteed by the constitution against State aggression cannot be impaired by tne wrongful acts of individuals unsupported by State authority, in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual unsupported by any such authority is simply a private wrong or crime of that individual —an invasion ot the rights of the injured party, it is true, whether they affect his person, his property or his reputation; but.il not sanctioned in some way by the State, or not done under its authority, his rights renfain in full force and may presumably be vindicated by resorts to the laws of the State for redress. An individual cannot deprive a man of his right to vote, to hold property, to buy and sell, to sue in the courts, or to be a witness or juror. He may, by force or iraud, interfere with tlie enjoyment of a right in a particular case. He may commit assault against a person, or commit murder, or use ruffianly violence at the polls, or slander the good name of a fellow-citizen, but, unless protected in these wrongful acts by some shield of State law or State authority, he cannot destroy or injure the right. He will only render himself amenable to satisfaction or punishment, and amenable therefore to the laws of the State where the wrongful acts are committed. If the principles of interpretation we have laid down are correct, as we deem them to be, it is clear the law in question cannot be sustained by any grant of legisla iye power made to Congress by the Fourteenih amendment. But the power of Congress to adopt and direct primary as distinguished from corrective legislation on the subject in hand is sought In the second place from the Thirteenth amendment, which abolishes slavery and gives Congress power to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation. This amendment, as well as the Fourteentu, is undoubtedly self-execu-tory without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances. By its own unaided torce and effort it abolished slavery and established universal freedom. Still legislation may be necessary and proper to meet, all the various cases and circumstances affected by it and to prescribe proper mode- of redress for its violation in letter or spirit, and such legislation may be primary and direct in its character, for ihe amendment is not a mere pronibitim of Btate laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary s ervitude, shall not exist in any part of the United Btates. Now, conceding for the sake of argument that admission to an inn, public conveyance, or place of public amusement on equal terms with all oiher ci lzens is the r ght of every man and all classes of men, is it any more than one of those rights which the Btates by the Fourteenth amendment are forbidden to denv to any person, and is the constttut.oii violated until tne denial of right has tome Slate sanction or authority? Can the acof a mere individual, the owner of an inn, public conveyance, or place of amusement in refusing accommodation be justly regarded as imposing any i.adge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant, or only a- inflicting an ordinary civil injury property cognizable by the laws of the Btate and presumably subject to redress by those laws until the contrary appears? After giving to these onest'ons all ihe consideration which tucir tmnortance demands, we are foiced to the conclusion that such an act of refusal has nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude, and that If it is violative of any right of a partv, his redress is to be sought under the Kiw of tlie Btate, or, if those aws are adverse to his rights and do not protect him, liis remedy will be found in the corrective legislation wnlch Congress has adopted or may adopt tor counteracting the effect of the State laws cr State action prohibited by the Fonrteentu amendment, ltwould be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see tit as to a guest t e will entertain or as to the people he will take into his coach, or cab, or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal within other matters of intercourse or business. Innkeepers and public carriers by law in all States, so far as we are aware, are bound to the extent of tnoir facilities to furnish proper accomodation to all unobjectionable persons who, in good faith, apply fir them. If the laws themselves make any unjust discrimination amenable to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth amendment. Congress has full power to afford’a remedy under that amendment and in accordance with it. When a man has emerged from slavery and by the aid of legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the ran i of a mere citizen and ceases to be a special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen or manarfto be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected. There were thousands of free colored pe pie in this country, before the abolition of slaveir. enjoying all the essential rights of life, liberty and pronerty the same as white citizens; yet no one at that time thought it was any invasion of

their personal status as free men becafise tiler were not admitted to all the privileges enjoyeß by white citizens, or because they were subjected to discriminations in the enjoyments of the accommodations of inns, public conveyances and places of amusement; mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as a badge of slavery. I? since that time the enjoyment, of equal rights in all these respects has become established by constitutional enactment, it is not by force of the Thirteenth amendment (which merely abolishes slavery), but by force of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments. On the whole, we are of oolnion that no countenance of authority for the passage of the law In question can be found in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution, and, no other ground of authority for its pas-age being suggested, it muse necessarily be declared void, at least so far as its operation in the several States is concerned.