Democratic Sentinel, Volume 7, Number 14, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 4 May 1883 — THE IOWA AMENDMENT. [ARTICLE]

THE IOWA AMENDMENT.

Heaßrmat’on by the Supreme Court of the State of the First Decision Kentiered —Reasons for Declaring: the Action of the Legislature and People Null and Void. The Judges of the lowa Supreme Court have again decided adversely to the Prohibition constitutional amendment, adopted by the people last fall. There are two opinions, Judge Beck dissenting, as in the former rendering. Following is the summary of the majority decision: The question of the court’s jurisdiction is elaborately considered, and the case of Luther vs. Borden, upon which the appellants mainly relied upon, the rehearing, is considered at length. It i« shown that that case involved the question as to the right of a court holding its powers under a constitution to pass upon the validity of the constitution under which it Is itself organized, and that it has no application whatever to an amendment not affecting the judicial authority or the court; that the right of a people to alter or reform their Government at pleasure consists simply in the right to change the existing Constitution in the manner provided in it, or by revolution, which is a right not under but above the Constitution; that the right of revolution can be made elective only by superior force, and that failure subjects those undertaking to inaugurate the change to the penalties of treason; that un* less voluntary acquiescence is yielded to a pro* posed change in the Constitution, the question can be determined only by an appeal to the courts, or an appeal to arms, and that the maintenance of social security and of republican institutions requirel that the" courts should determine the question. The opinion maintains that this jurisdiction has been exercised in the seven States of Alabama, Missouri, Kansas, Indiana, Michigan, North Carolina and Wisconsin, and has been denied in none. In the course of the opinion upon this branch of the case the court says: ■■lt is well that the powers of the people and their relations to organized society should be understood. No heresy has ever been taught in this country so franght with evil as the doctrine that the people have a constitutional right to disregard the Constitution, and that they can set themselves above the instrumentalities appointed by the Constitution for the administration of law. It tends directly to the encouragement of revolution and anarchy. It is incumbent upon all who Influence and mold public opinion to repudiate and discountenance so daugerous a doctrine before it bears fruits destructive of institutions. ‘ It will be well if the people come to understand the difference between national and constitutional freedom before license becomes destructive of liberty.” As to the conclusiveness of the recital of the Nineteenth General Assembly that the Eighteenth General Assembly hud duly agreed to and entered upon its journals the same resolution that the Nineteenth Gen rat Assembly was about to submit to the people, the court holds that there is nothing in the constitution or the statute or the. nature of the subject making the recital conclusive; that the District Court is a court of general jurisdiction; that everything 1b presumed to be within its jurisdiction until the contrary is shown, and that the burden is upon those who deny that the jurisdiction of the court extends to inquiry into this recital to establish that fact, and that they have failed to do so; that the jurisdiction of the Nineteenth General Assembly to submit the proposition to thepeop e depended upon th>; fact that the Eighteenth General Assembly had agreed to the same proportion, and that the Nineteenth General Assembly could not stop the courts from inquiring into this jurisdictional fact by a mere recital that the facts exists, especially as ihc journal of the Eighteenth General Assembly, whichis the constitutional record of its proceedings, shos that the fact did not exist. The court maintain that even the action of a court is void and liable to be collaterally i peached if its records show that the fact upon wiiich its jurisdiction, depends does not exist. After a full review of the authorities cited upon this branch of the case, the court closes this point of the opinion aS follows; “The constitution makes three steps necessary for the adoption of an amendment — viz.: the proposal of an amendment in one General Assembly and its entry upon the journals; the agreement thereto by the next General Assembly and its submission to the people; and the approval and ratification thereof by the people. These steps are distinct, independent and essential. No one of them can be dispensed with. It is necessary that the proposition shall be concurred in by two successive General Assemblies. If, however, one General Assembly can cut off all inquiry into the action of its predecessor by a mere recital of what it has done, it follows that an amendment may be incorporated Into the constitution which has never received the sanction of more than one General Assembly. Such a construction might lead to a clear violation of the constitution. We cannot give it our sanction.” r Upon the question as to whether the resolution as enrobed is better evidence of the legislative action than the reso ution as entered upon the journal of the Senate of «he Eighteenth • General Assembly, the court holds that the constitution requires ea h house of the General Assembly to keep a journal of its proceedings, and the statute provides that the proceedings are proved by the journal; that there is neither constitutional nor statutory provision nor rule of the General Assembly requiring the enrollment of a resolution proposing an amendment to the constitution. The court holds that the journal upon, which the constitution requires an entry of the amendment to be made constitutes the bet’ er evidence of the terms of an amendment nropo.-ed. Upon this branch of the case the court says: “No authority has at any time been cited during the progress of this case which holds that, as to a paper requir dto b) entered upon the journal, the enrollment can ovirrule the journal entry as to a bill. We concede the correctness o's t‘.:e authorities cited. Under tde custom of legislation the enrolled bill is presented to the Speaker of the House and the Pres dent Of the Senate for their signatures, and is approved by the Governor. It is in all respects treated as the original act. No entry,of it is required to be made upon the journal, and hence the journal could not contain any evidence of its contents. But, with regard to a proposition for an amendment of the constitution, whether it be in the form of a resolution or of a bill, the provisions of the constitution are different. That is required to be entered upon the journal, and if this requirement is observed the journal does contain evidence of its contents. It is evident that the authoriti _s which apply to the case of an ordinary bill have no application whatever to the resolution inquestion.” The discusses and answers the various position of counsel on the argument upon rehearing, and concludes the opinion as follows: “We have approached and discussed this grave question with a full appreciation of the responsibilities which it involves, and we have given to its consideration the earnest attention which its importance demands. We have sought to maintain the supremacy of the constitution at whatever hazard. It is for the protection of minorities that constitutions are framed. Sometimes constitutions must be Interposed for the protection of majorities, even against themselves. Constitutions are adopted in times of public repose, when sober reason holds her citadel, and are designed to check the surging passions in times of popular excitement. But if courts could be coerced by popular majorities into a disregard of their provisions, constitutions would become mere ropes of sand, and there would be an end of social security and of constitutional freedom. The cause of temperance can sustain no injury from the loss of this amendment which would be at all comparable to the Injury to republican institutions which a plain and palpable violation of the constitution would inflict. That large and respectable class of moral reformers which so justly demands the observance and enforcement of law cannot afford to take its first reforma ory step by a violation of the constitution. How can It consistently demand of others obedience to a constitution which it violates itself? The people can in a short time re-enaot the amendment. In the matter of a great moral reform, the loss of a few years is nothing. The constitution is the palladium of republican freedom. The young men coming forward upon the stage of political action must be educated to venerate it; those already upon the stage must be taught to obey it, whatever interests may be advanced or may suffer. Whoever or whatever mav be voted up or voteji down, no sacrilegious hand must be laid upon the constitution. Abidingly and firmly convinced of the correctness of oiir former conclusion, recognizing no superior higher than the constitution, acknowledging no fealty greater than loyalty to its principles, and fearing no consequences except those which would result from a derelection in duty, we adhere to and reaffirm the doctrines already announced. The petition for rehearing is overruled. THE DISSENTING OPINION. Justice Beck’s dissenting opinion takes the broad ground that the adoption of an amendment by the people of lowa is a purely political question; that the courts of the State nave no jurisdiction over the matter whatever, and that the vote of the people having declared the amendment a part of the State Constitution, no errors that may have occurred in passing or publishing the amendment should have any weight whatever in determining its legality. The Judge quotes from many authorities that sustain the position taken by him.