Democratic Sentinel, Volume 6, Number 22, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 30 June 1882 — THE PARTY TAX. [ARTICLE]

THE PARTY TAX.

An Enormous Corruption Fund Beinfj liaised by tlie Republican Eeaders—An Infamous Farty Programme, [From the Chicago Times.] The President’s party vicegerent in Pennsylvania (Mr. Cameron) has levied upon the income of each of the eleven Bessemer steel companies in that prov - ince a tax of SI,OOO for the purposes of the party campaign. The companies, it is said, have all paid, or given notice of their readiness to pay the tax, which, by comparison to the party tax which has been levied on the stipends of Government officers and employes, is a light one. The party tax on official stipends is 2 per cent. This rate, levied on the $1,200 salary of a one-legged assistant door-keeper, amounts to $24; on the SSOO and $750 stipends of house pages (who are generally the sons of depend ent widows) the amount it requires each youth to pay into the party treasury is from $lO to sls. But the party tax of SI,OOO on the profits which any one of the Bessemer steel companies derives from the operation of the “protective” tariff of about 100 per cent, on that commodity represents a rate of taxation not exceeding one-half of 1 per cent. That is to say, the rate of party taxation which the President, by his party Lieu - tenants, levies on the public income of the Bessemer steel monopolists is only one-quarter the rate which he levies on the public income of Government officers and employes. There manifestly is a most “ unjust discrimination.” By “ public income ” is meant income derived from public revenue, or from the effective operations of the revenue laws. The income of public officers trom their official compensations (on which the party tax is levied) is paid out of the public treasury. The same money comes into the public treasury from duties on imports. Thus the party tax levied on the stipend of the officeholder is levied on an income which he derives indirectly from the operation of the Tariff law. The same law gives to the Bessemer steel manufacturer a large part of his large income. He derives it not indirectly but directly from the operation of the Tariff law. The money he gains by that operation is not transferred from the earnings of the people into the public treasury, and thence into his pocket, as in the case of the officeholder, but passes directly from the earnings of the people to his pocket. The principle is the same, however, in both cases ; for in both cases the income derived from the operation of the Tariff law is money taken from the earnings of the people by the authority and power of Government And it is on this ground that the President’s party lays its taxes on the income of both the officeholder and the Bessemer steel monopolist, and on this ground that both of them pay the tax. The officeholder knows that if he refuses to pay the tax the party will stop his income by dismissing him from his place. Rather than lose all his income, he pays 2 per cent, of it to the President’s party tax-gatherer. The Bessemer steel monopolist has reason to believe that if he refuses to divide with the party the profit which the party, by its tariff policy, has enabled him to get, the party will reduce his income by changing the tariff duties which are the bulwarks of his monopoly. Seeing that the party has taxed his tariff gains only one-quarter as heavily as it has taxed the poor officeholder’s income from the Tariff law, he pays over the amount without grumbling. Thus, the exchequer of the President’s party in Pennsylvania is repleted with SII,OOO by a tax of rather less than one-half of 1 per cent on the tariff gains of eleven “protected” Bosse mer steel monopolies. It is understood that the Presidential party plans for the fall campaign include the levying of taxes on the tariff profits of other great “protected” monopolies, and that payment of the tax of 2 per cent, on official salaries-will be enforced with the greatest vigor. Both a blacklist of those who refuse to pay the tax and a white-list of those who pay it are kept; and those whose names shall be found in the black-list are warned that it will be prudent to arrange their private affairs with a view to an early discontinuance of their relations to the

public service. Should all of them pay the tax—and it is not believed that any considerable number will refuse to pay it—the party coffers will receive no less than $2,000,000 from the officeholders alone. With this enormous corruption fund the President’s party Lieutenants believe they will be able to break down the formidable revolt in Pennsylvania, get the “ verdict of the people” in all the doubtful provinces, and secure control of the next House to the President’s party by a large majority. There are just two ways in which the execution of this virtuous programme can be prevented. One is in the hands of the people ; but its successful application depends on the manifestation of a canability and a willingness of the politcal people to do what free representative Government requires to be done to keep it standing which has not been manifested in this country during a very long period. It is in the power of the electors to break down and cast out the party machine and party bosses who seek to control their political action by means of vast bribery funds exacted from the pay of their public servants and contributed by monopolists who have taken the Government for their partner in business. Will the electors exert their power ? Will they break away from the appliances of the machine ? Will they resist and overcome the corrupting potency of enormous bribery funds ? There is not a single fact in our past political experience to encourage an opinion that they will. The other way to defeat the programme of bribery is in the hands of the President. By a word the President can stop the-coll ection of the party tax which his party Lieutenants have levied on the stipends of his administration subordinates. He is the head of the administration. Every officer and employe of the Government is an agent of his authority, dependent on his will. The power to remove and the power to appoint are his, directly or indirectly, from the highest tq the lowest member of the vast official establishment. He has but to declare his displeasure with the taxing of their salaries for party purposes, to express his wish that no person connected with the administration shall pay the tax, and let it be known that none will hazard the loss of his place by refusal, to bring the programme of controlling the expression of the country by means of * bribery to a sudden and complete stop. Will the President exert the power and influence of his great office to stop this infamous programme ? To indulge the notion that he will do so would betray imbecility. To doubt that the party tax on all official salaries has been levied with his knowledge and consent, to doubt that he wishes it to be paid, or that he will exert the power of his office to enforce its cbllection, would be a display by adult men of the innocence ot babes. The party tax on official stipends has been levied because its levy was the will of the President. It will be collected because it is the will of the President that the officers shall pay it. It is a party programme, the most corrupting and infamous it is possible to imagine ; but it is a party programme which has its source in the desire and its fulfillment in the power of a party President. It is one of the worst phases of the spoils system. And yet there are alleged civilservice reformers who affect to believe that the spoils system, which has its source in tiip desire of a party President, can be discontinued without disturbing its source.