Democratic Sentinel, Volume 3, Number 47, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 2 January 1880 — M’CLELLAN AND LEE. [ARTICLE]

M’CLELLAN AND LEE.

Hi« Seven Days’ Campaign Before Richmond. Gen. A. L. Long, Military Secretary of Gen. Lee, commanding the Confederate army at Richmond, lias written a newspaper account of the operations of the “ Seven Days’Fight” from a Southern standpoint, from which we transcribe the following: When Gen. McClellan crossed the Chickahominy it was thought he would advance immediately upon Richmond. This expectation was disappointed, however, for instead of advancing he began to fortify his position. The right wing rested on the Chickahominy, a little below New bridge, and the left extended to the White Oak swamp, embracing a front of about four miles, nearly parallel with that of the Confederates. The opposing lines were separated by an interval but little exceeding a mile, but each was obscured from tho other’s view by the intervening forest. The picket linos were often within close musket range of each other. At first thero was a good deal of picket skirmishing, but this was soon discontinued by consent, and a lively exchange of Newspapers, coffee and tobacco succeeded it. Tlio ofcrongtL of the Confederate forces was always greatly over-estimated by Gen. McClellan, and his frequent aud urgent calls for reinforcements exposed his timidity and want of confidence in his own strength. Gen. Lee, knowing this uneasy, insecure feeling of his antagonist, and McDowell’s force, which had always been a thorn in his side, being about this time withdrawn from Fredericksburg for the support of Banks and Shields in tho valley, prepared to assume the offensive. He conceived the bold plan of crossing the Chickahominy and attacking tho Federal right wing to force it back and to seize Gen. McClellan’s line of communication with his base of operations. This plan being successfully executed, the Federal General would be compelled to savo his army as best he could by retreat. Preparatory to the execution of this plan, Gen. J. E. B. Stuart was ordered to make a reconnoiseance in the rear of the Federal position. This officer, with a force of about 1,000 cavalry, executed his instructions with great boldness and success. He made the ontiro circuit of the Federal army and gained much important information. His design being confirmed by Stuart’s successful roconnoissauco, Gen. Lee proceeded to organize a forco requisite for the accomplishment of his proposed enterprise. Tho troops that could be conveniently spared from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia were ordered to Richmond. By the 20th of June, Maj. Gen. Holmes, with 0,000 men from North Carolina; Brig. Gen. Ripley, with 0,000 from South Carolina, aud Brig. Gen. Lawton, with 5,000 from Georgia, had arrived in Richmond. At the same time Gen. Jackson was ordered to withdraw secretly from the valley and proceed with such expedition as would enable him to reach Hanover Junction by the afternoon of the 25tli of Juuo. In order to mask his designs from the Federals, Gen. Lee directed Whiting's division and Lawton’s brigade to proceed to Staunton, apparently with the view of reinforcing Gen. Jackson, but really ordered to return immediately and join that General on the 25th at Hanover Junction. This movement further strengthened Gen. McClellan in the opinion of the vastly superior force of Gen. Lee, and completely blinded him in regard to tho real intentions of that General.

Gen. Lee determined to attack the Federal right wing on the morning of the 26th of Jline. Gen. Jackson was directed to move to Atlee’s Station, on the Central railroad; Gen. A. P. Hill was directed to cross the Chickahominy at Meadow bridge, as soon as Jackson arrived in supporting distance, and attack tho Federals at Meehanicsville, drive them from that place, so that tho bridge on the Richmond and Meohanicsvillo road might be open for the advance of the other troops. Generals Longstreet and D. H. Hill were ordered to move their divisions as near as practicable to the Mechanicsville- bridge without discovering themselves to the observation of the Federals, while Magruder, Huger and Holmes held the lines that were now completed with instructions to watch closely tho movements of the enemy in their front and act as circumstances might suggest. The effeotive force of the Army of Northern Virginia, including that brought by Gen. J-c'tson from the valley, as shown by the field returns of June 24 and 25, amounted to a little over 81,000 men. Thirty thousand of these were left in observation under Gen. Magruder, while Gen. Lee led 50,000 to the attack of the Federal force north of the Chickahominy, which amounted to about 25,000 men, commanded by Gen. Fitz John Porter. One division of this force, about 6,000 or 7,000 strong, under the command of Gen. J. B. Reynolds, occupied Mechanicsville at the extreme right of the Federal position. The main body, under the immediate command of Gen. Porter, was posted near Cold Harbor or Gaines’ Mill, about six miles below Mechanicsville, and connecting by bridges with the main body of the Federal army south of the Chickahominy. Gen. Jackson having bivouacked at Ashton on the night of the 23th, and his men Leing fatigued by previous long marches, did not reach his designated position in line of battle until the afternoon of she 26th. This delay was very ombarrassing to Gen. Lee, and greatly increased the difficulty of executing his plan of operations, as it exposed his design to the enemy and allowed him time to prepare for the approaching storm. Gen. A. P. Hill, on the arrival of Gen. Jackson—about 4 o’clock— crossed the Chickahominy and made a spirited attack ©n the Federal force at Mechanicsville, and compelled it to retire to a po-

sition which had been previously prepared beyond the Beaver dam, a small stream about one mile southeast of the village. The way being now open the divisions of Longstreet and D. H. Hill began to cross the Chickahominy. Ripley’s brigade, which was the first to cross, was ordered to support A. P. Hill in his attempt to dislodge the Federals from their new position. Failing in their first attempt to dislodge them, the approach of night prevented any other being made to carry their position. Gen. Reynolds, finding nis position would be turned, retired during the flight to Gaines’ 'Mill. On the morning of the 27th Gen. Lee formed his army into three columns, the division of A. P. Hill forming the center, moved by the main road from Mechanicsville to Gaines’Mill; Longstreet moved by a road between this and the Chickahominy, while Jackson and D. H. Hill moved by a road to the left which intersected the Mechanicsville road a mile and a half beyond Gaines’ Mill, or Cold Harbor. Stuart, with his cavalry, covered the left flank of the army as it advanced. The guide, having received indefinite instructions from Jackson, led his column by a road that intersected with the Mechanicsville road before- reaching Gaines’ Mill. This brought the head of Jackson’s column against Hill’s troops. Jackson being obliged to countermarch in order to gain the right road caused a delay of several hours in the operations of Gen. Leo and materially affected his plan of attack. It was his intention that when Gen. Jackson reached tho Mechanicsville road he should form his troops in order of battle and attack the Federal right while A. P. Hill attacked the center and Longßtreet the left. The Federal position near Gaines’ Mill was a plateau, bounded on the northwest side by a bluff eighty or ninety feet in elevation, which, curving to the north and oast, gradually diminished into a gentle slope. The plateau was bounded on its north side by a stream flowing along its base, whose banks gradually widened and deepened until, when reaching tho bluff, they had gained the width of eight or ten and the depth of five or six feet, thus forming a natural ditch. Three lines of breastworks, rising one above the other, had been constructed upon the base of the bluff and its crest was crowned with artillery. Three lines of Federal infantry occnpied the bluff and one line extended along the northeast crests for more than a mile, and batteries of artillery were in position in the rear of the infantry. The Federal position was very strong, and to carry it required tho greatest bravery and resolution on the part of the assailants. Gen. McClellan, being now fully aware of Gen. Leo’s real design, reinforced Gen. iuiue to between 40,000 and 50,000 men. When the columns of Hill and Longstreet had arrived in easy attacking distance Gen. Lee caused them to halt in order to give Gen. Jackson time to gain his position. Waiting until 1 o’clock Gen. Lee ordered Longstreet and A. P. Hill to commence the attack. The Confederate skirmishers advanced and drove in the Federal pickets. While the column of Longstreet advanced by the road to Dr. Gaines’ house and that of Hill by the main Mechanicsville road, the Federal position was hidden from Hill by the intervening road. Deploying several regiments to support his skirmishers, he pushed them through the woods. Very soon the Federal line was developed by a heavy fire of musketry. Hill’s column then deployed and advanced to the attack on the Federal center. When Longstreet arrived at Gaines’ house ho was in full view of the Federal left.

Taking advantage of an intervening ridge, j,he crest of which was parallel with and about 300 yards from the Federal lines, he deployed his troops under its cover Hearing Hill’s attack, Longstreet approached to gain the Federal left. His first line on reachiug the crest of the ridge was met by a storm of shot and shell; without faltering it swept down the slope toward the Federal position in the face of a terrible fire of artillery and musketry until arrested by the wide and steep banks of the stream at the foot. Being unable to cross it, this line was obliged to fall back. These troops, although much cut up, re formed for a second attack. Several Confederate batteries Were served with considerable effect in oovering the advance of the infantry. D. H. Hill, on reaching the scene of action, look position on the left of A. P. Hill and engaged the enemy. The battle having become general, Gen. Lee sent several staff officers to bring up Jackson’s troops to the support of Hill and Longstreet. Whiting’s division and Lawton’s brigade were the first to arrive. Whiting was directed to fill the interval between Longstreet and A. P. Hillaud Lawton was sent to the left of D. H. Hill to engage the Federal right. Gens. Ewell, Earley and Winder, as they arrived, were sent to the support of the Hills, and one brigade was sent tc the suppoit of Longstreet. Gen. Jackson led in person the remainder of his troops against the Federal right. The battle had raged with great fury for more than two hours, and the Federal lines seemed as unshaken as when it first began. The Confederates had been repulsed in several attempts to force the Federal lines. Tho day was now drawing to a close and Gen. Lee decided to end the conflict by a charge of the whole line. The word “ charge,” as it passed along the line, was responded to by a wild shout and au irresistible rush on the Federal position. The Texas brigade, led by the gallant Hood, was the first to penetrate the Federal works. They were immediately followed by other troops, and in a few minutes the whole position was carried and the plateau was oovered with a mass of fugitives. The Federals were in full flight, pursued by the Confederates, who delivered deadly volleys at every step.

While Gen. Lee was attacking Porter’s position at Gaines’ Mill, Gen. Magruder made a spirited demonstration against that of McClellan, on the south side of the Chickahominy. This double attack served to bewilder McClellan, and caused him to withhold reinforcements that would otherwise have been sent to Porter. This battle is considered by many as the most stubbornly contested battle of the war. It is true that the troops on both sides displayed great valor and determination, and proved themselves worthy of the great nation to which they belonged. Gen. Porter deserves great credit for the skillful selection of his position and the gallant manner in which he defended it. The victory was complete. When night closed the Confederates were in undisputed possession of the field. The next morning Gen. Lee directed Gen. Stuart, with his cavalry, supported by Ewell’s division of infantry, to seize the York River r ailroad. Gen. McClellan was thus cut off from his base of supplies and reduced to the necessity of retreating by one of two routes—tho one by the Peninsula, the other by the James river, under the cover of the gunboats. He chose the latter as the shortest and easiest. Gen. Lee remained on the 28th on the north side of the Chickahominy in observation of Gen. McClellan’s movements. Instructions were sent at the same time to Magruder to keep a vigilant watch on the Federals and report any movement that might be discovered without delay; These instructions were

not as faithfully executed as they should have been, for the retreat of the Federals had commenced on the morning of the 28th, and was not discovered until the morning of the 29th, when the Federal lines wore found to be abandoned by two of Gen. Lee’s engineer officers, Capts. Meade and Johnston, although the Confederate pickets were in many places less than half a mile from the Federal lines.

Gen. Magruder on this occasion lost his usual audacity, and with a vision of Austerlitz before him' was in constant expectation of beholding a Napoleon bursting his thin lines and forcing a passage to Richmond. The safe retreat of McClellan to the James is mainly dne to the advantage thus gained. When Gen. Lee on the morning of the 29th found that the Federal army was in retreat he ordered an immediate' pursuit-. All of the troops on the north •f the Chickahominy, with the exception of the divisions of Ewell and Jackson and Stuart’s cavalry, which were to remain in observation, lest the Federals might change their line of retreat, were ordered to recross that stream with the view of overtaking the retreating columns. Gen. Lee, on recrossing the Chickahominy, found Magruder, Huger and Holmes preparing to pursue the retreating Federal army. At 12 o’clock the pursuit was commenced, and about 3 Magruder came upon Sumner’s corps, which was in position near Savage’s station. Gen. Heintzelman having retired, Sumner’s and Franklin’s corps had to receive Magruder’s attack unsupported. Gen. Sumner held his position with great obstinacy until night ended the conflict. This determined stand of Gen. Sumner’s enabled the Federal array to make a safe passage oi the White Oak swamp. In the afternoon of the 29th, Gen. Jackson was directed to cross the Chickahominy and relieve Magruder in the pursuit. Gen. Lee directed tho other divisions of his a {my to march by several roads leading in the direction of Gen. McClellan’s line of retreat, with the view of striking his column the flank while Jackson pressed him in the rear. About 3 o’clock on the 30th, Gen. Lee, with the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, struck the Federal column at Frazier’s farm, and a fierce combat ensued, which was closely contested until night. Contrary to his expectations, he was not supported in this attack by Gens. Jackson and Huger, consequently Gen. McClellan again escaped, and continued his retreat, during the night, to Malvern hill.

The delay on the part of Gen. Jackson was very unusual. The explanation of this delay on this occasion was that, being greatly exhausted by long marches and battles for more than a week, he sought a short repose. His staff, out of regard for their General, allowed him to sieep jui ueyona tne time he had allowed himself. When he awoko he was greatly chagrined at the loss of time that had occurred, the loss of which he was unable to repair. Though Gen. Lee accomplished all that was at .first proposed, yet had the parts assigned some of his subordinates been performed with the exactness that was naturally expected, the results of his operations would have been far greater than those shown in the sequel. The experience of Sully may be here applied to Lee. “ Expeiience taught him that the speed of one legion, the inactivity of another, the obstinacy, the ignorance or the treachery of a subordinate officer was sufficient to mar the best concerted plan, nay, that the intervention of a shower of rain, an unexpected ditch or any apparently trivial accident, might determine the fate of a whole army,” etc.

On the morning of the Ist of July it was discovered that Gen. McClellan had occupied in force the strong position of Malvern hill; his powerful artillery swept every approach, and the shot of the gunboats fell beyond the Confederate lines. After a careful reconnoissance of Gen. McClellan’s position, Gen. Lee determined to attack his left. His first lines, composed of the divisions of Magruder, D. H. Hill and Jackson, was advanced urfder cover of the wood near the base of the hill. Magruder on the right was ordered to attack the Federals, while Hill aud Jackson threatened their center and right. The attack was delayed until near sundown, when Magruder made a most gallant attack. By dint of hard fighting his troops gained the crest of the hill and forced back the Federal left, but were iu turn driven back. The firing continued along the line until 10 o’clock. Confederates lay upon their arms where the battle closed, ready to resume the fight as soon, as the daylight should appear. Under the cover of the Dight Gen. McClellan secretly retired—his retreat being facilitated by a heavy fall of rain,which deadened the sound of his withdrawal. The Confederates the next morning, groping through the dense fog, came upon the abandoned lines. This was the first information they had of the retreat. Gen. McClellan had now gained the protection of the Federal gunboats, therefore Gen. Lee did not pursue, but ordered a day’s rest, which the troops greatly needed. Gen. McClellan continued his retreat to Harrison’s landing, on the James river, where he took up a position. Gen. Lee advanced the next day to that neighborhood, and, after a careful reconnoissance of their position, he deemed it inadvisable to attack, and, as there was no probability of the Army of the Potomac speedily resuming operations, he returned to his former camp near Richmond, to rest, recruit, and reorganize his army. While in the vicinity of Harrison’s landing the attack of Col. J. Thompson Brown’s artillery upon the Federal gunboats afforded a brilliant episode to the last scene of the military drama that had just been acted.