Democratic Sentinel, Volume 1, Number 49, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 18 January 1878 — EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENTS. [ARTICLE]

EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENTS.

Letter from Senator Edmunds to the President in Regard to Official Patronage. We give below the full text of the recent letter written by Senator Edmunds, of Vermont, to President Hayes, upon the subject of civilservice appointments. It was in answer to the President’s request for his opinions upon the subject: United States Senate Chamber, ) Washington, Dec. 29, 1877. ( Mn. President: Returning from an absence from town I find your note of the 17th inst. In it. referring to a prior conversation between us in relation to (he Intervention of Senators and Representatives in respect to nominations and appointments by the Executive Department of the Government, you ask me to give you my views and experience on the subject. I do so with greater pleasure and freedom from the circumstance that your views and my own concerning what ought to be the independence of the Executive in making nominations and submitting treaties, and the independence of the Senate in acting thereon, are entirely in accord, and that I believe this independence would be made mncli more perfect if what is suggested below could be carried into practice. In the great number of selections required to be made to fill the necessary offices in all. parts of the Republic, the capacity and character, and in many instances the opinions, of persons suggested for place ought to be known, and most generally be ascertained by information from some source extraneous to the Executive Department. It has not been possible generally for the President or heads of departments personally to know the propriety of a particular selection. This has naturally led to the practice of applicants for place and citizens recommending them communicating with the Executive branch of the Government through the Senators and Representatives in Congress, and reciprocally to the President and heads of departments asking and receiving the information and sometimes tlio advice of Senators and Representatives on the subject. So far, I think the, process was natural and reasonable, and perhaps in a degree necessary, as the simplest and safest means of the Executive Department acquiring indispensable information. But, as in almost every kind of affair unrestricted by positive and binding limitations, a useful habit becomes a custom, and the custom gradually transformed itself from its true nature as a means of information into the course of practically disposing of Executive local appointments according so the judgment or the will of Senators and Representatives. They came gradually to volunteer recommendations in every instance, and the Executive Department in like manner came to receive and treat such recommendations as final as a relief from personal scrutiny of testimonials and objections, and from much of the sense of responsibility for selections. This was evidently an abuse and perversion of the constitutional theory of appointments as well as of a salutary process in administration. The effect, of this was of course not beneficial. The citizen securing the prize of office became too often (he personal adherent of the Senator or member who secured him the place, and the disappointed ones became the reverse. Senators and members were sometimes influenced in their recommendations by considerations of ambition or of gratitude to those who had rendered or were expected to render aid to their personal aintE in politics. The liberty of free political expression and action belonging to the place-holder as a citizen became also somewhat cramped and embarrassed. Perhaps still more injurious to the public interest was the entanglement of the relations between Senators and Representatives and the Executive Department. Who can measure in such cases how much of Executive action in appointment is due to a desire to secure an appropriation, or avoid an investigation, or encourage or reward a legislative or Senatorial following ? Who can tell in such a case how far the Senator who votes for or against a favorite treaty or nomination, or the Representative who votes for or against an apDropriation or an inquiry, has been moved directly by what has been or what is expected to be done or omitted by the executive branch in the direction of his wishes ? I hardly need say that these things do not imply corruption in the ordinary Bense on any one. They imply rather bias or prejudice and perversion of judgment arising from self-interest and absence of power and success, from which human nature is nowhere free. The distinct separation and independence of the various branches of the Government rest upon principles drawn from universal experience, and they cannot be too strongly maintained. The Senate and House of Representatives must in their spheres watch, and scrutinize, and deal with, if need be, every step of the executive departments, and they in their turn must administer the law as it is through proper agents, free from the dictation of members of the legislative branch, and from the temptation either to yield to (heir domination or influence, or corrupt them by the bestowal of patronage. It may be that these suggestions are simple truisms, but "they are those that cannot be too often repeated. They are stated in more general terms in the formal declarations of both the political parties of the country at their last conventions. How, then, shall we follow them 7 It has appeared to me that much could be accomplished in the right direction by the absolute abstention of Senators and Representatives from recommending particular appointments at all, unless their advice should be asked by the Executive Department, and, accordingly, since the incoming of the present administration, I have endeavored consistently and steadily to abstain from doing so, and I believe I have kept my purpose. I have thought it consistent with this position, when applications or recommendations for place were sent me, to forward them to the proper office, with a written statement or memorandum of the character and standing of the signers, if known to me, and I .have thought it right, indeed a duty, whenever any of my constituents in the employment of the executive departments have complained of its action as unjust in respect to him, to make the necessary inquiries and endeavor to to rectify what should appear to be wrong. These, I think, ought to be the clear and positive boundaries in respect of appointments between the members of the two branches of the Government. lam gratified in believing that the course is satisfactory to my constituents, and in feeling that neither my official course nor that of the Executive Department, so far as I am concerned, can be affected by the influences to which I have alluded. But to have proper and fair effect, whatever course is pursued ought to be uniform, constant, and universal. Any system will be rad ically vicious and will fail that opens the candidacy for the duties and honorß of public trust to citizens of a State or section only, upon the previous knowledge of the executive branch or the simple recommendations of private persons, while there is brought to bear for the candidates of other States and sections the powerful and personal solicitations of Senators and Representatives whose gratitude for success may be drawn upon in an emergency, or whose disappointment in failure may prejudice them against some necessary measures recommended by the Executive. It can be easily seen, too. that there would be no gain to the public welfare if the practice of following the volunteer recommendations of Senators and Representatives were to give place to the influence of private citizens or to a business of brokerage in offices, as it is said has sometimes happened. It is not probable that the fitness of the persons appointed would be increased by such a change as this, and it is clear that the responsibility of the promoters of such appointments would be less, as they would be less easily ascertained, and would not have so strong motives to satisfy public opinion as those who have been elected to the House or Senate by their fellow-citizens, and who are generally supposed to desire fresh proofs of public confidence. With the vast extent of our territory and population the number of placeholders has of necessity become very great, and the means of personal or other definite knowledge of men by the executive branch has proportionally decreased. 1 and in the same degree the evils of patronage, in whatever hands it is to praotically exist, increased. I think these can be greatly jsltigated by an entire cessation by Senators and Representatives whatever from advice or solicitations respecting »ppoij?tei9gts, and by (fee wtefc’UteffiWit by l*w tit

definite regulations respecting selections for many officers and employments, and the terms upon which they shall be held, so that the executive branch and the legislative department may be and feel perfectly free in their respective spheres, and so that the holders of office may feel also that they are the servants of the law and not the personal tenants at will in their places of either heads of departments of Congressmen. I am respectfully yours, George F. Edmunds.