Democratic Sentinel, Volume 1, Number 45, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 21 December 1877 — RESUMPTION. [ARTICLE]

RESUMPTION.

General Garfield’s Great Speech Ee viewed. E. P. Miller, or New York, Refutes Its Fallacies. The True Way to Prosperity Pointed Out. Gen. Garfield, of Ohio, delivered, on the 16th of November, what is regarded as the ablest speech that has been given in Congress in opposition to the repeal of the Specie Resumption act. It was eloquent, earnest, and contained some of the strongest points that can be made in favor of the forced resumption of specie payments. Able as it wae, however, so confused are his views upon the subject that his strongest arguments in opposition to the repeal of the act are among the best that could be offered in favor of such repeal. Let us notice a few of them. He lays down the following as the true basis for the currency of the country: “ The only sound, safe, trustworthy standard of value is coin of a standard weight and fineness, or a paper currency convertible into coin at the will of the holder.” In another part of his speech he indorses this statement, made by Hugh McCulloch: “ That every great crisis in this country has been preceded by an enormous enlargement. hf paper circulation.” I affirm that to be true, says Mr. Garfield, and I challenge controversy by any man. It waß true in England always. It has been true in this country. We had a great crisis in 1797. another in 1817, another in 1837, another in 1857, and one last in 1873, almost exactly twenty years apart. They are periodic, and return as the result of causes springing up amoug the mass of our business people ; and they have all been preceded by an enlargement of credits, aa undue expansion of the instruments of credit, and they have all resulted in the same sad uniformity of misery that has followed the culmination Or collapse. This, doubtless, is true; but, we would ask the gentleman from Ohio if all these enormous enlargements of the paper circulation, and expansions of credit with their subsequent disasters, have not taken place (with the exception of that connected with the panic of 1873) when business was being conducted on what he calls the “ only sound, safe and trustworthy basis—that of coin and paper convertible into coin at the will of the holder?” We assert that it has. And, if this iB so, why, in the name of humanity, does he desire to force the country back into the adoption of such an old, rotten, swindling monetaiy system? If we interpret his own words aright, they prove that the financial system he advocates is unsound, unsafe, untrustworthy, and, therefore, should be abandoned. Has not this system of coin and convertible paper always afforded an opportunity for the banks to enrich themselves at the expense of the masses of the people ? The Comptroller of the Currency, In his report for 1876, sayß that under the system of coin and convertible paper “ the people lost, every twenty years, by failures of banks, etc., an amount equal to the entire circulation of the country.” Previous to the introduction of greenbacks, the banks were permitted to issue from three to five dollars of paper notes to one of coin that they owned. From the Comptroller’s report we learn, too, that “the average issue of all the banks was at times four of paper notes to one of coin.” In Prof. Sumner’s “History of American Currency” it is stated that at one time “ the best of the banks in the New England States had out ten, and the poorest twentyfive, of paper currency to one of coin.” The banks were loaning this sort of trash to the people as money, and the people were paying them interest upon it, under the impression that it was at all times convertible into coin.

Is it any wonder that under such rule' panics should occur every twenty years, at which time all banks suspend, many of them fail, and the notes of the best of them sell at from ten (10) to eighty (80) per cent, discount, while the people pocket the loss? We would ask Mr. Garfield why two thousand banks should be allowed to control all the paper currency used by 45,000,000 of people? Why greenbacks, that are lawful money, are not just as readily convertible into coin as are bank notes that ‘ ♦ Whv not destroy the bank notes and leave the greenbacks, as the paper money of the country ? This certainly would be far better for the people, for in one case they would pay interest only for the use of real money, while in the other they are paying for the use of bank notes which are a sham, and are also payiDg interest on the bonds held by Government as security for these notes, which bonds were given for the purpose of destroying the greenbacks. Mr. Garfield tells us that “ the over-mastering necessities of the war led the men of 1861-2 to depart from the doctrine of the fathers,” and substitute greenbacks for coin and bank paper convertible into coin. If, as the gentleman would have us infer, the ooin and convertible paper is a safer system of currency than the greenback system, why was the Government compelled to abandon the former and adopt the latter ? Why' wan the coin and bank notes, that formed the basis of business in 1860, entirely banished from circulation and the whole business of. the country transferred to the legaltender note or greenback basis ? The fact is, they were not trustworthy, and for this reason failed to supply the requisite means to carry on the war ; and the Government was compelled to abandon them and adopt something better. Did not greenbacks prove equal to the emergency? supplying the means requisite to bring the war to a successful termination? Is it a mark of wisdom to change a success for a failure ? Would a man be considered sane who insisted on exchanging a good, sound, able-bodied horse that had carried him Ease to his journey’s end, for an old, windbroken cripple, that gave out before he had proceeded a quarter of the distance ? Can the gentleman give any reason why the Government paper money is not just aa safe or reliable for any and all purposes as the paper currency of the banks ? Is he not aware of the fact that greenbacks are lawful money, while bank notes are not ? That bank notes are redeemable in greenbacks and valueless without them ? That the bank notes bear the same relation to greenbacks that they do to coin, when we are on a specie basis ? Does he not know that the business of the country is based upon the legal-tender notes, upon the credit of the Government, and not upon bank notes, the credit of the bankers ? Does he not know that when the former is destroyed the basis of business is destroyed, and as a consequence business is ruined ? Is he not aware of the fact that the Resumption act authorizes inflation ; authorizes an increase of the paper money which produces panics; and, for this reason, those who favor it are the real inflationists?

Does he not know that the public debt was increased by the issning of $300,000,000 of interestbearing bonds, given in order to destroy the greenbacks, and the people are paying over $15,000,000 annually as interest on the bonds, which the banks pocket 7 And, during this whole period of exchanging real money for bank notes, not a dollar has been added to the coin of the country ; but, on the contrary, the amount has been diminished. It is such financial jugglery that has caused the hard times—that has slowly but surely crushed the life and hope out of our business men—driving so many of them to poverty and despair, insanity and suicide. Mr. Garfield says : “ I commend to the eloquent gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Kelley) the example of Prance.” But the truth in regard to France he clothes in the garb of falsehood, the proof of which will be found in his own statements. He says: “ What was the example of France in 1870 7 The end of that year, before the war began, France had $251/00,000 of paper circulation of the Bank of France, and $229,000,000 of coin from the same bank. When the war broke out they were compelled immediately to issue more paper, and make it a legal tender. They took pattern by us from their necessities, and issued paper until Nov. 19, 1873, or four years ago next Monday; they had $602,000,000 of paper issued by the Bank of France and $145,000,000 of coin. But when their great war was over they did what I commend to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Kelley). They commenced to reduce their paper circulation, and in one year reduced it almost $100,000,000, and increased the coin circulation $120,000,000. In the year 1876 they had pushed into circulation $200,000,000, of coin, and retired small notes to that amount. They are to-day within fifty days of resumption of specie payments. Under the law, fifty days from to-day France passes again into the illustrious line of nations who believe in a sound ourrency, and I commend to the eloquent gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Kelley) the example of France.” We call attention to a few points in connection with this statement. In 1870 the total amount of currency in circulation, belonging to the Bank of France, was $480,000,000; of this only $229,000,000 was coin or lawful money, the balance being bank notes, which were simply a substitute for, and redeemable in, coin. Observe, too, that the total of coin and paper held by the Bank of France had increased from $480,000,000 in 1870 to $747,000,000 in 1873, an increase of $267,000,000 of currency; while at the Bame time the amount of lawful money had increased from $229,000,000 of coin to $747,000,000 of legal-tender paper and coin, being an actual increase of lawful money amounting” to $518,000,000. During this time the decrease of coin was from $229,000,000 to $145,000,000, a diminution of $84,000,000. It will thus be seen she increased her legal-tender paper notes $602,000,000. Now observe the course pursued after the war. As Mr. Garfield says, “ They reduced the paper circulation $100,000,000 and increased their coin $120,000,000. According to his. own figures, then, the contraction, as pursued by France, consisted in substituting $120,000,000 of coin for $100,000,000 of bank notes, which is no contraction at all, but, instead, it made an addition to their lawful money of $20,000,000 of coin. Again, _he says, “In 1876 they had pushed into circulation $200,000,000 of coin, and retired small notes to that amount.” This was simply substituting one kind of lawful money for another kind of lawful money. Coin for legal-tender paper, dollar for dollar, which produces no contraction whatever, either of absolute money or currency in circulation among the people, and which could not in any way d&niM6 business. *o4 Ur, dtefeid imagine that the United gtateg

has followed any such example as this in forcing specie payments? Not only do his own statements, but all the facts and figures bearing upon the case, show that they have not. He says that in 1860 we had only $207,000,000 of bank notes and $200,000,000 of coin, making a total of $407,000,000, as the greatest amount of currency that could be kept afloat at that time. Of this only $200,000,000 was lawful money—coin—the balance being bank notes convertible into coin. In the report of the Comptroller of Currency for 1876 (page 166) it is Btated that there was in circulation, Aug. 31, 1876, $684,138,959 in legal-tender notes ; $26,344,742 in fractional currency, and $176,243,955 In bank notes. This would make the total amount of currency $886,727,657. Of this amount $710,483,701 was lawful money, and the rest bank notes redeemable In lawful money. It will be seen that the currency of the country had increased from $407,000,000 in 1860 to $880,727,657 in 1865, an increase of over $479,000,000, besides the coin. During this time the lawful money had increased from $200,000,000 (of coin) to $710,000,000 of legal-tender notes and fractional currency ; while the amount of coin, although withdrawn from circulation, did not vary much from the amount in the country in 1860. This would show an actual increase of legal-tender paper money amounting to $710,000,000. And how'does it now stand ? According to Mr. Garfield's own showing, there was, on the Ist of November, 1877, $736,000,000 of greenbacks, bank notes, fractional currency and silver coin in circulation. Of this, $318,000,000 was bank notes, leaving $418,000,000 legal-tender notes, fractional currency and coin as the lfegal money; thus, instead of substituting coin for legaltender paper, as France has done, keeping not only the volume of currency, but the amount of lawful money, as large as at the close of the war, this country has all the while been changing legal-tender notes for bank notes which are not legal tender, and at the same time has also diminished its coin from about $200,000,000 in 1865 to $130,000,000 in 1877, a decrease of about $70,090,000. These figures show an actual contraction of the lawful money of this country amounting to about $388,000,000, while France has not contracted hers a dollar ; she has simply changed her legal-tender paper for solid coin, while we have been changing our legal tender lor bank notes and sending coin out of the country to pay interest on the bonds sold to obtain the greenbacks to destroy. Another important item, France has no gold nor silver mines from which to obtain an increase of specie; while the United States, during the time specie payments have been suspended, has dug from her mines over $1,000,000,060. France has obtained her supply by promoting the industries of her people and selling the products of these industries to foreign buyers for specie. This country has, by its contracting financial policy, throttled the industries of her people and sent the coin, dug from her mines, out of the country to meet the demands upon foreign debts. France has no foreign debt. This country, since the beginning of the war, has sold to foreigners more than $2,000,006,000 of Government, State, municipal and corporation bonds, the interest of which is paid in gold. Again. France has always been an exporting nation. The United States, from 1860 to 1865, imported annually an average of $95,000,000 worth more than she exported ; and the products of this country, including the products of our mines, will, for years to come, be absorbed in paying interest and principal on our foreign dt bt. And, until this foreign debt is paid, we can have, no assurance of being able to keep coin as a basis for our currency. Europe can, any day, send $50,000,000 or $100,000,000 of our bonds home, throw them upon the market, and draw on us at sight for the coin. If that coin is in circulation as currency. and exchangeable for greenbacks and bank notes, her agents will gobble it up and send it away, and nothing can prevent them. This would inevitably cause the banks to suspend. Although we may bring our paper money to par with coin, we may not be able to keep it there even for a week. Another point in regard to the legal-tender notes of the Bank of France—they were made lawful money for all debts, public and private, while greenbacks were precluded from paying custom dues and interest oil the public debt. Ou this account the value of the French legal tender has always been within 2 per cent, of par, and most of the time within half of 1 per cent. Had the greenbacks, legally, the same debt-paying power, they would never have varied much from par in coin, and we should have been at a specie basis long ore this, if none of them had been destroyed. Mr. Garfield and his specie-payment friends assert that the panic of 1873, and the subsequent hard times, are due tc the inflation of prices consequent upon putting so large a volume of legal-tender money into use. We have the most positive proofs that such is not the fact; but, on the contrary, that the whole difficulty has been caused by the destruction of le-gal-tender money and the substitution therefor of bank notes which are not legal tender. The proofs are these : The largest volume of legal-tender money was in circulation in 1865, at which time there were, as we have stated, including fractional currency, $710,000,000 in uso. There was none issued after loo*, tikj pttuiu aid tint mem until 1873, eight years after. On page 166 of the last Comptroller’s report it is stated that in August, 1865, there were in use $33,954,230 of 5 per cent., and $217,024,100 of 7 8-10 per cent, compound-interest legal-tender notes—making a total of $250,978,390. These notes were authorized in 1863-4, and were payable in 1867-8. Three were few bank notes issued previous to 1864; on the Ist of October of that year there were only $15,260,504 of these notes in circulation, while ou the Ist of January, 1866, there were $298,588,419 an increase of $253,327,915 in just fifteen months. The reader will observe that this sum was just a little more than was necessary to absorb the $250,978,390 of interest-bearing legal-tender notes—and this is precisely what the banks did; they absorbed during the year 1865 nearly all these interest-bear-ing legal tenders, and put out in their place their own bank notes, which they got for almost nothing from the Secretary of the Treasury. When these interest-bearing notes liecame due the Government issued 5-20 6 per cent, gold bonds in exchange for them, and burned up the notes. Thus the banks virtually obtained for nothing money enough from the Government to buy up these in-terest-bearing legal tenders—and also drew the interest on them—to enable them to purchase $250,000,000 of 5-20 0 per cent, gold bonds, on which the people have been paying 6 per cent, interest ever since. Again, on page 166 of the Comptroller’s last report, it is stated that the aggregate amount of legal tenders, fractional currency and bank notes in use Aug. 31, 1865, was $635,717,266. On the Ist of Jan., 1874—three months after the panic began, the aggregate amount of paper currency in circulation was $777,874,367. This shows that with all their efforts at contraction for the purpose of getting rid of irredeemable paper money, they had actually increased the amount $142,165,101. During these eight years, however, the legal tenders—the only real money in circulation—had been contra.‘ted over $300,000,000; thus the foundation the real money was all the time being lessened while the superstructure was widened and heightened by means of bank notes. This is certainly a most peculiar way of getting rid of paper money—a most peculiar way of preventing inflation.

The largest aggregate volume of paper currency in circulation—aside from the interest-bearing legal tenders—was in 1875, when there was $782,591,165, which is $146,871,899 more than was in use in 18G5, when the war closed, at which time there was the greatest amount of legal tenders. Of this amount, $354,128,027 were bank notes—an Increase of $308,867,746, and a contraction of iegal tenders of $300,000,000. Ten years of contraction has increased our paper circulation in volume', but most wofully decreased it in value, as is proven by the fatal results attendant upon our nation’s prosperity. And how have the people suffered during this period of financial knavery ? Hugh McCulloch, the man who engineered this specie-resumption business at the start, the man who, with the exception of John Sherman, is more responsible than any other for the panic, hard times, and suffering among the people, said in one of his Tribune letters that, “in 1865, when he had the management, the business men of the country were nearly out of debt.” It is a fact that farmers, merchants and mechanics had lifted mortgages that had been hanging over them for years. Ordinarily-skilled mechanics were ge’ting from $4 to $5, and laborers from $2 to $3 a day. The national debt was being paid at the rate of $100,000,000 a year. Every bueineßS man was making money, and the whole country was in a state of unparalleled prosperity. The average number of failures, as reported by Dun, Barlow & Co., during 1864, 1865 and 1866, was only 564 per annum. Emigrants wire landing on our shores at the rate of 300,000 a year. City and country property was in high demand, and being rented and sold at increasing prices. Manufactories, railroads, banks, savings banks and insurance companies were never in so solvent or so prosperous a condition. Had there been no change in our currency ; bad the business of the country been allowed to remain on the legal-tender basis, every department of business would have continued active to the present time. But how do we find it to-day ? The whole nation is literally bankrupt! Not one business man in a hundred is making more than his expenses. The rejiorted bankruptcies have increased from 560 to 10,000 a year, and hundreds of thousands of farmers and small dealers, not reported, have had the labor of a lifetime swept away. Manmfacturing establishments by the thousand have been shut up, or are running on half-time. Mechanics get from $1.50 to $2 per day, and laborers from 50 cents to $1.50 per day. Emigration has almost entirely ceased. Savings banks, life and fire insurance companies, by hundreds, have been forced into bankruptcy. Banks of issue and deposit are winding up lor want of business. The stock and bonds of many railroads and banks that were above par in gold, are now far below, or almost worthless. More than 3,000,000 of workingmen and women are living—or dying—in forced idleness, and many honest men are turned into thieving tramps and useless vagabonds. Strikes and riots are rampant among those whose wages have been reduced below starvation point, until the lives and property of the people are at the mercy of lawless mobs. And still the grinding process goes on. And who is being benefited by it 7 Nobody but a few millionaire bankers in Wall street and their associates, who have been speculating in Government credit, and at the same time selling the nation out to foreigners. About a dozen men who constitute the Wall street Syndicate are controlling and using the Government in their own interest. The facts and figures herein given furnish the most positive proofs that the panic of 1873, and the subsequent hard times, are due to the effort to destroy the legal-lender notes and put bank notes in their place, and that the Wall street cankers are responsible for the injury to the country arising therefrom. Lawful money cannot be destroyed and sham put in its place without ruining the Industries built upon that lawful money. The destruction of $300,008,000 of legal-tender paper anwy has damaged business just as much aa the dee Ruction of $300,000,000 com would have doae, if aoia were the Walton dey paogey la use. i'iie'' £p isle Beaumption apt is tie rr the fpioie resumption'

lainy, for it provides for the total destruction of the legal tenders aud the unlimited inflation of bank paper. Mr. Garfield says: “ Daniel Webster never utterel a greater truth In finance than when he said that of all contrivances to cheat the laboring classes of mankind none were so effective as that which deluded them with an irredeemable paper money.” There are two kinds of irredeemable paper money. This statement was made by Mr. Webster with reference to one kind, while Mr. Garfield is attacking the other. One kind iB called irredeemable because the law of the land makes it genuine money that must bo received in payment of debts, and that is not based upon and therefore need not be redeemed in any other kind of money, but is based upon all the property, including the gold and silver, of tho entire nation. Such money is our greenback. The oth< r kind of paper money the law docs not recognize aR money; nobody need receive it for debts unless they choose, and the parties issuing it are by law required to redeem it in lawful money whenever it is presented for redemption. Such arc bank notes, and it was this money and no other that Daniel Webster considered “ the worst of all contrivances for cheating the laboring classes.” This was tho only kind of paper money in existence in hi's day, or of which he had practical knowledge. Although this bank paper was nominally redeem ■ able, yet Mr. Webster knew that, with from three to ten dollars afloat for one of ooin on which it was based, it was virtually and necessarily “ Irredeemable.” The most valuable property of the greenback is its legal-tender quality ;it is money of Itself'it is strong enough to stand slone, and needs no other money as a basis. No changes in the times affect its money value, or subjects those who hold It to loss by any inability for its redemption. Nothing except an act of Congress can affect it, and such act can at any time affect coin as well, as is proven ny the act to demonetize aud remonetize silver. The greenback has no enemies except the bankers, foreign importers, and thg money lenders—aud these are they who are seeking to enforce resumption for the purpose of destroying the people’s truest friend. Their object Is to make the quantity of actual money as small as possible, so that It may be the more easily controlled; and also by contracting the amount of lawful money a larger quantity of bank notes can bo put in circulation, and interest upon them be obtained from the people for the benefit of the banks. Mr. Garfield asserts that: “We are bound ou three great grounds to maintain the resumption of specio payments. First, liecause the public faith demands it. Secondly, because all the great business Interests of the country demand it; and thirdly, because our future prosperity requires a solid, permanent basis on which confidence can again plant its feet, and the business of the country revive.” J|lt is an old saying that one man may lead a horse to water, but twenty men cannot make him drink. The Resumption act may force the people to attempt specie payment, but ull the laws Congress can devise cannot maintain it. That the Government can sell bonds and redeem its legal-tender noteß no one will doubt; but this will not bring us to a specie basis by any means. It will simply remove from circulation tho lawful money of the people, and put the paper notes of tho banks in its place, aud at the same time convert the people’s money into a bonded Interest debt. The power to maintain specie payments will depecd entirely upon the supply of and demand for specie. This supply and demand will depend upon tho business prosperity of the country, upon the laws of trade, and the balance for or against us in our dealings with foreign nations; it will depend upon who receives the interest on our public debt and where it is expended : all of which dependencies are injured rather than benefited by the enforcement of the Specie Resumption act. “ The public faith,” Mr. Garfield says, “ demands the maintenance of specie resumption.” If the people have faith in anything, it is in money that saved the country from disunion; not in that which proved a failure. Nine out of ten of the business men of the country, if asked which they prefer as their paper money, greenbacks or bank notes, would tell you greenbacks. If anything could destroy public faith, it would bo the pursuance of such a monetary system as would ruin the business of the country—and destroying the greenbacks, and substituting bank notes therefor has most effectually done this. If the gentlemen desire to promote the business interests of the country, and give a solid, permanent basis for its industries, let him honor the basis that gave confidence in the most trying period of the war—a basis that has appeared unstable only because its enemies have for twolve years been attempting to destroy it. Let him vote for the repeal of the.Spccio Resumption act, and he will have mado a sure move to obtain what he is seeking to secure.. Mr. Garfield says: “ We who defeud the Resumption net propose not to destroy the greenback, but to dignify it, to glorify It. The. law that we defend docs not destroy it. It simply re ducts its volume to $300,000,000, and it makes the greenback convertible into coin, but it does not destroy and cancel it.” We ask the gentlemen if there was not in use in August, 1865, as statea on page 166 of the Comptroller’s report $681,138,959, of legal-tender paper, and over $26,000,000 of fractional currency. Have not these all been destroyed about $364,000,000 of legal-tender notes and a few millions of fractional currency ? And the. Resumption act authorizes the reduction of these to $300,000,000. Is it necessary to destroy $51,000,000 more in order to “ dignify and glorify” the remainder? We admit that the destruction of one-half of the lawful money of any country would enhance the value aud increase the purchasing power of the remainder immensely, but it would be done at a fearful slaughter of the business men and business interests of the country. We have a good example of the effects of such a proceeding, by contrasting the prosperous times of 1865-6 with the disasters of 1876-7. Wrecked fortunes, ruined merchants and manufacturers, bankrupt railroads, suspended banks, sacrificed real estate, idle and famished workingmen, all testify as to the cost.

If there was only wheat enough in the United States to supply its forty-five millions of people with food for one year, and no means of obtaining more, and by act of Congress one-half vsb destroyed, there is no doubt but lliat it would “dignify and glorify” and raise the price of the remainder—but millions of men, women and children would die of starvation as the result of such a “ dignifying ” course. The business of a country is based upon its lawful money ; and not a single dollar of the legaltender notes should ever have been removed from circulation unless there was a dollar of coin, or its equivalent, that could not only have been put in Its place, but kept there. The destruction of greenbacks, when they sre the lawful money of the people, has the same disastrous effects upon business as it would to destroy so much coin when coin was the laws ul money in use. Business is prosperous and property increases in value when the volume of legal-tender money is on tbe increase. On the contrary, business becomes dull and property shrinks in value when the quantity of legal money is being diminished. Panics follow the inflation of prices, due to an enlargement of the quantity of bank notes, which are not legal money, but mere substitutes for money. An increase of legal money, whether it be gold, silver, or paper, while it may increase values, does not produce what may be called an inflation of prices, or panics resulting therefrom. To have the business of the conntry uniformly and steadily prosperous, let the lawful money be secured against any sudden expansion or contraction, and let there be a gradual increase in volume, corresponding to the increase of population and business. If men contract debts when there is a large volume of legal money in circulation, and are compelled to nay those debts when the volume is greatly reduced, it proves ruinous io the debtor clasA. Again, if debts are contracted when money is of one kind or one value, and have to be paid in money of another Kind and greater value, it proves disastrous to the debtor.

The diminution of the volume of the legal-tender notes during the last ten years, compelling men who contracted debts with a large volume of money to pay them with half the volume of lawful money, but with an increased volume of bank notes, will readily explain the cause of so many bankruptcies. The policy advocated by Mr. Garfield has already destroyed more than half of the legal-tender notes, bankrupted nearly half of the business and wiped out more than half the value of the property of the country, and yet he insists upon destroying $54,000,000 more, in order to “ dignify and glorify ” the $1300,000,000 that he condescends to leave unconsumed, but which the Resumption act authorizes the destruction of; $54,000,000 is a little more than one-seventh of all the real money now in use; if that amount Is destroyed, it will bankrupt oneseventh ol the men now in business, force oneseventh of the working classes now employed into idleness, and cause a shrinkage of all property one-seventh of its present value ; and this would be the cap-sheaf of ruin to our country. If Mr. Garfield really seeks to promote the interests of the country, let him repeal that infamous Specie Resumption act, fix the basis of business where it should be—let the standard of value remain, and confidence will be at once restored ; capital will seek investment, labor find employment, and prosperity and happiness return to this oppressed people. If he desires to “dignify and glorify” the greenback, by bringing it to par with gold, he can do It In a week’s time,' and that without destroying another dollar. 1. Let him get a bill passed by Congress, and signed by the President, authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to issue 4 >£ per cent, bonds, and offer them at par for greenbacks ; as Such bonds are now selling at 1% above par in coin, this would bring greenbacks to a par with coin at once. 2. To prevent the removal of greenbacks from circulation, authorize the Secretary to pay them out as last as received for 5-20 6 per cent, bonds and destroy the bonds. Continue this until all the high rate of interest bonds are paid off. 3. Let tbe Government loan its greenbacks upon undoubted security to the people, to build railroads, steamships, and for all needed public improvements, the people paying 4% per cent, per annum aa interest on the name. This would save to the people of this country $150,000,000 a year, now being paid to foreign capitalists as interest on borrowed money; it would secure the Government from loss, secure the people from heavy taxation, and at the same time provide them with the means for improvement and culture, which alone can elevate and ennoble; which alone can “ dignify and glorify ” either a na-

tion or its money.

E. P. MILLER,

39 and 41 West Twenty-sixth street, New York.

Forty-seven members of the XLVth Congress are natives of Penneyl vania, and Pennsylvania is proud. Of this number, Messrs. Blaine, Wallace, Cameron, Mitchell, McMillan and Patterson are Senators* New York haq fprty-niue representatives in Congress.