Decatur Democrat, Volume 41, Number 39, Decatur, Adams County, 9 December 1897 — Page 3

MIWSTffl' Are Reviewed at Length in the Annual Message of the President of Currency Legislation Is Pointed Out—Takes a Strong Stand for Gold. gpttin Should Have a Chance to Prove Her Honesty of Purpose Toward Cuba. jjecognition of Insurgents or InterW ntion He Deems Unwise Under Existing Circumstances. Hawaii should Be Annexed- Redproelty, I the Seal*. Civil Service, Indian* and Other Qunntlen*. ' Wz«hington, n® o - *•—Following is the fun leit o f President McKinley's message to ewgrese: To the Senate and House of Representatives: It gives me pleasure to extend greeting to the Fifty-fifth congress assembled at the seat of government, with many of - kBB senators and representatives, I have been associated in the legislatuve service. Their meeting occurs under felicitous con-I ditlons, justifying sincere congratulation I and railing for our grateful acknowledgment to a beneficent Providence which has flenally blessed and prospered us as a natloii. Peace and good will with all the jjaliens of the earth continue unbroken. Can.e tor Congratulation. A matter of genuine satisfaction Is the mowing feeling of fraternal regard and unification of all sections of our country, the Incompleteness of which has too long delayed realization of the highest blessings of the union. The spirit of patriotism is universal and is ever increasing in fervor. The nubile questions which now most engross us are lifted far above either partisanship, prejudice or former sectional differences. They affect every part of our common country alike and permit of no division on ancient lines. Questions of fcrelcn policy, of revenue, the soundness of the currency, the inviolability of national obligations, the Improvement of the public service appeal to the individual conscience every earnest citizen, to whatever party he belongs or in whatever section of the country he may reside. The extra session of this congress which closed during July last enacted important legislation, and while its full effect has not wi been realized, what It has already accomplished assures us of Its timeliness and wisdom. To test its permanent value further time will be required, and the people satisfied with its operation and results thus far, are In no mind to withhold from It a fair trial. (TMIEXCY LEGISLATION. Caagrea. Should Not Hesitate to Enter I'pon Revision. Tariff legislation having been settled by the extra session of congress, the question next Dressing for consideration is that of the The work of putting our finances upon a sound basis, difficult as it may seem, will appear easier when we recall the financial operations of the g° v « rn ’ ment since 1866. On the 30th day of June cf that year we had 0U f tS a t 4P?Jj? 47 (l 4 e l m liabilities in the sum of $/28,868,447.41. on th* 1 1st of January, 1879, these liabilities had been reduced to $143,889,495.85. Os our in-terest-bearing obligations, the fibres are even more striking. On Jtity. 1. IM™, tn principal of the interest-bearing debt of the government was $2,332,331,208. first day of July, 1893, this sum had been reduced to $585,037,100. or an aggregate reduction of $1,747,294,108. The interest-bear-ing debt of the United States on the first day of December, 1897, was $847,3b5,620. The government money now outstanding (December 1) consists of $346,681,016 of United States notes, $107,793,280 of treasury notes issued by authority of the law of 1890, $384,963,503 of silver certificates, and $61,280,<bi of standard silver dollars. With the great resources of the government, and with the honorable example or the past before us, we ought not to hesitate to enter upon a currency revision which will make our demand obligations less onerous to the government, and relieve our financial laws from ambiguity ana doubt.

Wo Ground for Distrust. The brief review of what was accomplished from the close of the war to 1893 makes unreasonable and groundless any distrust either of our financial ability or soundness, while the situation from 1893 to 1897 must admonish congress of the immediate necessity of so legislating as to make the return of the conditions then prevailing impossible. There are many Plans proposed as a remedy for the evil. Before we can find the true remedy we must appreciate the real evil. It is not that our currency of every kind is not good, lor every dollar of it is good; good because the government's pledge is out to keep it bo, and that pledge will not be broken. However, the guaranty of our purpose to keep the pledge will be best shown by advancing toward its fulfillment. Evil of the Present System. The evil of the present system is found in ♦be great cost to the government of maintaining the parity of our different forms of money—that is. keeping all of them at par with goM. We surely cannot be longer heedless of the burden this imposes upon the people, even under fairly P roß P € ™ys conditions, while the past four years have demonstrated that it Is not only an expensive charge upon the government but a dangerous menace to the national credit. Must Provide Against Bond Issues* f It is manifest that we must devise some »la» to protect the government agalnst oonu issues for repeated redempt.ons. w - must either curtail the opportun ty r«r speculation, made easy by the multiplied Jedemptions of our demand °bllS atlo , ns '” increase the gold reserve for their redemption. We have $900,000,000 of currency whiob the government by solemn enac merit has undertaken to keep at par witn gold. Nobody is obliged to redeem In gold out the government. The banks are n - required to redeem in gold. The meat is obliged to keep equal with gold an **s ootstanding currency and coin obi ga Mons, while its receipts are not required J? be paid in gold. They are paid in et ery bind ofmoney but gold, and the only means by which the government can with certainty get gold is by borrowing. It can get Jt 1» *0 other way when it most needs it. Jbe government without any fixed gold revenue is pledged to maintain gold re“emptioß, which It has steadily and faltnftdiy dene, and which under the authorlgiven it will continue to do. The Jaw which requires the government a**er having redeemed Its United Stales to pay them out again as current *®a<s demands a constant replenishment > ‘be gold reserve. This Is especially so ® tfrnes of business panic, and when the reyennes are insufficient to met the exb aees »f the government. At such times government has no other way to sup- **" deficit and maintain redemption but t“ r ougb the increase of its bonded debt, as the administration of my predeces™r, when $262,315,400 of 4% per cent, bonds "ere issued and sold, and the proceeds used ■* Pay the expenses of the government In ’i'. 8s of fits revenues and sustain the reserve. While It ts true that the Jfupler Part of the proceeds of these bends supply deficient revenues, a i» i^ a ** er able portion was required to maingold reserve ’*** our revenues equal to our expenses S there would be no deficit requiring she is[nce of bonds. But If the gold reserve » below 1100,000.000 how will it be renlsned except by selling more bonds.

exiting J'l 5 ’ practlcabl e under ' thesl recurHnl means t 0 Prevent serve’ If no FV on . the sold rethe nolicv of Ration is had and ued thin ‘ ng ü bonds is t 0 be contintary nf the ?. A tss 3hould glve the «ecre- ', „ he treasury authority to sell bonds of Interest 8 P eriods > bearing a less rate oi interest than is now authorized by law. An Obvious Duty. rec4nt r s n f>f tl I y hJ ecOmmcn<l as soon as the fl®C-‘Pt s Os the government are quite sufernmento t P h»» al * the expenses of the govStatit 1 When any of the United In told on i re Presented fur redemption sh?ll L w., , redeemed in gold such notes outln b lJ^h Pt and set apart and only paid out In exchange for gold. This Is an obStates d n U oi y> If , the holder of the United Prefers the gold and gere u tA? 1 ? ♦ government he should not receive l V e government a United States «ote without paying gold in exchange for The reason for th »s is made all the more apparent when the government issues an interest-bearing debt to provide gold for the redemption of United States notes—a. n <> nin t?rest-bearlng debt. Surely it should not pay them out again except on demand and for gold. If they are put out l n a py other w ay they may return again, to be followed by another bond issue to redeem them—another interest-bearing debt to redeem a noninterest-bearing debt. Prompt Solation Necessary. In my view it Is of the utmost importance that the government should be relieved from the burden of providing all the gold required for exchange and export.. This responsibility is alone borne by the government without any of the usual and necessary banking powers to help itself. The banks do not feel the strain of gold redemption. The whole strain rests upon the government, and the size of the gold reserve in the treasury has come to be, with or without reason, the signal of danger or of security. This ought to be stopped. If we are to have an era of prosperity in the country, with sufficient receipts for the expenses of the government, we may feel no immediate embarrassment from our present currency; but the danger still exists and will be everfiresent menacing us so long a? the exsting system continues. And, besides, it is in times of adequate revenues and business tranquillity that the government should prepare for the worst. We cannot avoid without serious consequences the wise consideration and prompt solution of this question. Endorses Secretary Gaffe’s Flan. The secretary of the treasury has outlined a plan in great detail for the purpose of removing the threatened recurrence of a depleted gold reserve and saving us from future embarrassment on that account. To this plan I invite your careful consideration. I concur with the secretary of the treasury in his recommendation that national banks be allowed to issue notes to the face value of the bonds which they have deposited for circulation, and that the tax on circulating notes secured by deposit of such bonds be reduced to one-naif or one per cent, per annum. I also join him In recommending that authority be given for the establishment of national banks with a minimum capital of $25,000. This will enable the smaller villages and agricultural regions of the country to be supplied with currency to meet t'heir needs. I recommend that the issue of national bank notes be restricted to the denomination of ten dollars and upwards. If the suggestions 1 have herein made shall have the approval of congress, then I would repmmend that national banks be required to redeem their notes in gold. t THE CUBAN QUESTION. The Time Not Ripe tor Intervention on Our Part. The most important problem with which this government is now called upon to deal pertaining to Its foreign relations concerns its duty toward Spain and the Cuban insurrection. Problems and conditions more or less in common with those now existing have confronted this government at various times in the past. The story of Cuba for many years has been one of unrest, growing discontent: an effort toward a larger enjoyment of liberty and seif-con-trol; of organized resistance to the mother country; of depression after distress and warfare and of ineffectual settlement to be followed by renewed revolt. For no enduring period since the enfranchisement of the continental possessions of Spain in the western continent has the condition of Cuba or the policy of Spain toward Cuba not caused concern to the United States. The prospect from time to time that the weakness of Spain's hold upon the island and the political vicissitudes and embarrassments of the home government might lead to the transfer of Cuba to a continental power called forth, between 1823 and 1.860 various emphatic declarations of the policy of the United States to permit no disturbance of Cuba's connection with Sixain unless in the direction of independence or acquisition by us through purchase, nor has there been any change, of this declared policy since upon the part of the govern m The revolution which began In 1868 lasted for ten years, despite the strenuous efforts of the successive peninsular gov ernments to suprpess it. Then, as now. the government of the United states testified its grave concern, and offered its aid to put an end to bloodshed in Cuba. The overtures made by Gen. Grant were refused, and the war dragged on, entailing great loss of life and treasure and increased injury to American Interests besides throwing enhanced burdens on neutrality on the government. In 1878 peace was brought about by the truce of Zanjon, obtained by negotiations between the Spanish commander, Martinez de Campos, and the insurgent leaders. The Present Insurrection.

The present insurrection broke o“t.!n February. 1895. It is not my purpose at this time to recall its remarkable Increase, or to characterize its tenacious resistance against the enormous forces massed against it by Spain. The revolt and the efforts to subdue It carried destruction to every quarter of the island, developing wide proportions and the efforts of Spain for its suppression. The. civil zed cbde of war has been disregarded, no less so by the Spaniards than by the Cubans, The existing conditions cannot but nil this government and the American people with the gravest apprehension. There is no desire on the part of our people to profit by the misfortunes of Spain. We have only the desire to see the Cubans prosperous and contented, enjoying that measure of self control which is the inalienable right of man, protected in their right to reap the benefit of the exhaustless treasures of their county. The (ttt inAde by my predecessor In April, 1896, tendering the friendly offices of this government failed. Any mediation on our part was not accepted. In brief, the answer read: “There is no effectual way to pacify Cuba unless it begins with the actual submission of the rebels to the mother country.” Then only could bpaln act in the premised direction of her own motion and after her own plans. Not Civilized Warfare. The cruel policy of concentration was initiated February 16, 1896. The productive districts controlled by the Spanish armUs were depopulated. The agricultural inhabitants were herded in and about the garrison towns, their Lands laid waste and their dwellings destroyed. This policy the late cablet of s ‘ )aln qarv measure of war and as a means of cutting off sunlit from the insurgents. Jt baa utterly failed as a war measure. It was not civilized warfare. It was extermlnatton' protests Entered. A vainst this abuse of the rights of war I have felt constrained on repeated occasions to enter the firm and earnest protest of this government. There was much Ls nubile condemnation of the treatment of American citizens by alleged Illegal arrests and long imprisonment awaiting trial or pending protracted judicial proceedings. I felt It my first duty to make instant deni nd for tbe release or speedy trial of all Amtwlean citizens under arrest. Before the Alangs of the Spanish cabinet In October Us“ 22 prisoners, citizens of the United had been given their freedom. For th a relief of our own citizens suffering becaui of the conflict the aid of congress was cause oi enpcial message, and under ?he S aPPropHaUon of April f effective Hppci aiven to American citizens in r Uiem at their own request having been returned to the United States. Minister Woodford’s Instructions. The instructions given to our new mlnSwln before his departure for his him to impress upon that govpost direoted o f the United its aid toward the ending er the war-In Cuba by reaching a peacesft$ f t .nd lasting result, just and honorable f aVke to SP»tn and to the Cuban people.

r I Those Instructions recited the character I and duration of the contest, the widespread j losses it entails, tlje burdens and restraints | it imposes upon us, with constant dis- ’ furbance of national interests and the injury resulting from an indefinite continuance of this state of things. It was stated that at this juncture our government was constrained to seriously inquire if the time was not ripe when Spain of her own volition, moved by herown interests and ev(*ry sentiment of humanity, should put a stop to this destructive war and make pro- j posals of settlement honorable to herself and just to her Cuban colony. It was urged that as a neighboring nation, with large in- i terests in Cuba, we could be required to . wait only a reasonable time for the mother country to establish its authority and restore order within the borders of the island; that we could not contemplate as indefinite period for the accomplishment of this result. No Humiliation Sngpreated. No solution was proposed to which the slightest idea of humiliation to Spain could attach, and indeed precise proposals were withheld to avoid embarrassment to that government. All that was asked or expected was that some safe way m\ght be speedily provided and permanent peace restored. It so chanced that the consideration of this offer, addressed to the same Spanish administration which had declined the tenders of my predecessor, and which for more than two years had poured men and treasure into Cuba in the fruitless effort to suprpess the revolt fell to others. . Between the departure of Gen. Wood- ! ford, the new envoy, and his arrival In Spain, the statesman who had shaped the policy of his country fell by the hand of an assassin, and although the cabinet of the late premier still held office and received from our envoy the proposals he bore, that cabinet gave place within a few days thereafter to a new administration under the leadership of Sagasta. Spain Promises Much. The reply to our note was received on the 23d day of October. It is in the direction of a better understanding. It appreciates the friendly purposes of this government. It admits that our country is deeply affected by the war in Cuba, and that its desires for peace are just. It declares that the present Spanish government is bound by every consideration to a change of policy that should satisfy the United States and pacify Cuba within a reasonable time. To this end Spain has decided to put into effect the political reforms heretofore advocated by the present premier without halting for any consideration in the path which in its judgment leads to peace. The military operations it is said will continue but will be humane and conducted with all ; regard for private rights being accompanied by political action leading to the autonomy of Cuba while guarding Spanish sovereignty. This, it is claimed, will result In investing Cuba W’ith a distinct personality; the Island to be governed by an executive and by a local council or chamber, reserving to Spain the control of the foreign relations, the army and navy and the judicial administration. To accomplish this the present government proposes to modify existing legislation by decree, leaving the Spanish cortes, with the aid of Cuban senators and deputies to solve the economic problem and properly distribute the existing debt. In the absence of a declaration of the measure that this government proposes to take in carrying out its proffer of good offices it suggests that Spain be left free to conduct military operations and grant political reforms, while the United States, for its part, shall enforce its neutral obligations and cut off the assistance which it is asserted the insurgents receive from this country. The supposition of an Indefinite prolongation of the war is denied. It is asserted that the western provinces are already well-nigh reclaimed: that the planting of cane and toi oacco therein has been resumed, and that | by force of arms and new and ample reI forms very early and complete pacification is hoped for. Have Not Failed in Oar Duty. The immediate amelioration of existing conditions under the new administration of Cuban affairs is predicted, and therewith all the disturbance and all occasion for any change of attitude on the part of the United States. Discussion of the question of the international duties and responsibilities of the United States, as Spain understands them, is presented, with an apparent disposition to charge us with failure in this regard. This charge is without any basis in fact. It could not have been made if Spain had been cognizant of the constant efforts this government has made, at the cost of millions and by the employment of the administrative machinery of the nation. That it has successfully prevented the departure of a single military expedition or armed vessel from our shores in violation of our laws would seem to be a sufficient answer. But of this aspect of the Spanish note it is not necessary to speak further now. Firm in the conviction of a wholly performed obligation, due response to this charge has been made in diplomatic course. Throughout all these horrors and dangers to our own peace this government has never broken or in any way abrogated its sovereign prerogative of reserving to itself the determination of its policy and course according to its own high sense of right ano ?n consonance with the dearest interests and convictions of our own people should the prolongation of the strife so demand. The Untried Measures. Os the untried measures there remain only: Recognition of the Insurgents as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba, neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise 1 between the contestants, and intervention In favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That by our code of morality would be criminal aggression. Recognition of Insurgents. Recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban Insurgents has Often been canvassed as a possible if not Inevitable step both in regard to the previous ten years struggle, and during the present war. lam not unmindful that the two houses of congress in the spring of 1896 expressed the opinion by concurrent resolution that a condition of public war existed, requiring or justifying the recognition of the state of belligerency In Cuba, and during the extra session the senate voted a joint resolution of like Import, which, however, was not brought to a vote In the house of representatives. In the presence of these significant expressions of the sentiment es the legislative branch, it behooves the executive to soberly consider the conditions under which so important a measure must needs rest for justification. It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban Insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of statehood, which alone demand the recognition of belligerency in Its favor. Possession, In short, of the essential qualifications of sovereignty by the Insurgents and the conduct of the war by i them according to the received code of war are no less Important factors toward the determination of the problem of belligerency then are the Influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal policy of the recognizing state. Recognition Ifbt Justified, “Belligerence, too, Is a fact. The mere existence of contending armed bodies and their occasional conflicts do not constitute wa- In the sense referred to. Applying to the existing condition of affairs In Cube, l the tests recognized by publicists and writers on international law, and which have been observed by nations of dignity, bonesty and power, when tree from sensitive •> selfish and unworthy motives, I fail to find in the Insurrection the existence of such a substantial political organization real palpable and manifest to tnq world, having the forme and capable of the ordinary functions «f toward its own people and to other states, with courts for the administration of jusGce with a local habitation, possessing such organization of force, such mater lai, such occupation of territory as to take tbe contest out of the category o{ a belllous insurrection or mlshes and place It on the terrible footing of 'war, to which a recognition of belibrerency would aim to elevate it. i I “The contest, moreover, solely on land' the insurrection has not possessed Itself of a single seaport whence it may send forth its flag, nor has It any means of communication with foreign powers except through the military lines of its adversaries. No apprehension of any of those sudden and difficult complications which war upon the ocean Is apt to precipitate upon the vessels, both commercial ; and national, and upon consular otlrnr powers, calls for the definition, oi their relations to the parties io the eoniest. Considered as a question of expediency, 1 : regard the accordance of belligerent rights . still to be as unwise and premature, as I regard It to be, at present, indefensible as a I measure of right. j “Such recognition entalks upon xhecounI try according the rights which flow from it ■ difflcolt and complicated duties, and inquires the exaction from the contending | parties of the strict observance oLihefr ' rights and obllgatfcus). It f&nfoirs the Tight

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of search upon the high seas by vessels of both parties: it would subject the carrying of arms and munitions of war. which now ( may be transported freely and without In- I terruption, in vessels of the United States to detention and to possible seizure: It would give rise to countless vexatious questions, would release the parent government from responsibility for acts done by the insurgents, and would invest Spain with the right to exercise the supervision recognized by our treaty of 1795 over our commerce on the seas, a very large part of which, in its traffic between the Atlantic and the gulf states and between all of them and the states on the Pacific, passes through the waters which wash the shores of Cuba. The exercise of this supervision could scarce fail to lead, if not to abuses, certainly to collisions perilous to the peaceful relations of the two states. There can be little doubt as to what result sucli super- | vision would before long draw this nation. It would be unworthy of the United States < to inaugurate the possibilities of such result. by measures of questionable right or expediency, or by any indirection.” What Recognition Would Mean. Turning to the practical aspects of a recognition of belligerency and reviewing its Inconveniences and positive dangers, still further pertinent considerations appear. In the code of nations there is no such thing as a naked recognition of belligerency unaccompanied by the assumption of international neutrality. Such recognition will not confer upon either party to a domestic | conflict a status not her<«ofore actually possessed or effect the relation of either party to other states. The act of recognition usually takes the form of a solemn proclamation of neutrality which recites the de facto condition of belligerency as its motive. It announces a domestic law of neutrality in declaring state. It assumes the international obligations of a neutral in the presence of a public state of war. It warns ail citizens and others within the jurlsllctlon of the proclaimant that they violate those righteous obligation® at their own peril and cannot expect to be shielded from the consequences. The right of visit and search on the seas and seizure of vessels and cargoes and contraband of war and good prize under admiralty law must under international law be admitted as a legitimate consequence of a proclamation of belligerency. While according the equal belligerent rights defined by public law to each party in our ports disfavors would be imposed on both, which while nominally equal would weigh heavily in behalf of Spain herself. Possessing a navy and controlling the ports of Cuba her maritime rights could be asserted not only for the , military Investment of the island but up to the margin of our own territorial waters, and a condition of things would exist for 1 which the Cubans within their own domain could not hope to create a parallel: while its creation through aid or sympathy from within our domain would be ever more Imnorfslble than now. with the additional obligations of International neutrality wo would perforce assume. Regarded, at Present, as Unwise. The enforcement of this enlarged and onerous code of neutrality would only be influential within our own jurisdiction by land and sea, and applicable by our own instrumentalities. It c ° u ja Jmpart to the United Skates no jurisdiction between ( Spain and the insurgents. It would give (he United States no right of Intervention to i enforce the conduct of the strife within the paramount authority of Spain accord-| Ing to the international code of war. For these reasons I regard the recognition ox ; the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents as now unwise, and therefore inadinissable. Should that step hereafter be deemed wise as a/ measure of right and duty, the execuI tive will take it. Intervention. Intervention upon humanitarian ground? has been frequently suggested, and hae not failed to receive my most anxious anti earnest consideration. But should such a step be'now taken, when it is apparent that a hopeful change has supervened in the policy of Spain toward Cuba? A new government has taken office in the mother country. It'ls pledged in advance to the declaration that all the efforts of the world cannot suffice to maintain peace in Cuba by the bayonet; that vague promises dr reform after subjugation afford no solution 1 of the insular problem; that with a substitution of commanders must come a change of the past system of warfare for pne in harmony with a new’ policy which shall no longer aim to drive the Cubans to the "horrible alternative of taking to the thicket or succumbing fn misery;" that ref.Qnns...niust Jbe instituted in accordant (ConUnaed on I’age 10.) .1

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