South Bend News-Times, Volume 31, Number 309, South Bend, St. Joseph County, 29 October 1914 — Page 14

ID) Fan Ger anisia In Straggle for two 3 n I'm massesr il A Distinguished American Historian's Interpretation of the Plan to Extend German Influence from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf by Means of a Great Teutonic Confederation. ST. PfTERSfiURG

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By Dr. Hans Huldricksen, tho Eminent Swedish Sociologist. PAN-GERMANISM and Pan-Slavism are expressions which have become familiar as indicating in a general way what is really at tin; bottom of the causes for the present war. When tho war has been fought to a finish, which will bo the dominant power In Europe a federation of all tho Germans under tho Kaiser's rule or of all the Slavi brought under the sceptre of tho Czar7 Respecting Pan-Germanism, there aro soma points of quite remarkable scientific prophecy rnado by an American historian, who wrote that, "the Germans aim at nothing less than tho domination of Europo by tho Gennanlo race." At the time these words were written, or ven when first published, a year ago, such a war as Is raging throughout Europe was merely a theoretical probability. Diplomats and historians realized only that tho war dogs wero tagging at tho leash. Their breaking loose did not appear Imminent; no signs of a su.Ticlent pretext could bo discerned. Yet now, when virtually all the nations of Europe aro at each other's throats, tho statement above quoted will seem to most readers so obvious as to be trite. The argument which it introduces, however, is rich in material upon which the thinking reader may base expectations regarding the future of the nations now at war. It is contained In tho volume called "Pan-Germanism," and is published by Houghton Mifflin Company. Boston. Its author 13 Roland G. Usher, Ph. I)., professor of history at Washington University, St. Louis, and himself a historian of reputation. Professor Usher remarks that "one of the fundamental errors of which idealists and advocates of peaeo have been often ;;uilty" Is to treat the vast projects of Germany as an unreality. He considers the project already half accomplished. "It Is literally true," he declares, "that Germany has become Bismarckian. His heavy spirit has settled upon it. It wears liis scowl." "When LI Hung Chang first learned from Bismarck the magnitude of these plans he was skeptical. Put before his brief stay in Germany was over he wrote in his diary: 'From all that I have seen I am more than ever convinced that the Kaiser and Prince Bismarck meant what they said when they averred that the German Empire was destined to become a dominant factor In Europe.' "The vital factor In the modern International situation Is the aggression of Germany, her determination to expand her territories, to increase her wealth and power. Three centuries ago Prussia was a tiny state whose many parts were separated from each other by tho lands of her neighbors. Cut off from tho Bea on all sides, pushed hither by tho oncoming Russian, dragged thither by tho encroaching French, surrounded by tiny incompetent states, her rulers saw In aggression the only poasiblo method of preserving tho national lifo. To prevent her absorption by her neighbors she grow faster than they; sho must rob them instead of waiting for them to rob her. By war, tdio secured access to the Baltic; by war, sho obtained the coveted Silesia; by war, Bhe annexed much of Poland; by war, she spread her aegis over tho whole of northern Germany. "Tho humiliation of conquest sho knew under Napcleon, and sho has never forgotten nor ever will that no natural barriers stand between her and tho invader. Poverty-stricken, still recovering from tho ravages of the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, menaced on all sides by powerful enemies, her only safety, Bismarck saw, lay in aggression, her only chance of victory depended upon striking tho first blow. By this policy sho has built up ono of tho most powerful states in tho world and ono of the most populous and prosperous. But she has reached tho boundaries of Germany; Turther expansion means tho acquisition of what other nations now own." Of course, that means war, for every really available Ppot is held by England. Franco or Russia. "Germany can, therefore, obtain colonies suitable for her purposes only at the expense of these last. This is what is meant by tho oft-reiterated statements that England, Franco and Russia aro by their very existence Inimical to Germany's welfare; that, if sho is to cscapo ruin, she must fight them."

T! 7 By LUCIEN WOLF. WHAT a crash of Pacifist Illusions and diplomatic paradoxes! It is, of course, a small matter In the colossal sum of red ruin, but It 13 a themo on which the philosophers of another civilization will dwell In many an imposing and complacent tome. One wonders what they will say. Will they deploro he madness . our stneration, or will they no rather denounce our submergence of tho great ideals cf humanity in a universal and overmastering materialism? For bo it noted that u material reliance on tho lower passions Is the common denominator cf all these illusions and paradoxes. Tho theorists of Armed i'euco and Mr. Norman Angell are substantially at one. Pcaeo was to bo maintained by fear In the ono case and made permanent by cupidity in the other. Can we wonder that they have failed when we. note the brutal paganism of the underlying assumptions, and that la this raganism the strongest of all brute impulses i-i neither a reasont-d fear 3or tho common advantage? Rut all this is the concern of the preacher rather than the politican. and preaching low has th fatal demerit of being too late.

But she must fight them to such purpose that the existence of the English fleet will no longer be a menace to her commerce. Here is where the Pan-Germanic theory proves itself, as the author proceeds to demonstrate: "To secure a sharo of tho world's trade in some fashion which will not expose her to tho attacks of the English fleet, and which will create an empire less vulnerable in every way than she believes the British Empire to be. an overland route to tho East must be found. The Germans consider perfectly feasible the construction of a great confederation of states, including Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Balkan States, and Turkey, which would control a great band of territory stretching southeast from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. A railway from Constantinople to Bagdad would effectually tie the great trunk lines leading from the Rhine and Danube valleys, to Constantinople and the Persian Gulf, and so establish a shorter routo to India than that via Suez. "Egypt, Syria, Arabia, Persia, India herself, the mother of nations, would fall into German hands and be held safe from conqueot by this magnificent overland route to the East. "Pan-Germanism is, therefore, in the first place, a defensive movement for self-preservation, for escaping tho pressure of Franco and Russia, both bent on her destruction. It Is, in the second place, an offensive movement directed against England, its object, the conquest of the English possessions in the Mediterranean and in Asia. She expects thus to obtain an outlet for her surplus population and manufactures and to create an empire as little vulnerable politically, economically or strategically as any the world has yet seen." In discussing Germany's chances of welding together such a world power Professor Usher analyzes the Inherent weaknesses of her powerful rivals. For example, he quotes Lord Curzon's remark that "the English are only a bit of froth upon an unfathomable ocean." "England, Germany hates, disdains and despises. For France and Russia she possesses a wholesome respect mingled with fear, but not with love. France she considers a strong man who has run his race and is now beginning to reach senility; Russia she looks upon as an uncouth stripling not yet conscious of his strength, not yet skilful enough to use the strength of which he is conscious, and not yet intelligent enough to avoid being easily deceived." Prerequisites to the success of the Pan-Germanic scheme have been attended to in a great measuro. Germany has built a fleet large enough for defensive purposes. Her army is "large enough and efficient enough to stand as a barrier between her and her enemies." and her economic position is superior. And Germany could proceed to launch her great scheme is quite a startling bit of prophecy, in the light of recent happenings: "Tho seizure of Belgium and Holland will very likely be the first German movement when the actual accomplishment of Pan-Germanism seems fairly assured. Indeed, it has been so long held that an attack upon the autonomy of Pclgium or Holland would bo the equivalent of a declaration of war upon Europe that Germany will certainly xvuid any such outspoken manifestation of her intentions. "But Germany needs the strategic points which those two countries control. Tho Netherlands alone can furnish her a suitable naval base on tho Channel from which to contest its possession with the English or from which to intimidate tho English fleet Into permitting the German ships complete freedom of passage. So long as the German fleet must operate from a base of supplies so far removed as Kiel from the naval base of the Eagllsh in tho Thames, her position must be at the best anomalous. The occupation of Holland would make it a reality. From Holland, too, the German army From Belgium it can most easily reach Paris. With both countries In their hands an attack on either capitals would bo equally feasible, and the capture of either would be equally fatal to the Triple Entente. "Tho commercial significance of the position of Belgium and Holland is no less striking. They control the outlet of the Rhine, and therefore can prevent Germany's complete utilization of tho splendid natural higway draining so large and so rich a section of her land, a

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The politician is, at any rate, now enabled to see how the whole of his mechanism of Peace was based on a paradox, which, in the proportion that it was developed and applied, waa bound to fail and to become a danger to Itself. In a simple state of society the old tag, si vis vacem, para Icllum, was good enough, though even then it wa3 more often than not a selfseeking sham. But when it became universalized and systematized by the so-called "principle" of the Balance of Power, and tho still more specious and dangerous theory of the equilibrium of military alliances, its perils became virtually automatic and uncontrollable. That is tho misery of it all to-day. Peace has been crushed by Its own mechanism. The idea that any singlo Power has gone to war because it wished to, or because it thought it had anything to gain by it, is, Indeed, only one more of our illusion The truth Is that never were the destinies of Europe in tho hands or men moro sincerely vowed to peaceA few years ago there were perhaps men "who were disposed to play tricks with the delicate fabric of international concord. But to-day where are the fire-eaters? Germany's Chancellor lias been anathema to the Jingoes ever sinre he has been in office, and France has a Foreign Minister who actually voted against the Three Years' law. Copyright,

;.; . - '' T;-.. - . v-: - .. n ;.;.v:V 5" ; tv .- 1 s f . .... . ' A. " ; ' ...... r . .. - -, ,r r X ....... . - V-i:::,'-'-:r.., Bismarck, Still the Ruling Spirit of Warlike Germany, Writes Professor Usher, and the Man Who Crystallized the Ideal of Pan Germanism Into Definite Shape. hij:hwa so easily connected with her other rier systems by a network of canals. Plans are already being executed for a network of canals between the Rhine and the Westphalian coal fields, by means of which they expect tc supply the fieet at its new base and which promises largely to increase at once the facilities of transportation, and, above all, to reduce its cost for the every-day trade of the empire. The possession of these two countries, moreover, would at once give Germany the great colonial empire of which she dreams. Holland owns Java and the Celebes, admirably fitted for colonization, from whom for three renturies she lias drawn a princely revenue. She owns a fertile section of Guiana and rich islands in the West Indies, whoso strategic value would also be great. Belgium owns the vast Congo Free State, ono of the wealthiest of European dependencies. Here would bo an outlet for German manufactures of the first importance. If these colonies alone could bo retained, Germany could restore the autonomy jf those states in Europe, pay a heavy war indemnity and yet find tho war well worth while." In discussing tho probability of tho success of Pan-Germanism Professor Usher draws some significant conclusions. Evidence in favor of its feasibility is to be found in the fact "that the statesmen and diplomats of Europe, who know more about the situation than historians ever will, believe that its success is probable." The writer proceeds: "When, however, wo write of the success of Pan-Germanism, we mean something more complex than at first may appear. Pan-Germanism involves the creation of tho confederation of states which it intends to make tho controlling factor in international politics; it involves, in '.he next place, the ability of this confederation to get control of the world or at least to leteat England; It further assumes the feasibility of maintaining control and of preserving its own existence against internal as well as

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The machine has been too much for all of them, and the reason is that It never really was what it was supposed to be. Thero never lias been an equitable Balance of Power in Europe. Tin- rudimentary attempts in this direction which followed the collapse of what M. Sored calls the "august fiction" of the union uf Christendom, tinder tin? combined sovereignty of the Pope- and the Emperor, were really all more or less disguised races for predominance. They wero not conceived for the common good, but were all directed against some real or supposed design on the hegemony of Europe. As embodied in tho treaties of Westphalia, the Balance of Power was aimed at t he domination of Austria. In the treaties of Utrecht it was turned against the Franco of Louis XIV. In tho Congress of Vienna it reached the acme of topsy-turvydom by solemnly balancing a Quadruple Alliance against a France m tutcUc and calling it an Equilibrium. In ?very case the result was only a fresh accumulation of overpowering strength in one direction, and, of course, a fresh war. It is true that after these results were long post poned, but that was not because of the wisdom of the settlement in that year, but rather because the destruction of its elaborate mosaic was necessarily a work of time. Nevertheless, until the death of Prince Bismarck Europe wisely left the Balance of Power to take care of itself, and armaments did not become exl'Jll, by tae Mr Company. tiren liritain riiihts lie

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Map Showing tho Purpose of Pan-Germanism in Modifying tho Map of Europe. "A Great Confederation of States Including Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkan States and Turkey, Which Would Control a Great Band of Territory Stretching Southeast from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. A Railway from Constantinople to Bagdad Would Establish a Shorter Route to India Than That Via Juez"

:r, : "t external foes. The Germans are apparently ready to assume the ease of creating the confederation and devote their attention chiefly to the possibility of securing control of the world, should they succeed in developing their own offensive strength in the manner proposed. All the conditions advanced about England's weakness and the inefficiency of France and Russia bear upon tho second of these three propositions, and have little or nothing to do with the first and third. This is tho real weakness of Pan-Germanism. "Pan-Germanism, In fact. Is weakest at Its centre. Its success Is least probable at home. Without tho co-operation of Austria and Italy the scheme is impossible, and scarcely two generations ago the enmity between the three allies led them Into wrar with each other. Austria and Prussia have hated each other throughout history with a vigor scarcely surpassed by the hatred which Prussia bears France, indeed, when Bismarck was first in Vienna he doubted his own safety. The Italians have by no means lost their distrust of Austria, and it is really probable that the first successes trained by tho alliance may result In such accessions of strength to ono or more of the allies as to rouse tho Jealousies and apprehensions of tho others. The notion of putting into Austria's hands the whole eastern coast of tho Adriatic is extremely distasteful to Italy, and certainly would place Austria in a strong position, from which tho conquest of tho Po Valley would bo undoubtedly feasible. Thero aro vital differences, therefore, between the three contracting countries. "The great district known as the Balkans Is an absolutely essential factor of the Pan-German confederation, yet there is no part of all Europe which lacks moro conspicuously geographical, political and racial unity. The Balkans hate each other so cordially, the states which have attained political existence contain within their own borders so many elements of discard, that it might almost bo claimed that the only elements of unity are tho vigorous hatred that they all boar the Turk and tho Intense suspicion with which they all regard Austria and Russia. "Yet, through these defiles run the great roads connecting Europe and Asia, along which the trade of centuries has passed, and which must still continue to be tho channels of overland communication with tho East, The Balkans hold tho eastern side of tho Adriatic, tho western shore of tho Black Sea, tho 'whole lowTer course of tho Danube, and two sido3 of tho Aegean. If the Triple Alliance ever expects to obtain a position of importance in the Mediterranean it must possess them." Supposing that the Germans have decided to bring the matter to the issue of arms (of which there wero no real signs at the date of this publication, 1913), Professor Usher finds them confronted with these disadvantages: 0 M

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WE cessively burdensome for many years. Tho revival of the Balance of Power and tha application of the principle of Armed Peaco was, curiously enough, not dub to any new displacement of the so-called Equilibrium as it had existed after tho Franco-German War If, indeed, thero was a time when Europe waj under the hegemony of a single Power, it was assuredly durmg the period between the Peace of Frankfort and the death of Prince Bismarcl. After the Alliance signed with Austria in 1S79, Germany succeeded in attaching to herself, for the isolation of France, all the great Powers and some of the minor State3. Italy joined her as an ally. Russia became a sort of sleeping partner of the Triplico under tho famous Reinsurance Treaty, and Great Britain entered tho constellation by a Mediterranean agreement with Italy. Even France for a time, under M. Ferry and M. do Freycbet, became a resigned, if not happy, satellite of th6 Wilhem3trasse. The change which came in the nineties wa3 the result of opportunity, and not of unendurable domination. It arose from the quarrel which broke cut between Russia and Germany after Count Caprivi's denunciation of the Reinsurance Treaty, when it took the form of the Franco-Russian Alliance. This, however, only whetted the appetite of the Equilibrists, although nothing had happened to justify any fear on their part With two Powers against three, however, the balance was still obviously served.

"Their economic weapons, about which the Germans talk so glibly, the starving of England, the depriving of her factories of raw materials, the cutting-off of her supplies for the maintenance of a fieet, these depend ono and all upon the ability of the German navy to outmanoeuvre the English and get posse? sion of the Channel in such fashion that a pitched battlo would be necessary to dislodgo it, or upon its ability to defeat the English fleet in the first place in so decisive a manner that assistance could not come from the Mediterranean and from America in time to avert the catastrophe. It is perhaps well to remember la this connection that the Germans are not a nation of sailors, and that their navy has thus I'ar been used only for manoeuvres like those of tho King of Franco when he marched up the hill and then marched down again. "The German army is probably moro efficient than the fleet, but is very likely not a efficient as tho Germans think lt is. Military critics have declared it bound too tightly with red tape, filled with unintelligent officials, toe stiff and mechanical In its evolutions to give much of an account of itself in battle. Certainly, it cannot compare in point of sizo with the army Russia could put in the field, and competent judges have declared it far infTloi In quality to the French army. To bo sun none of theo armies has recently been under lire except the Russian army, whoso experience was perhaps not a desirable preparation for another war. The condition of the English army in England Is admitted on all sides tc he bad, though the actual deficiencies have nc doubt been exaggerated by the eager advo cates of universal conscription. "The really doubtful factor In the prepeni situation is Russia. She, far more than Eng land, holds the scale. She is likely to pain in tho long run, whichever side wins. Should Germany overthrow England and France ir Europe and take possession of the Mediterranean, Russia would certainly reach Indi.1 first. If she should Join Germany, the down fall of England and France would he assured and tho victors could divide tho world at theli leisure. But she could not join Germany with out renouncing her ambitions in tho Baltir without permitting the Germans to overrun that sea and throwing herself back upon Asiand making it tho centre of a new empire. "The likelihood of such a renunciation of her position in Europe Is exceedingly small. Th probability that Germany would believe In her KJ sincerity, if she offered thm an alliance o:y such a basis, is Infinitely smaller. Germany i jii exposed that the treachery of Russia woul . o fatal. As the situation looks at presen nothing .linrt of the breaking of the ailianc: ')twen England, France, the United State and Russia can permit the German scheme tc obtain anything more than a temporary blJ partial success."

uneven. It was redressed in 1304. when Gr'.al Britain was won and the Triple Entente waj made. Thus .vhat was r'0pularly supposed tc be a real Balaii.e of Power, guaranteeing t!..- p-oj of Europe by its perfect equipoise of thre-i great Powers against three others ot equai rank, was at last estaMi.-d. Nr.r was thii conception of its valu. a delu-!'n of the nob rnonrhr aione. It was torn. ally recpgr.ized a: Baltisrhport bv a joint statement of the Ts.r and Kaiser, published on th- r.rea !or. of their meeting th.-r in 1012. NV:; the p.s it wa a delusion. As the Tsar Alexander I. pointe i out to the Congress of Vienna, no Balance of Power eould be equitably expr. s-d in ternn cf States alone, and this- troni th.; beinnir. was the vice cf the New Equilibrium. Yx wealth, population, mill'ary potentiality Ir. bhort, all that makea for r-.i! national strength the rival combinations were ut no tinM equal. The result wag a c-' struggle fr.fuperiority, which kept the rnirKin cf difference so narrow that, in cases of rriMb. any merei y precautionary effort on the part cf one I'ow? or group of Powers was bound to becoiie cn? belli. This, in a few words, is the cans of the present war. The great mechanists cf O Peace has not only not preserved the peace, but it has made war more certain, rrore deadly, more ratastrophie. than the madness of an? despot or the criminal ambition o! any cclQueror could possibly have made it.

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