Democratic Sentinel, Volume 9, Number 16, Rensselaer, Jasper County, 15 May 1885 — RUSSIA AND INDIA. [ARTICLE+ILLUSTRATION]

RUSSIA AND INDIA.

Comprehensive Account of the Russian Advance in Central Asia, by Eugene Schuyler. England Under the Necessity of Insisting Upon a Delineation of the Afghan Boundary. A Map Showing the Seat of the Threat" ened War and the Contiguous Country. Mr. Eugene Schuyler, late United States Minister to Turkey—than whom no man in America, probably, is better posted in European politics—contributes to the Chicago Time * a valuable aud interesting paper upon the Anglo-Kussian dispute, the main portion of which we reproduce below. It will well repay perusal: At a moment when peace and war seem

tromblipp in the balano it is natural to inquire into the causes and reasons that have brought about the crisis. What is Russia’s object in gradually but surely apuroachinp India? What does she desire there or elsewhere? Why is England so alarmed at every step, and apparently fearful of the result? But to understand the course of events and to answer intelligibly to ourselvei questions like these we must sei arate the general causes of difficulty from the present dispute over the line of a frontier. The advance of Russia in Asia has been marked by many phases: First, the conquest of Siberia by the Cossacks in the sixteenth century and the gradual extens on'of Russian colonization to the coast of the Pacific, whole Asiatic tribes being made nominally Russian subjects without any particular intention on their part of fulfilling duties, but simply for the purpose of receiving the presents customary on such occasions. This continued through the whole of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Then, beginning about thirty years ago, a continued pushing forward of the Russian outposts on the southern frontier of Siberia into the steppes, the subjugation/ whether nominal or real, of various tribes of Kirghiz and Kalmucks, until these culminated in the conquest of Toorkistan and Tashkend by (fen. Tchernayeff, speedily followed bv the occupation of Samarcand. After tilts Bokhara was made a close ally; Khiva was subdued in 187 a; Khokand was annexed shortly afterward; and Kuldja has already been occupied in consequence of the Mussulmans’ movement against the Chinese. All this was done without much system and without orders from the Government at St. Petersburg. It was never possible to draw back the boundaries, but every fresh dispute with the natives led to an acquisition of territory and influence. The last phase was reached only after, and indeed in consequence of, the treaty of Berlin. At a time when war with England seemed imminent the Russians resolved to advance in a different direction between the Caspian and the Sea of Aral southward, where steps had already been taken to subjugate the wild Turcoman tribes, partly with the intention, now for the first time avowed or existing, of pushing as near India as possible. Up to that time, although a plan for the conquest of India had been presented to the Emperor Paul at the beginning of the century, and there had been at intervals much wild talk among officers of the army of the possibility of such a move, it had never been seriously considered; but it Was then felt that it was necessary to be in a position not only to annoy England in case of war, which then seemed so possible, but ultimately, whenever it became necessary to make another movement on Constantinople or to open the Bosphorus to the free passage of Russian vessels, so to threaten India and divert the attention of England that it would not be again possible for her to ruin the Russian plans. The belief in the possibility of interfering with English rule in India, had grown greatly in ten years, owing in large measure to the action ■of the English themselves. Every Russian movement had been so closelv scrutinized in England, so many questions had been put to the Russian Government as to their intentions, whether present or future, that the evident alarm manifested by the British Government increased the belief in their weak hold on India. The British Embassy at St. Petersburg gave much time to the ‘study of Asiatic affairs, and frequently succeeded in obtaining, by favor or by bribes, from subordinate officials' reports, maps and plans of the movements of troops on the frontier. As was natural,those frequent questions and protests naturally annoyed the Russian ■Government, although it was evident at the time that England was in no condition to oppose the Russian advance in any other way. it was impossible under the circumstances for Russia to consent to drawing an imaginary line through the steppes beyond which it would not pass so long as no English troops could advance, either to oppose them or to keep in order -the wild tribes on the other side. Matters, however, reached such a point in 1872, that the Russians, for the sake of peace, agreed to consider Afghanistan as beyond the sphere of their influence. Two questions, however, immediately •rose: First, as to whether the English could control the Afghans sufficiently to be responsible for any attacks they might make upon Russian proteges, and, secondly, what were the boundaries of Afghanistan., It was agrees, in the ■tain, that all places should be considered as belonging to Afghanistan which had been in tffes actual possession of either Dost Mohammed

or Shere AIL For the sake of convenience, however, the Russians consented to recognize as Afghan certain provinces which had not been in the effective possession of these two sovereigns, in order that the boundary line might be drawn m> the river Oxus or Amoo-Darya. This line terminated on the river at a place called Hodja Salah, and was to go from there westward to the Persian frontier, the exact line not being specified. Matters remained for nearly ten years in that condition. The English protested, it is true, against the subjugation of Khiva, althpugh Russian troops confined themselves to the right bank of the Oxus in their permanent occupation. They protested, also, against the occupation of Merv in 1884. Some even went so far as to advise sending money and ammunition to the Turcomans In order to enable them to oppose the Russians. The occupation of Merv and the neighboring provinces brought the Russians for the first time close to the Afghan frontier and to Herat, always considered the key to India. The English had at la<t given up their fears that Russia might advance through Kashgar .or the mountain passes of the Himalayas, and owing to their own defeats and bad fortune had become convinced that it would be difftult for the Russians to attack India by the way of Cabul; but Herat once occupied, the road would be easier, all successful Invasions of India having come from the Afghan frontier. Thelffussians, in reply to England’s questions, had already proposed a commission for the purpose of settling the boundaries of Afghanistan, which the English had refused, fearing lest by a icepting this they would impliedly agree to Russian occupation up to

the very line. After Mery was taken the Russians renewed their proposition, and this time it was accepted. The English, however, proposed that the boundary commission should consist of one Englishman, one Russian, and one Afghan. This Russia objected to on the ground that, according to their own arrangement with England, and especially by the treaty made between the Ameer of Afghani-tan and England after the late war, the Afghans were put under English protec ion; that while the English Commissioner could ask the Afghans for advice and counsel, just as the Russians could the .Turcomans, their subjects, the boundary must be drawn by the two nation ■< alone. Alter some discussion this was agreed to. Sir Peter Lumsden, an English officer well known in India, was appointed the Russian Commissioner, assisted by Mr. Condie Stephen, a young diplomatist who had won his spurs, first by acquiring thoroughly the English language, then by his successful management of the Consulate at Phtlippopolis, and, finally, by his leadership of several surveying and exploring parties* on the Persian frontier. They were accompanied by a large staff and an escort The Russians appointed as their Commissioner Gen. Zelevoi; but before the time appointed for the meeting the Russian Commissioner was taken ill at Tifiis. It was necessary, the Russians thought, for some agreement to be come to as to the region through which the boundary line should be drawn, and as to the principles which should govern the delineation. This it was better to arrange at home, and for that purpose Capt. Lessar, a French engineer officer in the Russian service, who had explored the whole region up to the very gates of Herat, and had recently been attached as diplomatic agent to the Governor General commanding the transcaspian region, was sent to London for the" purpose of hastening a decision by the English Government. There were various delays, caused more by the English than by the Russians, and, meanwhile, before the arrival of Lessar at London, or even the departure of Sir Peter Lumsden for the frontier, the Afghans, Incited by the English in India, had advanced and taken the small town of Penjdeh, over which they had had no actual rule for very many years, and which, therefore, did not fail within the conditions of the arrangement of 1872. As a protest against this, the Russians advanced thoir outposts far beyond where the English thought the frontier line should be drawn. Such was, fn brief, the state of affairs when the present controversy became still more embittered by the advance of Gen. Komaroff. That Russia should wish India for its own sake seems too absurd to be worth consideration, when we remember that the size of India is equal to three-quarters of that of Russia in Europe, that its population amounts to 253,000,000, that its debt, which would have to be assumed by Rnssia in case of annexation, is over $860,000,000, about one-third of that of Rnssia itself. Although its commerce amounts to a large sum—s26o,ooo,ooo of imports, $417,000,000 of exports—yet as most of this is with England it would probably continue in the same route; it could not at once be changed and go into the hands of Russia by the annihilation of British power in India, nor, indeed, could Russian factories supply the need of the Indian market. It is not the possession of India which the Russians desire, nor do they wish to make any actual attack upon English rule In India. They do wish, however, to be in a position to threaten India, whether by force of arms or bv intrigues, in case England should again object to any aim of Russian policy In the west. One of those aims must certainly be considered the opening of free commumcaiion from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. In this stage of civilization the world at large could sympathize with the free development of anv nation so long as it interferes with the rights of no other state, rather than with the policy of restriction. The opening of the Bosphoros and the Dardanelles should be merely a question between Rnssia and Turkey, in which foreign powers should have no actual interest except to desire the freedom of the seas and of the straits. But whether or not the Russians desire the conquest of India, or simply to gain a position from which to annoy the English, it Is the obvious duty of the British Government to decide upon a frontier which the Russians can not be allowed to overstep. Much as they might protest and question, it is obviously impossible for the English to insist upon a frontier line drawn through the steppe, which they have no possibility of defending, ana it Is for their interest, a* they wish no further barren possessions, to

Vestrict themselves to what thev really hold and to draw the frontier as near India as is safe, by which they can be nearer their own base of operations and the Russians as far as possible from theirs. It would seem that the English made a mistake in 1872 in insisting on the Oxus as the boundary between Afghanistan and the Russian protected or tributary states. The tribes and petty countries on the left bank of the Oxus. although at various times they had been subject to Afghanistan, had frequently been entirely independent, and were of the same Turkish race as the tribes living on the right bank. It was therefore always to be possible for Russia, in the event of war. when all things are allowable, to carry on intrigues with such people. After my return from Central Asia I had the honor several times of being asked my opinion on this subject by leading statesmen, and always held that the mountain barriers, where there were passes easily defensible, were far better for English'purposes than the river. I remember particularly insisting on this in several conversations with the Prince of Wales, whom I found particularly well informed on>the whole subject.

L.ord Dufferin.

Lord Dufferin is now attracting so much attention by reason of his negotiations on the part of England with the ruler of Afghanistan that a sketch of hjs life, together with a picture, will be interesting to our readers. The Earl of Dufferin is an

Irishman, and a great-grandson of the accomplished Richard Brinsley Sheridan. He is Frederick Temple Hamilton Blackwood, only son of the third Baron Dufferin, in the Irish peerage, and his mother (the Dowager Countess Gifford by her second marriage) was a clever lady authoress, eldest daughter of Mr. Thomas Sheridan, and heiress to the wit, talent and genial temper of her family, which her ’son has inherited in his turn. Lord Dufferin was bom at Florence in 1826, succeeded to the peerage on his, father’s death in 1841, was educated at Christ Church College, Oxford, but took no honors or

degree, leaving the university early; he entered public life as a Lord-in-Waiting in Lord J. Russell’s first administration. He was attached in 1855 to Lord J. Russell’S mission to Vienna, and was sent by Lord Palmerston as British Commissioner to Syria in 1860. He was Under Secretary of State for India from 1864 to 1866, and in the war office subsequently for a few months. Under Mr. Gladstone’s administration, which commenced in 1868, Lord Dufferin was Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster for four years and then assumed direction of the Government of Canada, a post which he held until 1878. He was subsequently Ambassador at St. Petersburg from 1879 to 1881, and was appointed to Constantinople in April, 1881. The following year he went on a special mission to Egypt.

, - Penjdeh anti Its Surroundings.

Penjdeh, where the first Russo-Afghan battle was, fought, is between sixty and seventy miles south of the old Russian, boundary, and about fifty miles north of the line now claimed by the Russians, but disputed by the Afghans and English. It is, in fact, very near the boundary of the disputed territory, which extends from north to south about 110 miles, and from east to west about 100 miles on its southern side, and 150 on its northern. It is not a large area, but is well watered by the Jlushk and Murghab Rivers, which unite a little north of Penjdeh, and by the Heri Bud, which bounds the territory on its western side, defining the Persian frontier. The valleys of these rivers are fruitful, but it is neither their agricultural wealth nor the mineral resources of the mountains that make the territory so desirable.

If the territory in dispute is conceded to Bussia, it brings her frontiers within a hundred miles of Herat, the acknowledged key to Afghanistan and the passes into India. While Penjdeh may not of itself be as Lord Dufferin says, worth fighting about its possession by Busßia would be a subject of solicitude to England, who, considering the steady advance of Russia southward from Khiva, must nece-ssari y mistrust the motive of this extension of the Russian frontier. There could be no especial object in acquiring Penjdeh and the teiritory above described, unless there existed the nlierior purpose of acquiring Herat, thus putting the Eassianß in a position to influence the policy of the Ameer, and ultimately absorb his entire dominions. The more this question is examined as to its political bearings in Afghanistan and Northern India, the more essential it appears for English supremacy and prestige in that quarter of the world to stop Russian aggression where it is, and if possible force its retreat hack to Khiva at least.

Uneasiness in India.

The New York Herald prints a conversation held in New York a few days ago, with Col. Matson, formerly the United

States Consul General in India, which is at this moment highly interesting, because the Colonel declares, as the result of his travel and study, that the country is ripe for revolt against British rule. He adds that the Russians have not been turning their faces toward India all these years without opening communication with the principal people of the Indian nation, who have given the assurance over and over again that they will assist at any scheme which i-s calculated to bring about an overthrow of the hated power now in existence. In fact, the Indian people are anxious for Russian success, having received assurances from the emissaries of the Czar that when Russia does come into possession of that country its people will be given a government practically their own, like that which exists in Canada. Englishmen sneer at the. possibility that Russia could ever conduct a government upon these liberal principles, but Colonel Matson says that in the case of Finland, with which he is i horoughly familiar, the people are more contented and prosperous under Russian control than they were when the country was attached to Sweden, and he adds that when he last went through Finland he was constantly assured that its people would not go back to their former government even if they had the chance. The Indian leaders are desirous of having some powerful nation engaged in the protection of the country for the reason that if the people were left to themselves the Mohammedams and Buddhists would instantly fall out and go to fighting among themselves. They have had quite enough of British supremacy, which has ruined the country and set its people back into a more profound condition of servitude than is known anywhere else in the semi-civilized world.

Sir Peter Lumsden.

Sir Peter Lumsden, whose biography is herewith presented, was bom in 1829, and entering the Bengal army in 1849 he has continued since then to see active service in

India. He has served on the Northwestern frontier in numerous expeditions, on a political commission in Afghanistan, in Central Indian operations in 1858, and in all the army grades upward. “I draw the long beau,” said the stumpy little woman with a six-foot sweetheart